Towards a common understanding of energy security? : An analysis of elite discourses in the UK, Poland and Germany by Wisniewski, Jaroslaw
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Towards a common understanding of energy security?











TOWARDS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF 
ENERGY SECURITY? AN ANALYSIS OF ELITE 





























Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
European Studies, 






The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
































During the first decade of the 21st century energy security has re-emerged as an issue of 
concern on the international agenda, attracting a wide range of analysis and increased 
attention in scholarly debates. This thesis seeks to contribute to the existing literature 
with its focus on the formulation of understandings of energy security on the level of 
national elite discourses of European Union (EU) Member States. This thesis analyses 
elite discourses on energy in three EU countries: Germany, Poland and the United 
Kingdom. It looks at energy as an increasingly salient theme of newspaper coverage for 
the period of 2000-2009. It addresses two research questions. Firstly is energy supply 
seen as highly threatened to an extent that extraordinary measures are necessary? 
Secondly, it assesses whether and to what extent discourses converge across the three 
selected countries. The overall aim of this thesis is to discuss whether a common 
understanding of energy security is emerging across EU Member States’ elite 
discourses. 
The thesis identifies politicisation, not securitisation, as having the biggest influence on 
national public discourses. It demonstrates signs of convergence between all three 
national discourses, showing its occurrence in terms of defining problems and to a 
lesser degree in terms of preferred solutions. The thesis identifies year 2006 as a 
particularly pivotal learning experience which triggered an increased scepticism towards 
Russia. It also shows that this scepticism was directed towards a personified villain, 
Vladimir Putin. These shifts were visible in other key events identified in the thesis, 
primarily in August 2008 (conflict in Georgia) and January 2009 (second gas spat 
between Kyiv and Moscow). There are instances suggesting that the perceptions of 
these problems are gradually (albeit slowly) translated into a common European 
challenge. A more unified EU foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia in the energy field 
however seems unlikely. The differences between discourses concerned various national 
factors causing energy insecurity in all three countries. Visible differences were also 
seen in terms of perceptions of the European Union. Ideas for pan-European solutions 
emerged only following salient crisis events, shifting perceptions but then returning to 
business as usual. Although all countries tend to increasingly perceive Russian energy 
policies as a common European problem, the thesis is pessimistic about the perspectives 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
The European Commission (EC), in its 2001 Green Paper on Energy Security in 
Europe, titled one section ‘Gulliver in chains, or energy supply in the European Union’, 
after Lemuel Gulliver, a fictional character from a Jonathan Swift novel (Bosse, 
Schmidt-Felzmann 2011: 479; Bosse 2011). Just as the good Gulliver tries to obtain his 
freedom from capture by Lilliputians, so does the EU need to free itself according to the 
paper from ‘from effective dependence on the Middle East (for oil) and Russia’ (for 
natural gas)’ by adopting a policy of geopolitical diversification (2001: 23). 
Interestingly enough, Emperors ruled Lilliputian kingdoms, which add an additional 
flavour to the metaphor; mainly due to the dubious democratic regimes in all of the 
countries mentioned. It also shows a direction in which many of the energy texts were 
due to be framed in the forthcoming decade, as stories of heroes and villains. This was 
reflected in the coverage of the events from the winter of 2005/2006, which involved 
one of the Lilliputians – Russia. Events referred to as a ‘dispute’, ‘disagreement’ or 
even a ‘conflict’ between Russia and Ukraine. 
It all began with Gazprom’s decision to cut supplies flowing from Russia to Ukraine on 
1 January 2006. ‘Europe needs a clear and more collective policy on the security of our 
energy supply. Now, powers reside at the national level and we need a Europe-wide 
approach’ indicated Andris Pielbags (Commissioner for Energy at the European 
Commission, 2004 – 2010). Events in early 2006 were an unexpected wake-up call, 
which, in the words of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External 
Relations, required energy security to be higher on the political agenda (Emerson 2006). 
Only a few months later, Radoslaw Sikorski, the then Minister of Defence of Poland, 
compared the Nord Stream pipeline planned by Germany and Russia to a Ribbentrop-
Molotov pact (EU Observer 2 May 2006). The storyline here therefore has its 
beginning; it also had its villain – Russian Federation (oftentimes substituted by its 
president, Vladimir Putin) and a clear victim – the EU Member States suffering gas 
cuts. The role of Ukraine is somehow murky, depending on various competing 
storylines, ranging from a victim (experiencing cuts), to a perpetrator (stealing gas 
destined for EU recipients). These storylines contributed to the New Cold War narrative 
(Ciuta 2010, Klinke 2011), best epitomised by Edward Lucas’s (the editor of The 
Economist) book under the same title, framing Russia as the bad character using various 
tools (in particular its own resources, oil and gas) to (in its most extreme approach) 
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‘blackmail’, ‘bribe’, ‘extort’, ‘bully’, and ‘divide and rule’ (Lucas 2008) EU Member 
States. This narrative had clear implications: confrontation, autarky and traditional 
(realist) alliance politics (Klinke 2011: 711).  
Yet barely a year later, Angela Merkel emphasised, that ‘we Europeans have witnessed 
Russia as a reliable energy supplier, even in times of the Cold War’ (quoted by Klinke 
2011: 712). In contrast to the previous story of Russia as a villain, this one promoted 
cooperation on the basis of mutual dependency: EU needs Russian resources; Russia 
needs EU’s markets (and investments). The best way therefore to assure energy security 
of both is through closer cooperation; disruptions in 2006 were merely a result of an 
economic disagreement, pragmatic cooperation should continue (Yafimava 2011). 
Direct pipeline links between Russia and the EU’s recipients, Nord Stream and South 
Stream, will eliminate unpredictable transit countries, thus assuring energy security. 
This narrative did not analyse (in contrast to the previous one) motivations behind 
actions of certain actors; it put forward market economy-based arguments of mutual 
interdependence between the supplier who in the words of Merkel, has always been 
reliable, and the consumer. This approach to the energy issue then here does not see any 
direct existential threats, only cooperation based on common interests. This more 
cooperative story rejected the New Cold Wars’ inclinations to see relations with Russia 
in terms of conflict.  
It would however be unwise to say that the energy discourse included only these two, 
sometimes very extreme, readings of events. They were, as this research will show, 
often interrelated with each other, with some authors contributing to both narratives, 
others staying somewhere in between the two. Apart from these two possible readings 
of events I also have to refer to the climate change (threat of global warming), nuclear 
energy (greatest threat to the environment vs. alternative to high carbon emitting oil or 
coal) and various geopolitical approaches, focusing on specific spatiotemporal settings 
(e.g. on the pipelines) to name a few arguments present in the energy discourses in the 
first decade of the 21st century. All of these, in various ways, refer to energy security. 
Energy security can therefore be interpreted differently. Ciuta (2010) in his analysis of 
the concept of energy security points out its totality – energy security is security of 
everything, everywhere and against everything (2010: 135). If this is the case, how 
could one understand the common EU energy security? The European Union is a union 
of 28 different states; diverse in terms of history, political systems, and cultural, 
religious, societal systems; different in terms of their geographical location. This creates 
hypothetically an unlimited set of indicators, codes and variables influencing 
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perception(s) of threat(s) of each Member State, not to mention the EU as a whole. 
Something that may be a security issue for some, may for others be an issue of 
economic relations. Kratochvil and Tichy (2013) point out that these perceptions can be 
asymmetric, as some countries can feel more dependent on different sources of energy 
than others, thus developing different perceptions. Energy security means something 
different to an energy exporter, than to an energy importer. For the former, the security 
aspect is to assure that the product will be sold; for the latter, that the product will be 
delivered. To further add to the complexity, a transit country will define its own energy 
security in a completely different manner (Godzimirski 2009: 174).  
‘Producers/exporters and consumers/importers of energy resources may operate by the 
same – volume, price and continuity – categories, but the parameters paid attention to 
are different; the two sides emphasize their interests and formulate their concerns 
differently’ (Shadrina 2010: 29).  
 
Yet some countries can still be exporters and transit (e.g. Russia), or both importers and 
transit (e.g. Ukraine or Poland), which further complicate their perceptions of energy 
security. They consequently attach different meanings to their past, current and future 
policy choices. 
Energy policy, just as energy security, can be understood in many different ways. It is a 
reflection of the energy priorities and energy culture, and energy situation of each 
country (Eurobarometer 2011: 3). The constant reference to energy security may even 
suggest a very direct relationship, where energy policy equal security policy. Could that 
really be the case? Whereas there is an increasingly growing scholarship analysing 
energy security through the security and foreign policy lenses, its analysis from the 
point of what is behind the general attitudes towards energy security (and energy policy 
and the relationship between both) is relatively limited, to mention the noticeable 
examples of Ciuta (2009, 2010) or Kratochvil and Tichy (2013). In this thesis I focus 
my attention on the discourses, on the ‘ideational framework’ (Kratochvil and Tichy 
2013: 2) through which meaning is attached to these policies. The empirical research 
conducted here is therefore discourse-immanent, meaning that it will only be based on 
the elite discourse presented in mainstream broadsheet daily newspapers. I do not 
however include references to elite interviews, e.g. with experts or politicians in the 
various countries. This is both a limitation as well as an advantage. On the one hand, by 
focusing on specific newspapers, my research gives only a partial account. It could 
however be an element of a wider empirical analysis of energy security or European 
energy policy. On the other hand it allows me to go in greater depth and to contribute to 
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the understanding of the prospects for more common energy policies, especially vis-à-
vis Russia.  
If energy security can have so diverse readings, how can the EU Member States ever 
agree on one (or few) common denominator(s) leading to a common EU energy 
security? Application of the term security should imply a threat. Is there one threat on 
which all Member States can agree? What is the relationship between energy policy and 
energy security, on the discursive level? This thesis will address two main questions 
encompassing all of these problems; it will look at the presence of security in national 
energy discourses; it will investigate whether perceptions of key actors (EU and Russia) 
were converging. Investigation of these three questions will contribute to our 
understanding of how energy security is addressed in EU Member States and to what 
extent (and in which contexts) cooperation (and a common EU energy security) may be 
acceptable according to the public energy discourses. The thesis will also contribute to 
the existing literature of Europeanisation of publicised discourses, by qualitatively and 
quantitatively analysing the coverage of energy in six different elite newspapers from 
three different EU Member States. Eventually, it will contribute to Ciuta’s (2010) 
question ‘in what sense is energy a security issue?’ by providing an analysis of the 
presence of security in the elite energy discourse of three different EU Member States 
and arguing that there was no securitisation of energy on the level of elite discourses in 
all three analysed case studies.  
My research is based on two research-guiding questions and indicators through which I 
aim to answer them (Table 1).  
Research-guiding question Indicators 
I. Is energy supply seen as highly 
threatened to an extent that 
extraordinary measures are 
necessary? 
-­‐ Existential threats 
-­‐ Extraordinary measures 
-­‐ Presence of the security language 
-­‐ Discursive frames 
II. Whether and to what extent 
discourses converge across the 
three selected countries. 
-­‐ Discursive events 
-­‐ Tone of the coverage of Russian 
policies in the energy sphere 
-­‐ Benefits and disadvantages frames 
of the coverage of the EU in the 
energy sphere 
Table 1. Research-guiding questions and indicators 
 
The goal of this thesis is to consider as to what extent is energy policy approached as a 
vehicle for enhancing security in national discourses (I)? To what extent is energy 
policy channeling security? What are the narratives? Are any of them dominant? How 
are they constructed? How is the discourse changing in terms of the topics it covers? 
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And ultimately, what is security ‘doing there’? Assuming that each country does have 
its own set of indicators defining energy securities, and knowing that, on the policy 
level, EU energy security has been gaining prominence (and thus led to common 
initiatives) a question arises whether perceptions of threats between various Member 
States were in fact converging? Can common EU energy security initiatives and policies 
be explained by the fact that similar perceptions concerning energy were being 
constructed above national borders? This leads me to the second question of how do 
discourses converge (if at all) across three selected countries? (II). I will observe 
convergence in two main dimensions – in terms of the problems defined and solutions 
offered. The existing literature on energy in Europe (discussed in the latter part of this 
Chapter and also in Chapter 2) identifies Russia and the European Union as two main 
actors in the analyses of energy policies of various European countries. Both, or to be 
more specific, perceptions of them, are important for the discussion about convergence. 
My research shows that the process of convergence has been observed primarily during 
the January 2006 energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine; with Russian policies 
identified as threats, and the EU as a helpful vehicle through which these threats can be 
mitigated. I have set the end point at the moment when the Treaty of Lisbon enters into 
force; Treaty which included new provisions related to energy in general (and energy 
security in particular) including the energy solidarity clause – Article 222. Energy 
solidarity has initially appeared as one of the demands during (and after) the 2006 
Russian – Ukrainian energy crisis, materialising as an element of the Treaty of Lisbon; 
and becoming one of the tools through which the perception of the ‘helpful EU vehicle’ 
should mitigate threats identified in the winter of 2005-2006. I will look at convergence 
over time; focusing on the perceptions of Russian and EU policies/statements/initiatives 
in the energy sphere.  
 
Policies already converging 
Why would one expect energy discourses to converge? The reason arguably is that 
energy policies of EU Member States have already showed signs of convergence. 
Academics and practitioners agree that EU energy policy is a sector, which experienced 
significant political changes in the first decade of the 21st century. The first ten years 
brought a number of initiatives: ambition to complete the internal European electricity 
and gas market; a more sustainable, efficient and diverse energy mix; an integrated 
approach to tackling climate change; a strategic European energy technology plan; and 
finally a coherent external energy policy. All of these were the priority areas recognised 
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by the EC in its green paper A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy from March 2006.  
The Treaty of Lisbon specifies that energy policy competencies should be shared 
between the Member States and the EU, which constitutes that states are ceding their 
full control over energy security, liberalisation of internal markets, energy 
interconnectors, etc. (Kratochvil and Tichy 2013: 2). A particular example is the call for 
energy solidarity, strongly promoted by Poland and the Baltic States and expressed in 
the Treaty’s Article 100 (McGowan 2011:501). It establishes measures that will be 
undertaken in the case of a disruption of delivery, where: 
‘Without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the Treaties, the Council, on 
a proposal from the Commission, may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Member 
States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if severe 
difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy.’ 
 
There were observable changes on the policy level; energy appeared in the EU Treaty 
for the first time. The transfer of authority over energy from Member States to Brussels 
is defined (naming four institutions: the EC, the European Parliament, the High 
Representative and the rotating Council presidency) but ‘the combined politico-
technical expertise and the weight of the institutional quadrangle are required to ‘play in 
tune’” (Braun 2011:4, 8) for the policies to be effective. There is the potential for 
transfer of powers from the Member States to the EU institutions, which has not (yet) 
been fully exercised. It can be argued that integration is a long-term process, and more 
time will be needed for it to become a reality. Events such as energy crises (the 
aforenamed 2006 crisis, similar events in 2007, and especially in 2009) as well as the 
Treaty have arguably (according to Kratochvil and Tichy 2013: 2) contributed to the 
strengthening of common energy policy. 
In the majority of analyses over the EU energy policies, EU energy security focuses on 
the analyses of policies; of interplays between the EU institutions (Commission, 
Parliament) and national authorities; of interactions between national interests of the EU 
Member States; or as concluded by Kratochvil and Tichy (2013: 2), on the ‘the material 
conditions of the mutual relations and the institutional structures that underpin them’. 
All of them provide useful tools allowing one to understand how national policies 
influence the European Commission and vice versa and the nature of energy 
cooperation between the EU and external energy actors (primarily Russia). They also 
help to identify the dominant narratives of the energy discourse. In the next section of 




The State of the Art and contribution of this thesis 
The existing literature contributes to the energy discourses in various ways. Authors 
writing in a realist tradition such as Michael Klare, one of the leading figures in 
contemporary literature on energy, frame the issue as one of rivalry over resources. He 
splits the present-day international energy order into two groups of nations: energy – 
surplus, and energy – deficits countries (Klare 2008: 14). References to statistical 
sources are particularly important in providing a material basis for his (and other 
realists’) conclusions and recommendations, as a reflection of the reality. In 1990, 
almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global energy 
consumption of Western Europe stood at 20%, right behind the world leader, the United 
States, using 24% of energy, with China far behind at 8%. In the 2009 BP Statistical 
Review of primary energy consumption (that is oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear, and hydro 
power) the United States was still a leader, at 20%, while China jumped to second place 
with 17.7%. The European Union was ranked third, with over 15% of global energy 
consumption. Klare identifies this as a highly competitive system of energy-hungry 
actors. In Klare’s understanding, energy security is about having access to resources or 
not having them at all. He identifies the system in terms of a zero sum game: those who 
will not be able to secure access to energy will lose, as times of ‘easy’ resources are 
close to an end, and the era of ‘difficult’ ones (i.e. situated under the Arctic pole, 
difficult to extract without sophisticated technology, etc.) becomes imminent. The 
realist response to the EU energy security is therefore – security from not having access 
to oil and gas, and as energy is seen as the main factor influencing development, limited 
access means slower development which in the end means being subjected to one of the 
new ‘hegemons’ – China or India; with the referent objects of such security being 
nation states. He sees Europe in terms of Brzezinski’s (1997) grand chessboard, where 
geopolitics is shaping the behaviour of great powers, played by them in Eurasia and the 
Middle East (Klare 2004: 148). Klare however fails to clearly explain whether he sees 
the European Union as a unitary actor, or as a group of countries (certain paragraphs 
refer to French, German or Italian energy companies, whilst in others they are labelled 
as European/European Union companies), subscribing to Mearsheimers’ conclusion of 
the EU being a group of nationalist countries fighting with each other to dominate the 
continent, as it was in the nineteenth and twentieth century’s (2001). If EU Member 
States cooperate in terms of energy, it would be only as a result of balancing against the 
new ‘hegemons’ – China and India. Overall, the focus is put on confrontation.  
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Titles of the books provide vivid examples of how the line of thinking was framed. 
Michael Klare (author of books with such suggestive titles as Rising Powers, Shrinking 
Planet: How Scarce Energy is Creating a New World Order; Resource Wars; Blood for 
Oil) is but one of the authors from the Crisis Group, joined by Paul Roberts (The end of 
oil: The Decline of the Petroleum Economy and the Rise of the New Energy Order), D 
Goodstein (Out of Gas: The End of Age of Oil), Duncan Clarke (Empires of Oil: 
Corporate Oil Barbarian Worlds), Jeremy Leggett (Half Gone: Oil, Gas, Hot Air and 
the Global Energy Crisis), Richard Heinberg (Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of 
Industrial Societies), among others. Titles of the books were setting the tones for the 
narrative they covered; narrative seeing energy as a field of growing global rivalry. It 
sponsors linguistic formations such as ‘resource wars’, ‘the end of oil’, ‘peak oil’, ‘out 
of gas’, ‘corporate oil barbarians’, etc. to maintain the perception of the on-going crisis 
and forthcoming catastrophes, that may lead to an ‘energy clash’ (‘clashes’) following 
the logic of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of civilisations (1996), one of the dominant 
texts on the relationship between the West and the Islamic worlds after 9/11. Henceforth 
in this thesis I will be referring to this group of authors and their texts as representatives 
of the Crisis Group. 
The end of what can be labelled as ‘easy energy’, with resources getting increasingly 
difficult to extract (i.e. offshore oil and gas fields), or controlled by undemocratic 
regimes from Central Asia or the Middle East, is facilitating the rivalry. The issue 
underlined here is energy scarcity, and the concern being raised is that this scarcity will 
lead to future conflicts – not only regional, but possibly global (with the growing 
competition between oil hungry giants – the United States and China). This approach 
focuses on the aftermath of the second war in Iraq and oil geopolitics (centred in the 
triangle of Central Asia – Middle East – Africa). It is this narrative of competition and 
conflict where the aforementioned New Cold War storyline contributes; which makes 
an explanation of its principles important for this particular study, just as the realist, 
conflict-based narration was omnipresent throughout the analysed decade, in the 
newspaper coverage. Crisis Group provides the most extreme examples of existential 
threats in the energy sector, focused on violence (expressed through potential wars and 
other conflicts). In my research I will be referring to this construction developed by the 
Crisis Group as to a discursive example of an ‘existential threat’ within the energy 
discourse. My research has shown it to be the most ‘radical’ manifestation of ‘threat 
perception’ within the existent literature on energy issues.  
17	  
	  
Kropatcheva (2011) follows this realist approach in their analyses of energy sectors in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Kropatcheva looks at the geopolitical energy competition 
between Russia, EU and Ukraine in what she labels as ‘complex geopolitical and geo-
economic games’ (2011: 553-570).  
Other notable works on the linkage between energy and (classic) geopolitics include 
Mitchell, Grubb, Beck (1996), Anderson (2000), Bloomfield (2002), Dekmeijan and 
Simonian (2003), Barnes and Jaffe (2006), Marketos (2009). These authors however 
tend to take the link between energy security and geopolitics (or geography) as ‘a 
natural fact’ (Bosse, Schmidt-Felzmann 2011: 481). A common feature of this 
scholarship is the focus on the state. 
The basis of the New Institutionalist scholarship centres on the role of institutions in 
international relations. Following Douglass North, institutions are ‘the rules of the game 
in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction’ (North, 1990: 3). These are both norms and practices, but within certain 
legal frameworks. In the case of energy security, the New Institutionalist approach 
centres on the functioning of key energy institutions – the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the 
Kyoto Protocol and what can be generally labelled as EU legislation. These include 
analyses of legal aspects of energy security, such as external legal relations of the EU 
with major oil and gas supplying countries (Haghighi 2008a); efficiency of the current 
existing mechanisms (e.g. Energy Charter in Konoplyanik 2006; standard of double 
pricing and other energy subsidies in Haghighi (2008b); applicability of ECT for Gulf 
Cooperation Countries in Haghighi 2005; or analyses of the global energy governance 
in Mommer 2000; Doern and Gattinger 2003; Patterson 2005; Stokke and Honneland 
2006; Muller-Kraenner 2008; Schreurs, Selin and Van Deveer 2009; Goldthau and 
White 2010; Lesage, Van de Graafand and Westphal 2010. New Institutionalist theories 
apply the term ‘legalisation’, understanding it as a need for a state to legitimise its 
political actions through legal procedures, underlying the rule of law and transparency 
and promotion of global market mechanisms. The EU is of particular interest for the 
Institutionalist analysis, as it is establishing energy governance mechanisms through 
legal norms and practices focusing on internal EU energy markets, but having 
implications for external policies (i.e. EU’s insistence on Russia opening its energy 
sector for foreign investment as a prerequisite of the new Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA), or its promotion of the Energy Charter Treaty). This narrative 
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focuses on the material aspects of energy security, on various legal and economic 
variables. 
Energy security has also been addressed from the perspective of a mixed constructivist 
and critical geopolitics approach. Bosse (2011) traces how and why various geopolitical 
visions of European energy security are being constructed. She analyses the proposals 
of the European Commission (in the external aspect) as a ‘discursive policy process of 
geopolitical writing’ (2011: 512), where the EU is the core, surrounded by a peripheral 
network of countries playing the roles of producers, suppliers and transmitters. The 
EC’s approach towards these countries is seen as a mixture of colonialism (towards 
Moldova and Ukraine), mutual interest (towards Belarus), and network/partnership 
(towards Mediterranean countries and Russia). McGowan (2011) analyses various 
geopolitical visions of European energy security over time. He studies disparities in 
responses of the European Community/European Union to the 1970s and 2000s energy 
crises, and looks at how the EU expanded its competences to take action about energy 
insecurity through politicisation/securitisation of energy. McGowan concludes that 
although the saliency of energy was increased both in the 1970s as well as in 2000s, 
energy was in fact politicised, not securitised, as there was neither an existential threat 
nor extraordinary measures - two key components of the Securitization Theory. There 
are also authors who transverse between the realist and constructivist approaches. Casier 
(2011a) looks at the politicisation of the energy discourse over the first decade of the 
21st century. He highlights how energy dependence was gradually becoming a security 
issue, ‘attributing growing energy concerns to shifting identities and perceptions in the 
EU-Russia relations’ (2011a: 536). Though, as he admits (2011b) the leverage of Russia 
over the EU is highly overrated. Schmidt-Felzmann (2011) looks at the logic of energy 
solidarity vs. pursuit of national interests of the EU Member States concluding that the 
former is primarily a cover for the latter.  
This is where my research primarily contributes with the emphasis put on the national 
contexts in terms of development of understandings of energy security.  
A noteworthy number of publications analyse energy security from the regional 
perspective, focusing on area studies. These present a group of more descriptive, rather 
than analytical positions. Russian policies (both domestic and foreign) are often 
interpreted through the prism of its resource management. One trend (represented by, 
among others; Stulberg 2007; Goldman 2008; Sixsmith 2010 but also Lucas 2008) 
focuses on the lack of democratic legitimacy of the Russian governing elite, and their 
instrumental use of energy resources in both internal (consolidation of power) and 
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external (control over the ‘near neighbourhood’, that is the former USSR) policies. 
They interpret energy resources as a means of rebuilding Russia’s superpower status. 
Their coverage is also visibly opinionated, where Russia is depicted as a villain, using 
energy for its ‘dark’ purposes. 
Other scholars (e.g. Jonathan Stern and Katja Jafimava of the Oxford Institute of Energy 
Studies) tend to present Russian energy policies in a more positive light, underlining the 
pragmatic aspects of energy cooperation with Russia. Perovic, Orttung and Wenger 
(2010) examine Russia's new assertiveness and the role of energy as a key factor in 
shaping the country's behaviour in international relations, and in building political and 
economic power domestically, since the 1990s. Apart from the overall analysis of 
different directions of development of Russian external energy policies (towards 
Europe, US, and Asia) they also exemplify the modifications and stability of the 
concept of energy security. Others contributing to the energy security narrative of 
Russia include Hill 2002; Spanjer 2007; Rutland 2008. Some (Locatelli 2010) address 
the stakes concerned with the imports of gas from Russia and Central Asia for the EU. 
Russia, in their coverage, is not (usually) seen through an opinionated lens, but when it 
is, it shows a slightly negative tone.     
A number of scholars focus on EU energy security itself. Some of them (Youngs 2009) 
concentrate on energy security as a challenge for EU foreign policy, arguing for its 
reformulation. Youngs (2009) contends that ‘some relatively fundamental aspects of 
energy strategy are still under design; that policies are being driven by internal and 
external dynamics that do not always push in the same direction’ (2009: 181). Youngs 
asserts that the EU remains uncertain about its own most valuable source of 
international influence (whether it is the promise of EU membership, or EU legislation, 
or EU economic power). There are doubts among some actors whether energy should at 
all be coordinated at the EU level; that for some the EU may be ‘too big’ to pursue 
national aims and ‘too small’ for multilateral management; and that the EU finds it 
difficult to balance between over- and under-reacting to new energy challenges (2009: 
170-181). Overall, in the view of the existing literature, EU Energy Security poses more 
questions and doubts than answers and actual policies. 
Other scholars (Belyi 2003; Bregadze 2003; Aalto 2007, Aalto and Westphal 2007; 
Finon and Locatelli 2008; Gullner 2008; Heinrich 2008; Westphal 2008; Meulen 2009; 
Casier 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Handl and Ehler 2011) centre on EU-Russia relations, 
analysing the history, present and future scenarios for the energy cooperation between 
Brussels and Moscow. The common conclusion is that although the partnership is not 
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perfect, both parties have in fact complementary goals – the EU needs to import both oil 
and gas due to the lack of internal resources; Russia needs to export both oil and gas, as 
it constitutes a major part of its economy. These studies focus mainly on the relationship 
between the EU institutions and Russia.  
Matlary (1997) analyses the development of energy policy in the EU, with the focus on 
years 1985 - 1995 and the role of four Member States - Germany, France, Italy, and the 
UK as well as their dealings with the European Commission. She also explores the part 
of interest groups as well as other EU actors. The book addresses the historical context 
of the European Energy Charter, EU policy towards the East, and the relationship 
between energy and the environment. This was the first comprehensive academic 
analysis of the EU energy policy. Other authors of similar publications focused on 
particular topics, in particular on the promotion of the idea of a European Energy 
Community (Andoura, Hancher and van Der Voude 2010).  
There is a trend towards focusing on regional implications of Russian energy policy, for 
example the Baltic’s (Spruds and Rostoks 2008), Poland (Chalupiec 2009), or China 
(Bo 2008). Here, scholars narrow their research to multidimensional analysis of the 
changing energy environment for the analysed countries and/or regions. 
One notable publication (Kratochvil and Tichy 2013) deals with the EU and Russian 
discourses on energy relations. Examining various documents and speeches by the EU 
leaders and institutions as well as Russian policy-makers, the paper examines the 
dominant interpretations of EU-Russian energy relations. The study has two conclusions 
particularly relevant for my research. Firstly, although both sides share the same basic 
notions (integration, liberalisation, diversification), both interpret them differently. 
Secondly, the discourse of integration is dominant in both cases (the EU and Russia), 
which, in the opinion of authors, ‘shows that the claims about the alleged securitisation 
of EU-Russian energy relations are clearly exaggerated’ (2013: 1). The study, due to its 
innovative character and particular relevance to my thesis, is further analysed in the 
following chapter, where I establish my methodology. It also provides a voice arguing 
the inadequacy of Securitization Theory for the analysis of energy, adding to 
McGowan’s (2011) conclusions. 
The literature on the European Union and energy security focuses mainly on two 
material features – the aspect of the EU legislation and its influence and on the external 
security of energy supplies of the EU. Consequently, it sees two main elements of 
energy security of the European Union – markets and diversification. In terms of 
markets, authors see physical and legal infrastructure and transparency as key elements 
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of a functioning global energy market (Goldthau and White 2010) not only within the 
EU (en route to a single common market) but also through the inclusion of its nearest 
neighbourhood into an area of common energy regulation. In terms of diversification, 
the existing literature explores the existing state and possibilities of diversification of 
energy sources in terms of their geographical origins and transit routes; thus the focus of 
the literature on the EU – Russia energy relationship (or specific Member States – 
Russia relationships) and on the pipelines. Diversification therefore is all about Gulliver 
trying to free himself from the Lilliputians.  
The analysis of the existing literature allowed me to identify the potential gap which my 
research could explore, especially in terms of the lack of an in-depth analysis to the 
formulation of energy security understandings on the domestic level. It also allowed me 
to create my framework of analysis, in particular the terms of the categories of my 
codebook; by identifying issues, actors, frames, and events, which initiated debates 
(discursive events), how to understand what existential threats may mean in the energy 
field. Also, the existing scholarship on energy policy and energy security underlines the 
importance of two agents: the Russian Federation (policymakers, representatives of the 
authorities) and the EU (representatives of the EU institutions). Perceptions of both are 
vital for any analysis of energy in Europe. I will explore these issues below, as well as 
in the following chapter. 
 
Contribution 
The primary contribution of this thesis is to provide new knowledge and new insight as 
to how energy security is being conceptualised within public discourses. This 
framework allows to assess not only policy dynamics, but also as to what is ‘behind’ 
them and visible through the analysis of discourses – frames, discursive events, 
perceptions of key political actors (Russian authorities and business; EU institutions), 
similar topics or historical connotations and finally dominant narrative(s). This 
framework should be applicable to the analysis of national discourses of all EU Member 
States, as it allows enough flexibility to adapt to particular national contexts, still 
pertaining to the key indicators of securitisation (threats and responses to them) as well 
as European integration (perceived benefits vs. perceived disadvantages of the EU). I 
argue therefore that this particular model could be applied to the analysis of energy 
discourses of any other EU Member State. The thesis also contributes to the study of 
Kratochvil and Tichy (2013), an innovative approach of analysing energy relations 
through discourses. I do this by focusing on national discourses rather than on the 
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discourse produced by the political representatives of the EU institutions as well as 
input to what both authors label as ideational framework of energy relations. 
Furthermore, this thesis seeks to highlight the importance of energy security for the 
process of European integration. I will argue that energy was one of the few sectors 
where integration (in terms of policies) has actually continued, despite the enlargement 
fatigue (visible in particular after the 2004 enlargement). In particular it seeks to 
contribute to the on-going debate about the Europeanisation of publicised discourse as a 
feature strengthening governance in the European Union, by exploring national public 
debates about issues of key importance for the European integration project (also visible 
e.g. in della Porta and Caiani 2006; Stiff et al. 2007). I also draw from the literature on 
Europeanisation of public spheres (e.g. Risse 2010). Drawing from all of these 
approaches (Europeanisation, European integration) is helpful in the contribution to the 
ebate about prospects for a common approach towards EU energy policy or policy 
towards Russia. Seeing the EU as a potential ‘solution’ is in particular relevant to the 
theories of European integration. 
Drawing from a range of theoretical concepts, in particular putting forward the 
constructivist theoretical framework (with the main point of reference being the 
Buzan/Waever/de Wilde approach), the thesis examines selected EU Member State case 
studies to illustrate the shifts in their energy discourses, in particular how the 
perception(s) of threat(s) related to energy were being constructed from the beginning of 
2000s on the level of national discourses in the analysed case studies of Germany, 
Poland and the United Kingdom, and how these perceptions were undergoing change. I 
look at how the language of security started to enter the energy discourse, previously 
dominated by economic and/or environmental arguments, and whether it led to us–
versus–them logic and a geopolitical logic that would suggest a growing divergence of 
discourses, or rather was common, cooperation or integration the main story line. This 
thesis argues that although individual interpretations of energy security were different in 
each analysed country, the debates were in fact heading towards similar problem 
recognition and the promotion of cooperation. The thesis therefore also contributes to 
the existing literature on the Securitization Theory. 
The traditional approach of Securitization Theory, as developed by the Copenhagen 
School, sees securitisation as a problematic process leading to conflict, ‘since we are 
interested in when and how something is established by whom as a security threat’ 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 176). It was de-securitisation, de-labelling sectors or objects from 
the security discourse that led to cooperation. I argue that it is the growing level of the 
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presence of security in the energy sector that increases the level of synchronisation of 
perceptions of reasons for insecurity, integrating rather than confronting them. The 
question remains whether the increased presence of security is in fact a result of 
securitisation, or simply the politicisation of the energy discourse (due to the vagueness 
of existential threats and extraordinary measures). Examples such as the development of 
action plans and strategies as a consequence of the fear of terrorism, or fear of 
competition from Japan in the 1980s as a facilitator in the single European act – also 
confirm the theory of fear as a catalyst for cooperation. Results of my analysis 
contribute to these findings – the perception of threat of Russian actions in the energy 
sphere became a catalyst not only of increasingly similar perceptions of threats but also 
for cooperation, with EU seen as a helpful vehicle for that. Although these perceptions 
of threats were becoming similar, they did not converge in the long term (only episodic 
convergence was identified), they were however observably changing. The analysis of 
the tone of the coverage of Russian policies in the energy sphere shows a comparatively 
more negative coverage in Poland in comparison to the UK and to Germany. 
Nevertheless the way in which events were presented was increasingly similar. 
Securitization Theory was calling for the identification of existential threats which 
would require extraordinary measures. The question is – did energy really provide such 
existential threats and did it lead to extraordinary measures? Consequently, a) are 
extraordinary measures illegitimate because they undermine particular civil or 
democratic rights or b) are they extraordinary because of the scale of change or the 
investments in resources – i.e. they might be disproportionate to the size of the problem. 
Would giving the EU stronger competences for energy policy amount to an 
extraordinary measure? Extraordinary measures, as argued by the Copenhagen School, 
are based on the assessment of the existential threats. I base my assessment of the 
perception of existential threats on the realist (and neo-realist) based literature produced 
by the Crisis Group; as situations of violent conflicts for resources; not having access to 
energy resources (mainly oil and gas) or eventually gas and oil peaks. In the case of the 
energy sector the assessment of existential threats makes extraordinary measures fit to 
the second question – as extraordinary because of the scale of change. I also argue 
against the assumption that giving EU stronger competencies would be an extraordinary 
measure. To the contrary, I argue that this would be a consequence of an on-going 
integration process. 
Some of the authors (McGowan 2011; Kratochvil and Tichy 2013) have argued that 
energy has not been securitised. My research findindings on balance confirm this line of 
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argument. Still, the research has identified several instances which could confirm signs 
of securitisation of the discourse: through the invocation of fortresses. These fortresses, 
visible in the texts in particular from January 2006 onwards, were built in order to 
protect wider Europe (as defined in Poland and Germany, with marginal presence in the 
UK) from the threat posed by energy policies of Russia and by a personalised villain, 
Vladimir Putin. Within these energy fortresses, cooperation was to be determined by 
security-based factors. They were constructed on a Cold War based rhetoric and 
interpretations, epitomised in the New Cold War narrative. 
In the thesis I argue, following Campbell (1992) that in the case of energy in Europe, 
common threats do in fact have integrative potential. I also follow Booth’s (2007) 
positive understanding of security, showing that security’s influence on discourses can 
also lead to integrative processes, such as (perhaps future) development of a common 
European energy security policy. 
Security also increased the visibility and importance of energy, mainly as a consequence 
of increased saliency, which can be seen, for example, through the analysis of 
frequencies of texts devoted to energy in the overall newspaper coverage. The presence 
of security was therefore facilitating the increasing importance of energy in all national 
elite discourses thus making security a more important theme in the energy coverage by 
the quality newspapers. One has to however be very careful when it comes to defining 
what security is, as ‘security always has meaning in every context – although this may 
not be the meaning ascribed by a particular security theory’ (Ciuta 2011: 139).  
The most adequate conclusion might be that energy was on the borderline between 
politicisation and securitisation. Various narratives have attempted to identify 
existential threats (in particular the Crisis Group or in the European context the Cold 
War narrative seeing Russian external energy policies as such threats), suggesting 
extraordinary measures (such as ‘energy NATO’ strongly promoted by Poland and the 
Baltic States). They however remained in the ideational sphere, none of them have 
materialised. This politicisation/securitisation did however raise the saliency of energy 
and security challenges and it did lead to a dominant line of argumentation promoting 
cooperation within the EU.  
Although collective responses to the events (in particular to the 2006 energy crisis) were 
promoted across all three countries, I did not observe any ‘move’ which could have 
been considered ‘securitising’. One of the conclusions of the Poland case study is that 
the response widely advocated after the 2006 crisis, the establishment of a new security-
based organisation (or Musketeer’s Pact) could be seen as an extraordinary measure or a 
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securitising move. It however has never materialised, and was shortly after dropped by 
its authors. In all other instances the results of the analysis have shown a high level of 
politicisation, which never fell outside of the frames of conventional politics.   
Finally, the thesis contributes to the existing literature on the Russia – European Union 
relations. As already mentioned, it explores the changing perceptions of Russia and 
Russian policies in the energy sphere as seen in the texts published in elite daily 
newspapers in three different EU Member States. The thesis identifies a turning point in 
this relationship – January 2006, as well as the main reference point for perceptions of 
threats, Vladimir Putin. 
 
Discourse analysis 
Why discourse? Hay and Rosamond (2002:4) in their analysis of globalisation argued, 
that  
‘discourse matters in at least two respects. The way in which actors behave is not 
merely a reflection of the degree of accuracy and completeness of the information they 
possess; it is also a reflection of their normative orientation towards their environment 
and potential future scenarios. Thus the constraints and/or opportunities which 
globalisation is held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar 
ways in different (national) contexts’.  
 
This reflection may be directly applicable to the case of EU energy security – although 
different actors may have similar understandings of the EU energy security (a 
conclusion to which the analysis of both the EU’s initiatives and statements of the 
Presidencies or European Councils could lead). The responses to the perceived 
challenges and threats may also be different, due to different ideas, beliefs, and norms 
of perceptions of the same events present within the countries. The meaning given to the 
same concepts can be completely different. Vivid examples of energy cooperation with 
Russia include the hot debate in Poland between two centre-right wing parties (PO and 
PiS) or the Energiewende (energy transition) in Germany and the debate (even within 
the SPD – Greens government) over replacement of fossil fuels. As Hansen, Salskov-
Iversen and Biselev concluded (2000:5)  
‘discourses provide an arena within which people take up subject positions and 
identities, create relations to one another and construct worldviews. From this 
perspective, a major characteristic of discourses is their ability to map out what can be 
said, thought and done about different aspects of life – discourses generate ‘effects of 
truth’’.  
 
The focus on discourses, and discursive constructions can also be helpful in explaining 
the changing subject-positions of various authorities, by its focus on the ‘normative 
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orientation towards their environment and potential future scenarios’, as suggested by 
Hay and Rosemond (2002). For example, my research shows Polish quality newspapers 
to be strong advocates of cooperation with the EU institutions as beneficial for Poland, 
and as strong critics of the common EU climate change agenda. To paraphrase Hay and 
Rosemond, ‘the constraints and/or opportunities which [cooperation with the EU] is 
held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar ways in different 
(national) contexts’ (2002:4).  
Why attach importance to what newspapers say in the first place?  
‘[T]he sourcing and construct of the news is intimately linked with the actions and 
opinions of (usually powerful) social groups; it is impossible to select and compose 
news without a conception of the target or intended audience’ (Richardson 2007: 1). 
 
Consequently, the newspaper discourse has been extensively examined (Fowler et al. 
1979; Fowler 1991; van Dijk 1991; Fairclough 1995; Richardson 2001; 2004; 
Richardson and Franklin 2004). It has been widely debated in academia that journalism 
is for: entertainment; dissemination of the views of the powerful; or for profit 
(Murdock, Golding 1977: 18; Richardson 2007: 6-7). In this particular research I see 
journalism as a tool enabling ‘citizens to better understand their lives and their 
position(s) in the world’ (2007: 7). Although journalism can (and often is) used to push 
certain agendas (e.g. the use of PR as a foreign policy tool by the Kremlin, as argued by 
Orttung (2010)) it also provides the main mean of communication (Richardson, 2007: 
8); thus contributing to the policy papers and other official documents and speeches as a 
source of knowledge, as well as a means of communication with the general public, 
allowing one to see other variables influencing certain subject-positions.  
Following an extensive analysis of both the existing scholarship of energy policy and 
energy security, as well as what was written in the newspapers about energy in general 
and energy security in particular, I have developed my indicators in a way allowing one 
to analyse the discursive construction of energy security.  
 
Changing discourses  
This thesis will focus on the energy discourses in the EU Member States. Its aim is to 
show to what extent energy policy is approached as a vehicle for enhancing security in 
national discourses; whether there is a change in discourses suggesting a convergence in 




In this research I look at the public discourses about energy. To be more specific, my 
focus will be on the elite discourse as conducted in the quality newspapers in three 
different countries: Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom, looking on Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, The 
Guardian and The Times. The research looks at years 2000 – 2009, with the starting 
point being the overall picture of texts on energy published in broadsheet newspapers in 
all three countries.  
In order to address all two of my research questions I have developed the following set 
of indicators (Figure 1) 
 
 
Figure 1. Indicators 
EU* - Benefits/Disadvantages of cooperation with the European Union in the energy elite discourse 
 
All of the selected indicators are based on multiple questions of the analysis of 
discourses. The concept of discourse is vague and has received many different 
explanations by various academics, though the agreement seems to be that discourses 
can be recognised as ways of speaking and understanding the world (Hoijer 2004: 19). 
Phillips and Hardy (2002: 3) define it even more narrowly, as ‘an interrelated set of 
texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination and reception that brings an 
object into being’. Each approach to the analysis of discourses is therefore different. I 
decided to adopt a holistic approach applying various available tools, ranging from an 
analysis of frequencies, volume of words, through focus on the frames or (eventually) 
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on the impact of particular events; each one of them allowed me to point out a different 
important aspect of the discourse. These indicators are also based on my preliminary 
analysis of texts in all three case studies as I have identified their presence in all of 
them. These aspects help me to measure securitisation primarily by identifying its two 
main (universal) features: existential threats and extraordinary measures. Other 
indicators allow me to measure convergence, thus addressing the second question of this 
research, as to how do particular aspects of discourses converge (if at all) across three 
selected countries. The main points of reference and comparison will be the tone of the 
coverage of Russia in the energy discourse, the framing of the EU on the energy 
discourse in terms of benefits vs. disadvantages, the frames present in the discourse, 
relevance (and importance) of specific events and finally a quantitative analysis of the 
presence of the security language in the texts.  
Consequently,  
1st research question: to what extent is energy policy approached as a vehicle for 
enhancing security in national discourses 
- Existential threats. Securitization Theory, as developed by the Copenhagen 
School, focuses on a process through which a given issue becomes an existential 
threat or an issue of security concern.  
‘The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures 
to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the 
use of force but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize or 
to take special powers to handle existential threats. By invoking security, a state 
representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming the right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development’(Buzan, 
Waever, de Wilde 1998: 21).   
 
The process can also be described as a ‘securitising move’ which establishes the 
‘discourse of threat’ (McGowan 2011: 489). Furthermore, Buzan, Waever and 
de Wilde argue that this existential threat depends on the sector where it is being 
raised. The nature of the threat can also vary, as ‘the essential quality of 
existence will vary greatly across different sectors (…) (and therefore) so will 
the nature of existential threats’ (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 21). In the 
traditional approach, the most extreme example of an existential threat is a threat 
associated with violence – conflict, war, regime change, etc. How does it apply 
to the energy sector? As McGowan (2011: 491) has observed,  
‘it is relatively easy to distinguish the “existential” from the mundane cases’ but 
in more ambiguous cases ‘threat is perceived to have emerged which mobilises 
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political leadership but where the response is well within the boundaries of 
conventional politics’  
 
Consequently, I will look carefully at all instances when the label of an 
existential threat has been invoked in the text, addressing each case individually, 
with the most extreme examples of existential threats established based on the 
narrative produced by the Crisis Group – violent conflicts for resources; not 
having access to energy resources (mainly oil and gas) or eventually gas and oil 
peaks.  
 
- Extraordinary measures. Extraordinary measures are dependent on the 
existential threat to which they are to respond.  
‘[T]he existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a 
platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency 
measures’ (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 25).  
 
The question I will answer is which (if any) extraordinary measures have been 
promoted in energy discourses. Any action/initiative/postulate which will fall 
outside of the boundaries of conventional politics or existing institutional 
mechanisms will be considered as exceptional. On this note, I will not consider 
the inclusion of energy to the Treaty of Lisbon as an exceptional situation; 
merely as an element of the European integration process. Especially since 
energy has been present in the European integration process ever since the 
European Community of Coal and Steel. By extraordinary measure I will 
understand therefore any measure (policy proposal, initiative, etc.) falling 
outside of the existing domestic and international institutions and mechanisms, 
outside of conventional politics; outside of the politics-as-usual; advocated as a 
solution to an identified existential threat.  
 
- Security language. The presence of security language will be measured through 
the presence of the key words of ‘security’, and ‘threat’ (and their synonyms, as 
explained in Chapter 2) in all of the sampled texts thus mapping any potential 
increases and/or decreases in the occurrence of both against the frequency curve 
and specific spatiotemporal events, such as the 2005/2006 energy crisis. This 





- Analysis of frames.  Security is present in the text not only directly, through the 
presence of specific vocabulary; but also through frames through which texts are 
organised. A frame is the central organising idea for making sense of relevant 
events and suggesting what is at question. News and information have no 
intrinsic value unless they are embedded in a meaningful context that organises 
and lends it coherence. News messages transmit not only facts, but also certain 
implicit ideas (Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden 2008). I have identified four 
main frames, which are further discussed in chapter 3. They are: 1 – 
environmental consequences; 2 – economic consequences; 3 – geopolitics; 4 – 
conflict. 
 
2nd research question: How do discourses converge (if at all) across the three selected 
countries? 
- Discursive events.  
‘All events are rooted in discourse. However, an event only counts as a 
discursive event if it appears on the discourse planes of politics and the media 
intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time’ (Wodak and Meyer 
2009: 48).  
 
One of the main reasons of the importance of discursive events is the fact that 
they influence the development of the discourse. Wodak and Meyer use the 
example of the Chernobyl incident in 1986, which influenced the nuclear 
discourse in Germany, discourse about new technologies (e.g. need to develop 
alternative energy sources) or the success of Joerg Haider FPO in the 1999 
parliamentary elections in Austria, influencing discourses on the extreme right 
(2009: 49).  
 
- Tone of the coverage of Russia in discourses on energy. Russia (just as 
previously, the Soviet Union) is an important energy supplier to Europe, mainly 
in terms of gas and oil deliveries. Whereas in the 1990s the Western recipients 
of Russian resources could have hoped that the new (post 1991) Russia will 
develop in the direction of a liberal country, the presidency of Vladimir Putin 
reversed that trend. Russia still remains a major energy partner for the EU 
Member States, and at the same time exports are fundamental for the Russian 
economy, containing nearly 70% of the value of Russian export (Solanko 2011: 
19). Consequently, the energy relationship between the EU and Russia can be 
perceived as mutually beneficial and mutually important; which in particular 
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makes the tone of coverage of Russia in the elite discourse even more 
significant.  
 
- Coverage of the EU in discourses on energy. One of the main objectives of this 
thesis is to show a convergence of discursive constructions of energy security in 
different EU Member States. This makes the EU an important variable in the 
research. To be more specific however, I am interested in what way the EU was 
framed in the elite discourse. Whether cooperation with EU institutions was seen 
as benefiting for the Member States, or quite the opposite, it was seen as a 
disadvantage? And even more importantly, I am looking at whether there is a 
strong support for an EU solution/’EU vehicle’ to address energy policy 
objectives. Or even to provide security. 
 
I have to point out, however, that the division of indicators per research question does 
not mean I will not cross-refer results of one question in order to support the findings 
related to the other. Research-guiding questions and indicators are closely related to 
each other, I will therefore be referring to all of the findings resulting from qualitative 
and quantitative analysis in Chapter 7. 
 
Research design and methodology 
A multiple-case study with three national discourses: German, Polish and British, is 
applied. It is also a comparative study based on the ‘most-different’ analysis basis. This 
is also the most difficult test of my theoretical assumptions – theoretically I should be 
less likely to find securitisation/convergence here than in the case of an analysis of e.g. 
only new EU Member States (Baltic States and Central European) or the ‘old’ EU. The 
‘most different’ approach is not only based on geography (three corners of the EU) but 
also in their attitude towards the European integration process. While the United 
Kingdom is considered a Eurosceptic state, Germany is perceived as a country 
promoting European cooperation, while Poland, being a net-recipient of the EU funds, 
is considered to be pro-European. Secondly, while Germany is one of the founding 
fathers of the European Steel and Coal Community, the United Kingdom was invited 
over 20 years later, while Poland is a beneficiary of the 2004 enlargement. This largely 
influences the perceptions of EU and EU cooperation in these countries. Although 
Poland in 2000 (the starting point of this analysis) was not yet a Member State of the 
EU, it is vital to show the evolution of the perception of threat in the energy sector in 
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the case of Poland before and after joining the EU. Poland played an important role in 
raising the issue of common energy policy of the EU within the Union. This is further 
motivated through its reference to Socialization Theory, in particular to claims that 
changing identity and socialisation itself starts before a country joins an international 
organisation, through long-term negotiation and adaptation processes (compliance with 
negotiations chapters, amending national law to EU one, etc.) (Checkel el al. 2007). 
Finally, it is the geographical location of the state. Geography plays a major role in the 
energy sector in Europe (which is often underlined in all geopolitics-based analyses), 
and also helps to explain differences in energy discourses. While countries of the 
Mediterranean basin (Portugal, Spain, France, even Italy) are geographically more 
distant from Russia, they also tend to receive higher amounts of energy resources from 
the countries of North Africa. This influences different perceptions of the EU’s 
dependability on Russian resources from those who are reliant on them. In the case of 
the analysed countries, the United Kingdom can still rely on (depleting) resources 
coming from the North Sea, as well as through external pipelines (e.g. from France).  
However as only three EU Member State cases are being investigated here, the 
pertinence of this research to the overall view of the EU energy security is limited. For 
reasons of limited resources I was unable to include a bigger number of state case 
studies into my research. An inclusion of a country like France with an additional 
indicator, high reliance on nuclear energy, would have undoubtedly contributed to the 
debate on the environmental dimension of both energy coverage as well as energy 
security. This also provides an avenue for potential future research building on the 
results of this study. I have discussed avenues for future research in more detail in 
Chapter 8.  
Despite the limitations, there is limited literature exploring the nature of national 
definitions of energy security. The results of this research provide contribution to the 
possible development of more general studies and research projects over the internal 
and external dynamics influencing the design of a national energy security.   
The empirical analysis is based on newspaper articles (4596 texts all together, coded) 
selected from six quality daily newspapers (two from each country): The Times and The 
Guardian (The UK); Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita (Poland); Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Germany). The selection was based on 
the idea of including a centre-right and centre-left quality newspaper from each 
analysed country, in order to further explore the internal divisions (and debates) over the 
understanding of energy problematic in general and energy security in particular. Their 
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The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The second chapter sets out the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. This is done by reference to the existing scholarship on 
security studies, European integration, Europeanisation and journalism studies 
pertaining to this research; I contribute to the literature seeing security as an integrative 
phenomenon, visible also in e.g. Meyer, Edwards (2008). Chapter 3 addresses the 
research design and methodology developed in order to analyse and process the 
empirical data collected. I also further discuss the selection and categorisation of the 
empirical material. I set a number of research questions providing a framework for the 
case studies. Chapters 4 – 6 are the country case studies, starting with the UK energy 
discourse in Chapter 4, I continue with Poland in Chapter 5 and finally Germany in 
Chapter 6. All three chapters have a similar structure allowing one a thorough 
comparative analysis. All three chapters begin with a short overview of the energy 
sector in each of the countries, followed by an analysis of several research questions 
posted in Chapter 3. Chapter 7 provides results of the comparative analysis, comparing 
and matching the findings of Chapters 4 – 6 and answering the main research questions. 




















This study aims at showing how particular understandings of energy security are being 
formed on the discursive level. It aims at uncovering the ideational dimension behind 
the material sphere of energy in general and energy security in particular; it looks at the 
ideational frameworks through which EU MS attach meaning to their own energy 
securities, through which they interpret the mutual dependence between each other as 
beneficial or threatening; through which they interpret the relationship with the Russian 
Federation. It looks not only on the energy priorities, but on the energy cultures and 
energy situation in each of the analysed countries (all of which are further explored in 
Chapters 4 – 6). The material conditions of these dependencies would be relatively easy 
to explore e.g. through the analysis of interconnectors, quantity of energy resources. 
The ideational structures however are much more difficult to comprehend, as they 
manifest themselves in communication (Kratochvil, Tichy 2013); hence the focus of 
this research on the discourse.  
The most obvious approach would be to focus on the political discourse, on the rhetoric 
of key political actors (e.g. heads of state, members of the European Commission, etc). 
This however has already been addressed, to mention Kratochvil’s and Tichy’s 
assessment of the EU and Russian discourse on energy relations (2013). My thesis 
explores a niche and focuses on a particular aspect of media discourse – on the elite 
discourses. The research therefore employs discourse analysis as its main tool (using 
both qualitative and quantitative methods), whereby it explores a set of textual units 
produced by six quality daily newspapers from three EU countries – United Kingdom, 
Poland and Germany, attempting to derive the ideational framework of energy security.  
This chapter focuses on the theoretical background and on the methodology of my 
research. I will explore the main method of my research, discourse analysis, 
differentiating two frequently applied concepts: discourse and narrative. I will discuss 
the relevance of discourse analysis of elite newspapers for the purpose of European 
studies in general and my research in particular. Then I will move to the issue of 
Europeanisation and the relevance of elite newspapers for its analysis. Finally I will 
briefly discuss the relationship (and distinctions) between energy policy and energy 
security. I will continue with an assessment of how the existing scholarship defines 
energy security of the European Union exploring the question if ‘there can be security 
in energy security at all?’ I will look at the Securitization Theory and define the 
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understanding of its crucial elements – of existential threats and extraordinary measures. 
The most radical examples of existential threats and extraordinary measures in the 
energy field are those presented by the literature of the Crisis Group and the example of 
the USSR and Russia. In my testing process I will use them as a litmus test to estimate 
the ‘existential’ and ‘extraordinary’ characters of my findings. I will finish the chapter 
with an exploration of key indicators identified. 
 
2.1	  Discourse	  analysis	  
 
2.1.1	  Discourse	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  narrative	  
 
Discourse is a universe of texts clustered according to a specific category and to the 
language used in them. In the case of this particular research it is the universe of texts 
on energy collected from six elite newspapers from three different countries. The 
selection of sources is important since various newspapers can employ different 
linguistic constructions, which is visible in the difference between texts published by 
elite newspapers, and those published by tabloids. The very specific criteria applied to 
the selection of newspapers (and texts) are further explored in Chapter 3.  
In order to discuss the difference between discourse and narrative, it is useful to start 
with a ‘story’. The story refers to the events that a piece of prose conveys, be they the 
real events of a news story or the make-believe ones of fiction. These events are usually 
neither good nor bad in themselves. Let us take the example of the 2006 energy crisis 
between Russia and Ukraine. An event is the fact that Russia cut the supply of gas 
flowing through the pipelines crossing Ukrainian territory. A story does not tell the 
reader why Russia did this, i.e. was there any reason behind it? Was it justified 
somehow? The story in itself refers to the basic event. The meaning is attached to this 
event through discourse. It happens through various frames. In terms of this research, 
the cut of supplies can be presented through an economic frame (e.g. Ukraine was not 
paying for gas), or through the frame of geopolitics (e.g. Ukraine is historically a vital 
geopolitical area, and Moscow did what it did for the purpose of maintaining its 
geopolitical influence over Kyiv). This happens through the application of specific 
language. In the case of the economic frame one could see (e.g.) adjectives such as 
‘indebted’; the author of the text may talk about unpaid bills, violated contracts. In the 
case of a geopolitical frame, the author would refer to the rivalry over Ukraine between 
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East and West, linking it with the signs and language of the Cold War. In doing so the 
author would convey a certain message, attach a certain meaning to the event, building 
perception that the cut was caused by an unreliable customer, or by an imperial policy 
of Moscow. The latter case implies taking sides. Here the author would clearly point to 
the reader as to who is right, who is wrong, who is ‘good’ and who is the ‘villain’. The 
author of the text could then look for a reference outside of the event itself, to the Cold 
War period of rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs, in order to reinforce the 
message about the protagonists and antagonists (e.g. ‘evil Russia’). The use of a given 
story and the application of discourse may be dependent on the intention of the author. 
In the case of a news story, the author will merely present the events, within which 
discourse would have a limited presence. If however, the author wants to convey a 
certain message (e.g. ‘Cold War is back!’; ‘New Cold War is a reality!’) he/she will 
present the event in a particular way, to create a certain emotional response/reaction. 
Discourse therefore refers to various methods an author employs to present events in a 
way that shapes certain perceptions/interpretations of the event in a narrative.  
Discourse is a certain expression of thought. It is a way through which a story can be 
presented. Narrative is a certain (unobjective) account of connected events, a specific 
sequence, which has its starting point, has its flow, and finally has an ending. It also 
involves various characters, with usually opinionated characteristics. Narrative is a way 
that helps one to create a certain timeline of events. It helps an individual to remember 
various events he/she lived through, from a certain point to another. One of the best-
known literature examples of a given narrative is George Orwell’s (1945) Animal Farm, 
an allegory of the Bolshevik revolution in the early 20th century Russia, with symbolic 
references to particular characters (e.g. pigs being an allegory of Soviet leaders), 
showing the corruption as well as the greed of the post-revolution society. It also shows 
the power of ideology and its influence over people. 
Discourse analysis, finally, helps to uncover what is behind a given narrative, uncover 
the manipulation a given narrative contains. The most vivid example of a narrative in 
this particular research is the Cold War narrative, further explored below. Based on the 
selected texts, I uncover how were various events presented to the reader, and how were 
they interpreted. What were the messages authors tried to convey, how the events were 
shown, what references were given; how were specific actors portrayed. And finally 
whether there were any similarities and/or differences across national elite discourses 
(Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7).  
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This would be the most simplified description of the relationship between discourse and 
narrative. It of course exposes itself to criticisms, starting with a very basic controversy 
of how one should understand discourse in the first place, as it has a whole range of 
different meanings, which may mutually contradict each other (Tischner et al. 2007: 25; 
Richardson 2007: 21; Dolon et al. 2008). As I have already mentioned in the first 
chapter,  
‘discourse matters in at least two respects. The way in which actors behave is not 
merely a reflection of the degree of accuracy and completeness of the information they 
possess; it is also a reflection of their normative orientation towards their environment 
and potential future scenarios. Thus the constraints and/or opportunities which 
globalisation is held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar 
ways in different (national) contexts’ (Hay and Rosamond 2002:4) 
 
I will understand discourse within this research ‘both as a specific for of language use, 
and as a specific form of social interaction, interpreted as a complete communicative 
event in a social situation’ (van Dijk 1990: 164). The basic notion of discourse is 
communication. As Meyer has argued (2005: 121), ‘citizens’ ability to follow and take 
part in public discourse about political issues is rightly seen as an essential part of a 
legitimate political system’.  
How does analysis of discourse link with European studies? Linkages between 
discourse analysis and European studies are an area of interest in particular for social 
constructivists. The process of European integration cannot be fully explained only 
through rationalist assumptions, a constructivist would argue. Novy (2013: 15) gives the 
example of the Eurozone crisis. Its roots lie at its foundations which were not based on 
rational economic grounds, but rather on political decisions of particular individuals 
(key among them being Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl). The sole focus on the 
material realm while analysing the crisis would lead to a disregard the social practice. 
The studies of Europe by constructivists involve therefore ‘ongoing struggles, 
contestations, and discourses on how ‘to build Europe’ over the years and, thus, reject 
an imagery of actors including governments as calculating machines who also know 
what they want and are never uncertain about the future and even their own stakes and 
interests’ (Risse 2004: 162). The empirical example of the Eurozone crisis provides an 
ample proof of that. The constructivist approach focuses on communication and 
communication practices in its analyses of European studies, because ‘if we want to 
understand and explain social behaviour, we need to take words, language and 
communicative utterances seriously’ (Risse, 164). This focus on language links these 
constructivist-based analyses of European studies with the discourse analysis approach, 
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which assumes that ‘all objects and actions are meaningful, and their meaning is 
conferred by historically specific systems of rules’ (Howarth, Stavrakakis 2000: 2). In 
the case of constructivism, as Waever (2004: 197) argues, it has been ‘more pragmatic 
about including discourse analysis as an approach to the study of international politics’, 
but one has to point out that the most common approach among social constructivists is 
to keep both dimensions (language and reality) separate from each other (Hansen, 
Waever 2002), contrary to what postmodernists such as Foucault or Derrida would 
claim (Novy 2013). Political discourses therefore, according to constructivists, ‘are not 
conceived as merely reflecting the material world, but as actively mediating and 
interpreting ‘the world in a way that cannot be said to be a pure reflection of, or reduced 
to, other social or material structures’’ (Larsen 197: 23). What is important for the 
constructivist approach to European studies is not only the purely linguistic analysis, but 
also the discursive context (as outlined for this research above). This research applies 
both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
 
2.1.2	  Discourse	  analysis	  and	  Europeanisation	  
 
Europeanisation, just as energy security, is a wide term, having many definitions (Olsen 
2002; Howell 2002) which have ‘produced more questions than answers’ (Dyson 2002: 
3). It still attracted wide academic interest, to mention Ladrech (1994), Borzel (1999, 
2002), Bomberg and Peterson (2000), Borzel and Risse (2000), Goetz and Hix (2000), 
Radaelli (2000), Dyson (2000, 2002), Bulmer and Burch (2001), Featherstone and 
Kazmias (2001), George (2001), Buller and Gamble (2002), Dyson and Goetz (2002), 
Olsen (2002), Howell (2002), among many others. Dyson and Goetz (2002:2) point out 
the number of ways that Europeanisation was used,  
‘sometimes (…) narrowly to refer to implementation of EU legislation or more broadly 
to capture policy transfer and learning within the EU. It is sometimes used to identify 
the shift of national policy paradigms and instruments to the EU level (…); it is used in 
a narrower way to refer to its effect at the domestic level (…) or in a more expansive 
way to include effects on discourse and identities as well as structures and policies at 
the domestic level’.  
 
To paraphrase the words of Ciuta (2010: 135), Europeanisation, just as energy security, 
seems to be everything and everywhere. Howell (2002: 10) proposes a breakdown of 
Europeanisation into two categories with precise subject matter in relation to European 
integration: top-down and bottom-up categories.  
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The former is based on Ladrech (1994), Caporaso, Cowles and Risse (2001), Knill 
(2001), Buller and Gamble (2002), Dyson and Goetz (2002), George (2002), 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005).  Ladrech (1994: 70) defined it as a process, 
which reorients  
‘the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic 
dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national logic of national politics 
and policy-making’.  
 
The attention is put on the influence of Europe on its members. Its methodological tools 
are focused on surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer), having a strong institutional focus 
(Checkel and Katzenstein 2009: 10).  
The latter is based on Dyson (2000), Bulmer and Burch (2001), Featherstone and 
Kazmias (2001), Risse et al. (2001) and Borzel (2002). This process ‘incorporates up-
loading or bottom-up Europeanization’ (Howell 2002: 10), underlining the fact that 
ideas emerge and are developed at the Nation State level (Risse et al. 2001: 3); since 
‘Europeanization is assumed to be a two way process, between the domestic and the EU 
levels, involving both top-down and bottom-up pressures’ (Featherstone and Kazamias 
2001: 6). Member States therefore are not only influenced by the supranational 
institutions – they also ‘upload’ their ideas to the supranational level.  
The existent literature on Europeanisation of public discourses explores these processes 
of Europeanisation ‘from below’. Public discourses are defined here as ‘the “texts” 
emanating from the interaction of people in public debate’ (Van de Steeg 2002: 502).  
Europeanisation of public discourses therefore does not only focus on ‘the emergence 
and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance’ (Risse et al. 
2001: 3) but also on the reciprocity between the European and national structures (della 
Porta, Caiani 2006: 79).  This is based on: 
‘an analysis of the system of interaction (actors, resources, problems, style, and 
collective problem-solving rules) at the domestic level’, but also ‘whether the EU 
affects this system of interaction and if so in what way (as a resource, as a reformulation 
of the problem, as a new set of collective problem-solving rules, as a constraint on what 
is feasible, as an alteration to the opportunity structure, as a new frame of reference, 
etc.)’ (Radaelli and Franchino 2004: 948) 
 
The main focus therefore is on the national public discourses and the process of 
interactions with the EU level. This is where this thesis seeks its contribution, in an 
analysis of the national public discourses and the ‘bottom-up Europeanization’ (della 
Porta, Caiani 2006).  
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The debate on Europeanisation of public discourses is dominated by the analyses of the 
conditions and difficulties for the emergence of a European public sphere (Sifft et al. 
2007: 129). Political communication research focusing on the analysis of the European 
Union assumes that there is a link between the on-going transfer of authority from 
Member State to EU institution and Europeanisation of national publicised debates. As 
this is ‘an indispensable means of connecting multi-level governance with opinion 
formation processes’ (Meyer 2005: 120). Why indispensable? ‘The public sphere lags 
behind the transnationalization of the political system; it remains nationally bound while 
politics has been Europeanized’ (Gerhards 2001: 155). The existent literature on 
European public spheres has either argued against their existence (Grimm 1995) or has 
argued for research into Europeanisation of national public spheres (Gerhards 2001).  
One of the mostly debated issues was how this Europeanisation should be measured, 
with various empirical analyses based on either qualitative or quantitative methods (or a 
combination of both, e.g. in Grundmann 1999, Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, de 
Vreese 2001, Kevin 2001, Kevin 2003, Trenz 2004, Meyer 2005, Peters et al. 2005 to 
name only a few). 
Europeanisation, as I have argued before, has a number of different definitions. The 
analysis of Europeanisation of debates through newspapers has a number of 
shortcomings. Things seen through quality newspapers may significantly differ in 
comparison to television or tabloid media (Trenz 2004: 292).  Other shortcomings are 
centred on a contention that the public sphere is what ‘the media make of it’ (Risse 
2010: 114). But these tend to relate to the research into European public spheres, which 
is not a direct subject of this study. 
The existent literature on Europeanisation theory has increasingly focused on the 
Europeanisation of national public spheres, thus studying the relationship between 
European integration and domestic policies (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Börzel 
and Risse 2007). Two elements of this approach to Europeanisation, allowing exploring 
these interconnections, are particularly relevant for this research. The first is Koopman’s 
and Erbe’s (2004) division of Europeanisation into vertical and horizontal. The former 
refers to paying closer attention to Brussels and the EU institutions, e.g. European 
Commission. The latter addresses increasing attention paid to what is happening in 
other EU Member States. The second element of the research into Europeanisation of 
public spheres relevant to this research is based on the first two out of three criteria 
established by Risse (2010: 125-156), 
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1. the more the same (European) themes are controversially debated at the same 
time at similar levels of attention across national public spheres and media; and  
2. the more similar frames of reference, meaning structures, and patterns of 
interpretation are available and in use across national public spheres and media; 
 
Both research-guiding questions are related to these conditions set out by Risse. The 
thesis however is not a test of whether there is a European public sphere. It focuses on 
the Europeanisation of public discourses. Both are closely related to each other (but are 
not the same), with the debate on Europeanisation of public discourses, as I have 
mentioned before, being dominated by the analyses of the conditions and difficulties for 
the emergence of a European public sphere (Sifft et al. 2007: 129). Gerhards (2002: 
145) has identified two main shortcomings of these analyses. First, majority of authors 
focused on the media reporting and debates on specific (and short-term) European 
issues, e.g. the introduction of the Euro, the European enlargement, or protest events 
directly targeting European institutions (Imig and Tarrod 2001; Rucht 2002, Rootes 
2002). His second observation refers to the longitude – suggesting a research project 
based on a longer timeframe and (ideally) comparison across different case studies. 
Consequently, the primary interest of this thesis is in the analysis of different 
understandings of energy security across different countries, seeking similarities 
between them and the implication of these to the future of European integration in the 
area of energy. This thesis contributes to the literature on Europeanisation of public 
discourses by quantitative and qualitative analysis of six quality newspapers published 
in three EU Member States (the UK, Poland and Germany). The basis of it is a 
longitudinal study of a set of indicators across different national public discourses. This 
allows comparing Europeanisation of public discourses in three different national 
settings.  
Europeanisation of public discourses has attracted a wide range of analyses (Eder and 
Kantner 2000; Gerhards 2001; van de Steeg 2000, 2002, Risse 2003 to name just a few).  
Stiff et al. (2007: 130) ‘conceptualize Europeanisation as a multidimensional and 
gradual process that in one way or another extends public discourse beyond national 
spaces’. This however is a very wide definition implying that as soon as citizens 
participate in a discussion on a European topic led by national media, one can claim the 
presence of Europeanisation of public spheres. Combining Novy (2013: 60) and Kevin 
and Schlesinger (200: 206) provides a more specific definition of Europeanisation of 
national publics as ‘the process by which certain (European) themes and discourses 
penetrate and become salient in national debates, thereby becoming a significant part of 
42	  
	  
the everyday news-consuming habits of European audiences’. This definition also 
reflects the national orientation of the press (further explored below). Still, to reiterate 
the main argument of this thesis, it does not focus on the Europeanisation of public 
discourses per se. The primary focus of this thesis is on understanding(s) of energy 
security, whether they become more similar and if so why is the case. And ultimately 
what does it tell us about the future of European energy policy and integration in the 
area of energy. This research brings together elements of both Europeanisation (and 
various research trends linked with it) and European integration. It does not fit perfectly 
into the existing theories of Europeanisation or European integration. But this research 
is not about European integration as such or about European public spheres. My 
findings seek to conribue to the understanding of the prospect for more common 
European energy policies, in particular towards Russia. Results of my research, as 
explored in Chapters 7 and 8, fit (at least partially) to both the debates over 
Europeanisation as well as European integration. 
 
2.1.3	  The	  role	  of	  newspapers	  in	  the	  Europeanisation	  of	  public	  discourse	  
 
This thesis focuses on the analysis of public elite discourses based on the broadsheet 
newspapers from three selected countries. The following part of the chapter explores the 
rationale behind selecting elite newspapers as an appropriate locus for analysing public 
elite discourses. 
The first important aspect is their availability, both in terms of printed contents, as well 
as online. Printed media are not dead. Newspapers are read by more than 180 million 
people across Europe (Rooke 2009: 128). Germany, France and the UK (from within 
the EU Member States) remain the strongest markets for newspapers; between them 
they supply 60% of Western Europe’s daily sales, 71% of its paid-for weeklies and 78% 
of its free papers. Yes, they suffer (e.g. advertising cuts) but facts remain that they are 
influential both in the UK as well as in Germany (Papathanassopoulos, Negrine 2011: 
114). The newspaper market in Poland is one of the most dominant ones in Central 
Europe (Rooke 2009: 128). One of the dominant perceptions is that the impact of 
internet has negatively affected printed media (and their budgets, e.g. via losing 
advertising revenues) with an additional allegations being the fact that they publish 
news 24 hours after they happened (due to their publishing cycles). In reality however 
broadsheet newspapers are no longer printed – only (Wimmer, Dominick 2011: 333). 
Throughout the 2000s various European publishers started to follow the US example 
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(set by the Wall Street Journal) of putting up paywalls on their websites. This was the 
case of a majority of the newspapers analysed here, with only The Guardian making its 
contents available online for free. All other newspapers, The Times, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
Rzeczpospolita, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Sueddeutsche Zeitung have set up 
paywalls limiting the availability of their news. This is not only a reflection of new 
business models, but also a result of the changing media landscape, which blurs the 
distinction between the printed and online media. Broadsheet newspapers have to be 
considered as both a source of printed as well as online contents. A large part of this 
research was conducted via the online archives of the selected newspapers. Although 
more widely available data on the popularity of newspapers’ websites across different 
European countries is largely missing (with Rooke (2009) being one notable exception) 
the existing data indicates that texts published online are as widely read (or even more) 
as the printed one. The most vivid example is the website of The Guardian (one of the 
analysed newspapers) which is the world’s third most read newspaper webpage 
(according to the ComScore analysis published on the 13th of December 2012). 
Newspapers are also widely present in the social media, with The Guardian having over 
2 million followers, The Times, Gazeta Wyborcza over 180 thousand each, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung over 100 thousand, and Rzeczpospolita over 30 thousand, as 
observed on the 1st of April 2014. These differences between The Guardian and all 
other newspapers can be partially explained by the fact that it offers free access to all of 
its contents, thus increasing the number of unique visitors. One has to add the popularity 
of personal Twitter accounts of various journalists (e.g. The Guardian’s columnist 
Owen Jones and Rzeczpospolita’s Bartosz Weglarczyk are among the most popular 
Twitter figures in the UK and Poland respectively) to show that broadsheet newspapers 
are highly visible in the virtual realm. The reach of the contents produced by elite 
newspapers reaches far beyond their printed editions, which makes their circulation 
figures misleading and inadequate for the assessment of their readership as it may well 
be far higher. Although the decline in readership of printed media is an observable 
phenomenon, it does not mean it signifies the end of quality media. Some would argue 
this creates an opportunity for the newspaper market. As Kissel (2013) argues, 
‘News providers are in the extraordinary position of providing a service that has infinite 
demand, in an era where consumers are being conditioned to expect ever-cheaper prices 
for products. As in every other competitive industry, consumers will weed out poor 
quality media and pay for what they value. It will be a long and unpredictable process 
for many media proprietors, and distinctly uncomfortable for journalists who never 
before had to compete for readership. But one thing is certain. Those who equate the 
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decline of print media with the end of journalism may just suffer from a lack of 
imagination and a fear of creative destruction. And there’s nothing new about that.’  
 
The second argument supporting the claim that public elite discourse is best analysed 
through elite newspapers relates to their contents and their influence. Major daily 
newspapers and weekly magazines are ‘an obvious source’ (Wodak, Krzyzanowski 
2008: 32) for the analysis of dominant discourses, rather than ‘dissident or idiosyncratic 
voices’ (ibid.). They are disseminated to a wide (and to most extent measurable) 
audience which ‘enhances the constitutive effect of discourse – its power, that is, to 
shape widely shared constructions of reality’ (ibid.). Contents of the texts can both 
contribute to the existing discourses, as well as produce new, autonomous ones. Just as 
in the case of any given research, in the universe of available data, narrowing it is the 
key. In the case of newspapers it is the selection process of news published that decides 
which message will be conveyed to the readers, both in the printed editions as well as 
online. The selection process is usually based on the ‘newsworthiness’ of particular 
events or situations. Newsworthiness is in most cases based on 12 criteria identified by 
Galtung and Ruge (1965). They included frequency (events occurring with the same 
frequency as the given newspaper is published); unambiguity (clear interpretation of 
events is possible); meaningfulness (events meaningful to the public); unexpectedness 
(events unfold unexpectedly); continuity; references to ‘elite nations’ and to ‘elite 
people’; references to individuals; reference to something negative; threshold; 
consonance and composition (Galtung and Ruge, 1965: 65–71). The news presented by 
the printed media to a large extent depend on journalists’ own research, as well as news 
agencies (newswires), press releases, conferences, as well as from what van Dijk (1988: 
120) called ‘organised relationships with the press’, which suggests that external 
influences may also affect not only the selection process (of what will be printed) but 
also contents of those texts. Tuchman (2002: 89) further suggests that power elite 
sources have the capability of ‘pushing their agendas and frames of understanding into 
the media’, resulting in an ‘establishment view of the world’ (Fairclough 1995: 49). 
Newspapers not only produce discourses, they also provide an area of interplay between 
media and politics.  
The audience, as I have argued above, may in fact be far bigger than what a simple 
analysis of newspapers’ circulation would show. The existing literature underlines the 
influence of newspapers’ contents and the way they transmit major events to their 
readers. The researches of Ryan, Carragee and Meinhofer (2001) and of Valkenburg and 
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Semetko (1999) show that news coverage can strongly influence the way news readers 
or viewers make sense of news events and their major actors. Karl Bucher, considered 
by many ‘the father of newspaper science’ at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries 
(Mills, Barlow 2012) went even further, saying that  
‘Newspapers changed from mere institutions for the publication of news into bearers 
and leaders of public opinion – weapons of party politics. This transformed the 
newspaper business. A new element emerged between the gathering and the publication 
of news: the editorial staff. But for the newspaper publisher it meant that he changed 
from a vendor of recent news to a dealer in public opinion’ (quoted by Habermans 
1964: 53)  
 
Mills and Barlow (2012: 311) argue that not much has changed through the last century. 
Media, according to Habermans, became ‘an organ of the people’; what they do is 
mediating and intensifying the public opinion. The key role is played by the editorials 
(Habermans 1964; Mills, Barlow 2012). Editorials, according to Henry and Tator 
(2002) are a specific type of a conversation among the elites (economic and power), 
with the public becoming a de facto spectator. Herman and Chomsky (2002) go even 
further in their analysis, arguing that people’s norms and beliefs are defined through 
commercial media institutions promotion of specific social, political and/or economic 
interests dominating the state at a given time. Media are, in Gramsci’s (1971) view one 
of the main institutions responsible for persuasion of today’s societies. Newspapers 
facilitate debates, since  
‘news is a construct: it is a version of reality shaped in significant part by journalistic 
norms and conventions. Through the frames they employ and the gatekeeping role they 
play, journalists help to shape public opinion and debate’ (Patterson 1998: 17). 
 
They do not only facilitate the debates, they also act as interfaces of ‘persuasion’, 
especially since most of the newspapers are directing the mass audience (Chomsky 
1997). From among them Chomsky picks the elite media, labelling them as ‘agenda-
setters’. They are usually parts of profitable corporations, which only increase their 
impact (e.g. News Corp, owner of The Times, and Agora, owner of Gazeta Wyborcza). 
As such, Chomsky continues, they interact and relate to other main power centres, such 
as the government or other corporations. As Hargreaves (2003: 4) argues, ‘today, the 
news media appear to many to have become the first estate, able to topple monarchs and 
able to turn Parliament into a talking shop which ceases to exist if journalists turn their 
back’. Newspaper’s impact can be measured therefore not only through the circulation 
of its daily editions, but also through its online reach (website and social media) finally 
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through the status and the influence of the owner, where in the majority of situations it 
is a major business corporation. But what makes elite public discourse elite? 
 
‘Okay, you look at the structure of that whole system. What do you expect the news to 
be like? Well, it’s pretty obvious. Take the New York Times. It’s a corporation and sells 
a product. The product is audiences. They don’t make money when you buy the 
newspaper. They are happy to put it on the worldwide web for free. They actually lose 
money when you buy the newspaper. But the audience is the product. The product is 
privileged people, just like the people who are writing the newspapers, you know, top-
level decision-making people in society. You have to sell a product to a market, and the 
market is, of course, advertisers (that is, other businesses). Whether it is television or 
newspapers, or whatever, they are selling audiences. Corporations sell audiences to 
other corporations. In the case of the elite media, it’s big businesses’. (Chomsky 1997) 
 
Everyone else in the audience is, according to Chomsky, a spectator. According to 
Rooke (2009: 125) newspapers across Europe are generally serving ‘an ageing, but 
more educated and increasingly urban population’. ‘The newspaper industry’, as Rooke 
(168) argues, ‘from a corporate point of view is still very powerful, economically 
successful and, with an increasingly literate, educated and mobile public potentially 
profit-laden’. Elite newspapers therefore are not addressed at specific audience; they 
also play the role of a platform of communication for various (power) elites. Journalists 
have an impact on public preferences and their opinions, in a way that they are the ones 
who decide which issues should be debated, and which should be snubbed. What they 
do is ‘contribute in facilitating the input processes of government, as the legitimate 
ground on which the representative political system and the decision-making process is 
based and gains its supreme legitimacy’ (Ward 2002: 15). Media not only provide 
knowledge (the cognitive aspect), they also point to particular lines of thinking (e.g. 
through commentaries, analyses) thus providing an interpretative function.  
The analysis of the influence of the media on politics in the United Kingdom goes even 
further with its concept of ‘mediacracy’. Following Castells (1997: 375), 
‘Mediacracy is not contradictory to democracy because it is as plural and competitive as 
the political system is […]. Yet, the critical matter is that, without an active presence in 
the media, political proposals or candidates do not stand a chance of gathering broad 
support. Media politics is not all politics, but all politics must go through the media to 
affect decision – making. So doing, politics is fundamentally framed, in its substance, 
organization, process and leadership, by the inherent logic of the media system, 
particularly by the new electronic media’ [italics in the original] (see also Novy 2013: 
37).  
 
Newspapers play an important role in the process of Europeanisation of the public 
discourse and in policies. Rooke (2009: 135) in the analysis of the contents of the texts 
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noticed that press in the UK tends to be very nationally oriented. Press in Germany very 
regionally oriented, whereas press in Poland presenting a mix of national and regional 
provision. This is matched by Papathanassopoulos’s and Negrine’s (2011: 34) analysis 
showing that in general terms newspapers do remain a predominantly national medium 
in EU Member States. These divisions may make it almost impossible for the creation 
of an ‘overarching European identity in the sense of a generalized categorical identity 
that includes all Europeans’ (Delanty, 2005: 17). This does not preclude that all 
attempts to forge such an identity should be immediately written off; ‘only that the 
process may be a long one and that the role of the news media, policies and symbols are 
probably crucial in that process’ (Papathanassopoulos, Negrine 2011: 154). Following 
Schlessinger (2007: 424), 
‘In fact, states, nations and regions remain crucially important as locales for debate and 
as sources of identity. Europeanization is itself a profoundly ambiguous process. Who 
now – and who in the future – will be permitted to be a ‘European’ is an increasingly 
intense focus for struggles between inclusion and exclusion both within member states 
and at the borders of the EU itself’. 
 
How would it be possible to make people from different corners of Europe feel 
‘European’? How to link the policies produced by EU institutions be seen as 
representative of these people, not as an imposition on sovereign states by not 
democratically elected technocrats based in Brussels? Is it even possible to forge such 
an identity, where neither borders of Europe nor any possible threats (which could 
facilitate development of a common identity) have been established? Not to mention the 
ongoing migration between EU Member States, in particular following its 2004 
enlargement. Papathanassopoulous and Negrine (2001: 160 argue, that ‘the journalists 
and the media, who provide the content, frames, stories, music, can help create and give 
sustenance to the EU, or, by negotiation, call its very own nature and self-image into 
question’. Taking also into consideration opinion polls taken at the EU level by 
Eurobarometer, ‘what we are left with is a sense that people see themselves as citizens 
of nation-states and possibly also of an ill-defined European entity and relate to these in 
different ways and to different degrees’ (Papathanassopoulos, Negrine, 161). Different 
member states perceive the EU in very different ways; it may be even difficult to show 
one, dominant perception of the whole EU in a given country, as my research shows 
using the example of energy discourses. Papathanassopoulous and Negrine (168-9) add 
one more important variable – migration. With the Schengen zone and the free flow of 
labour in the EU the 19th – 20th century concepts of an allegiance of an individual to his 
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home country are becoming increasingly blurred, with people fashioning double or 
triple identities. This in turn, in various ways, finds its way into the press of the different 
countries. Results of an analysis by Koenig (et al)  ‘[do] not encourage the development 
of a European public of individuals, of a European public sphere, but something at odds 
with the idea of a European public sphere – a Europe of different cultures and peoples 
who may or may not be in conflict with one another’ (Koenig et al 2006: 165). Such 
conclusion may however be too simplistic. The debate around Turkey’s application to 
become a member of the EU may be an example and ‘a positive step towards defining 
the nature of Europe and its future trajectory and – and this is the key point – the need to 
reconsider the importance of difference in the 21s century’ (Papathanassopoulos, 
Negrine 2011: 169). Recognition of this difference and diversity became even more 
important after the 2004 enlargement and the inclusion of eight new member states. The 
existence of European public sphere remains to be highly disputed. With my research I 
contribute to this existing literature by exploring energy discourses in Europe. 
 
Contexts 
Discourses have specific limitations. They take place within certain confines: either in 
macro-contexts (in specific organisations or institutions) or in micro-contexts (certain 
time, place, participants, etc.) (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter 2000: 27). But what 
are the limits of these contexts? How do we decide upon the contextual comprehension 
of the discourse one wishes to analyse? 
‘A nagging issue that undoubtedly remains for many readers is the familiar issue that an 
infinite regress can occur whereby the observer presumably must describe ‘everything’ 
about the context. Such a demand is of course impossible to satisfy because no one 
could claim to have specified all of the local and larger sociocultural aspects of a 
context’ (Cicourel 1992: 309).  
 
Limits of context are hence entirely dependent on a particular research. In the case of 
the conversation analysis, the text is the context itself (Schegloff 1987; Titscher, Meyer, 
Wodak and Vetter 2000: 107-108). This narrow context analysis was fiercely criticised, 
for its lack of clarity on what belongs to the text, and all other (implied and assumed) 
influences, postulating inclusion of cognitive processes of the sociocultural knowledge 
(Titscher, Meyer, Worak and Vetter 2000: 113; Van Dijk 1983; 1993; 1997; 2006a; 
2006b). It argues for a broader notion of context that would include other background 
knowledge of people involved in the conversation being analysed (Atkinson and 
Heritage 1984; Cicourel 1992). This broader notion of context is also applied by the 
Critical Discourse Analysis, underlying the intertextual and sociocultural aspects – in 
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the first case, texts being analysed now are also related to texts produced before or 
concurrently. In the latter, texts are only understandable in terms of the underlying 
conventions and rules, pointing to both the cultural and cognitive aspects of discourses 
(Fairclough 1989; 1992; 1995). Defining Self and Other is one of the key characteristics 
of discourses (Derrida 1978; Hansen 2006). Language, as suggested by Derrida (1978) 
is a system of differential signs, where the meaning is established through juxtapositions 
and differentiation, for example Neumann (1996) in his study of the idea of Europe in 
Russia points to how proponents of Westernisation were portraying Russia as the 
inferior.  
The limits of discourse analysis, as indicated earlier, are set by the context. Van Dijk 
(1997: 193) suggests a structure with eight separate sub-contexts: (1) setting; (2) social 
circumstances; (3) institutional environment; (4) overall goals of the (inter)action; (5) 
participants; (6) situational relations between participants; (7) global relations between 
participants; and (8) group membership or categories of participants. ‘This means that, 
first of all, we now have a theoretical framework to begin to represent obvious elements 
of discourse and communicative events such as intentions, goals or purposes, as is true 
for any kind of action and interaction’ (1997: 194). Proper understanding of discourse 
requires more than the analysis of the words used and inter-relations of sentences within 
a text. In order to accurately decode the text it has to be worked out as to what the 
speaker is doing through discourse, and in what way this doing links to other contexts 
(inter-personal, cultural, etc) (Richardson 2007: 24). The meaning of the discourse is 
hence coupled with the context.  
This study will follow a simplified structure of contexts, borrowed from Gariup’s 
analysis of European Strategic Culture (2009). It is still heavily influenced by the 
Critical Discourse Analysis approach, in particular of Van Dijk (1983; 1993; 1997; 
2006a; 2006b), specifically in its focus on intertextuality and cognitive processes. Due 
to limited resources I was unable to apply a broad discourse analysis, as suggested by 
the CDA approach; as this would require interviews with policymakers from all three 
EU Member States and, ideally, from the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. This would however be a large-scale research project outside the time 
constraints of my PhD research framework. An addition to this broad analysis would 
however be a venue of potential further research thus enriching the results of this 
particular study. 
Gariup (2009) suggests four dimensions of contexts, which can be applied in discourse 
analysis of security: (1) context of situation (defining the speaker and the audience; the 
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physical setting and conditions of speech); (2) context of culture (norms and rules that 
shape interactions between the speaker and the audience); (3) co-texts (all texts related 
to the theme being analysed, both prior and forthcoming); (4) context of cognition 
(2009: 55-56). 
Consequently, within this research: 
Situational context: on-going European integration, since ‘Europe’ is an integral part of 
Member States’ self-defining narratives as argued by Weaver (2004). ‘While the 
American Spirit is tiring and languishing in the past, a new European dream is being 
born’ indicated Rifkin (2004: 3). In his The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of 
the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream Rifkin argues that the latter is a 
theme of the past, while the former is becoming more than just integration of a number 
of states – it is becoming a type of continental identity, a common dream. At the same 
time the Eurobarometer polls show a high degree of approval for future enlargements of 
the Union. A number of countries (Western Balkans, Turkey) keep expressing their 
willingness to join the EU and follow its enlargement criteria. These conditions are used  
’as a means to export its economic and political models to volatile regions, such as the 
Western Balkans. The result is evident in the tremendous reforms that have been carried 
out in Turkey, Croatia and the rest of the Western Balkans. As European citizens, all of 
us benefit from having neighbors that are stable democracies and prosperous market 
economies’ (Rehn 2007: 1).  
 
The EU’s ability to apply soft power in the close neighborhood is able to enforce 
stabilisation and conflict management (i.e. Kosovo crisis).    
Enlargement fatigue however, still became a dominant theme in European media 
(Szolucha 2010), with some politicians making explicit comments, to quote Sarkozy 
and his ‘Europe must have borders’ (The Economist 2007), or even to entrapment, 
where countries despite fulfilling EU’s criteria, would not be allowed into the Union 
(Hansen 2006; O’Brennan 2006). With voices raised that the EU cannot run properly 
without the Treaty of Lisbon (Szolucha 2010: 6) came the requirement to repeat the 
referendum on it in Ireland (rejected at the first attempt), undermining Barroso’s own 
words, ‘enlargement cannot proceed bureaucratically, or not even diplomatically (…) 
[it] has to be done democratically. We have to win the confidence of the public opinion 
in Europe’ (2010:4).  A repeated referendum over the same Treaty, caused by what was 
considered a wrong result in the first place, gave not only new arguments to the growing 




Was the integration process completely stalled? The Energy sector provides an 
interesting case where despite the whole discourse surrounding the post-2004/07-
enlargement fatigue a number of multi-level initiatives were taken, pointing to the fact 
that integration did continue – the formulation of a need for common external energy 
strategies (Solana 2006); policies on energy efficiency; promotion of renewable energy;  
a common EU position for the Climate Change summit in Copenhagen; Energy Action 
Plan 2007-2009; putting energy security as an important theme of the Presidency 
(United Kingdom in 2005; Germany in 2007) and eventually formulation of a legal 
basis for energy policy in general in the Treaty of Lisbon. All of these are addressed in 
detail in the last part of this chapter.   
This new era of EU integration taking place in years 2000 – 2009 (preparations for the 
enlargement, 2004/2007 enlargements, crisis over Constitutional Treaty, Treaty of 
Lisbon) provides both an internal (within the EU) and external (relations with countries 
from outside the EU) situational context of the research.  
As to speakers and recipients, within this particular research, it is the media and the 
general public that play these roles. To be specific, since the research deals with 
national energy discourses, both speakers and the audience are mainly domestic, though 
they may also have external implications. These are further described in Chapter 3, 
devoted to operationalisation of this research.  
Cultural context. National cultural contexts are taken into consideration here, paying 
attention to particularities of political cultures of all analysed states. They refer to the 
dominant ideologies, as well as historical implications of the states being analysed, in 
particular in reference to their attitude towards European integration. This is further 
explored by the analysis of centre-right and centre-left newspapers; differences between 
e.g. centre-left The Guardian and Gazeta Wyborcza and the way their coverage differed 
or was similar. Finally, there are differences in terms of the background of energy 
policies in all of the analysed countries, which is explored at the beginning of each 
empirical chapter (4, 5 and 6).  
Co-texts. Intertextual analysis is one of the important aspects of the analysis of energy 
security discourses. A number of suggestive publications relate directly or indirectly to 
the theme and play an important role in defining the discourse, to invoke the influence 
of Brzezinski’s (1997) The Grand Chessboard on the ideas of Polish political elites and 
journalists. Also, the roles played by major EU documents related to energy (in 
particular those related to the 20/20/20 targets) allow us to see the influence of euro-
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jargon on the national discourses (intertextual analysis). This is further addressed in the 
latter part of the chapter. 
 Cognitive context. What effect do ideas have in the formulation of energy security on 
the level of discourses? The cognitive context points to the cognitive properties of the 
participants, their beliefs, knowledge or opinions. In the case of energy security 
discourse this pertains to the influence of EU institutions and the way their ideas are 
extrapolated to the national level and vice versa – the way ideas developed on the 
national level are extrapolated to the supranational level. It also relates to the 
perceptions of Russian policies in the energy sphere. The cognitive context addresses 
the personal variation in the production of discourse (knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, 
ideologies), which is of particular importance when analysing texts from authors 
representing various ideological groups situated along the right wing – left wing nexus 
of political systems, e.g. with the centre-right newspapers being traditionally euro-
sceptic (or anti-European, especially in the case of the UK and Poland) with the centre-
left press presenting a more pro-European approach. 
 




As I have established earlier, discourse is not only the language and the written text. It 
is also the context within which it is being formulated or constructed. What, in this case, 
causes discourses to change? First, it is the intersubjective character of the discourse – 
discourse is constructed in a specific way, for specific reasons. It constructs problems, 
objects and subjects, advocating for particular steps, more or less concrete policies. 
Consequently, it is safe to conclude that the discourse changes with the change of 
context, i.e. the change in the existing spatial, historical and cultural aspects of the 
context affects the way in which signs are being read. Methodologically this can be 
deconstructed with the process of linking and differentiation, through an investigation 
of how the Self was being constructed against the Other. We can investigate as to when 
the discourse became unstable (that is, when did the old reading of the Self and Other 
change, and for what reasons?), and eventually analyse the process of their change, that 
is of the re-definition of Self and of the Other. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
provides an example of such change – the dominant NATO discourse of protecting the 
53	  
	  
Western hemisphere from a potential Soviet attack became irrelevant after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. What followed was not a dissolution of the organisation, but a complete 
change of its discursive construction – from protection against the threat from Moscow 
to dealing with a ‘variety of security problems, including instability, uncertainty and 
relations among allies’ (Wallander 2000: 76) to the formulation of the concept of 
‘humanitarian intervention’ as one of the main objectives of the organisation (Domagala 
2010).  
Consequently, in the case of the energy discourses in the EU, it was firstly the changing 
spatial context that was affecting new discourses. Following the 2004 enlargement, 
Russia found itself closer to the eastern external border of the EU. Also the fact that 
Russia and its polices were changing (in particular its resource management) meant that 
these were affecting the way it was being read as the Other.  
Secondly, the point of reference of national energy resources – access to energy supplies 
– began to change either as a result of depletion of own resources (United Kingdom), 
supply cuts (Poland), or as a consequence of rivalry between domestic parties 
(Germany). Links between both signs were changing. 
In addition, the process of discourse change is influenced by uncertainty. Uncertainty 
prevails, as it is difficult to predict, in the case of the energy discourses, the behaviour 
of energy suppliers (and Russia in particular) and events, such as energy supply 
disruptions. Empirical evidence for this is provided by the events of the summer of 
2008, where to the surprise of many analysts and experts, Russia decided to act 
militarily against Georgia. Further evidence is the energy crisis of 2009 and Russia’s 
unilateral decision to cut off all gas flowing through pipelines crossing Ukraine, which 
increased the level of uncertainty around Russian actions. Uncertainty over energy in 
the EU is not only caused by Russia. It is also the lack of agreement over what is called 
the oil and gas peak – it is difficult to conclusively estimate when exactly we will run 
out of both resources. There is then the uncertainty over the level of impact of the ‘new’ 
energy supplies, and the question of whether renewable, or green energy can replace the 
currently dominant oil and gas, and if yes – within what timeframe it will happen. 
Finally, the role of intergovernmental organisations cannot be left unnoticed. 
Socialisation provides an example of an on-going process of convergence within the 
European Union, where countries (and civil servants), through long-term cooperation, 
establish certain patterns and styles of behaviour, initiating mutual approaches, rather 
than aversion. It is also the rotation of civil servants, journalists and experts in between 
national countries and EU institutions/European organisations/networks leading to 
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multiplying effects on the local/national level. This means that those who are involved 
in the creation of the discourse (both of the discourse of the elites, as well as of the 
media discourses) are influenced by the process of socialisation, and thus multiply it 
(which can be seen, for example, through the application of the Euro-jargon or 
adoptions of foreign linguistic constructs or rhetoric to describe particular events). 
 
Media as political actors 
Whilst the Socialization Theory of Checkel (el al. 2007) focuses on officials, the focus 
of this research is on the media in general and newspapers in particular. I therefore 
centre my attention on the media as political actors (Page 1996; Pfetsch and Adam 
2008; Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner 2008). Media representatives, next to politicians and 
other public actors contribute to the public debate with their own voice, e.g. through the 
editorials (2008: 466). Some empirical studies point to the impact of news 
commentators on the public opinion (Page et al. 1987). I do not however investigate the 
audience or the reception of texts by the public opinion. Rather, following the 
exxamples of Adam (2007a), Tobler (2002) and Van de Steeg (2002) I investigate the 
synchronisation of debates across the EU Member States. 
According to Pfetsch et al. (2008: 467) the national debates on energy can be recognised 
as synchronised when issues are debated (1) at the same time and (2) with similar points 
of reference in different Member States. The debate over convergence will not only deal 
with discussion of common issues at the same time, but also over whether similar 
frames are applied and whether the national political cultures will change (over time). 
Gamson and Lasch (1983) observed that political discourses exist within a specific 
‘issue culture’, where both groups as well as individuals use a number of ideas and 
symbols to express their ideas (1983: 397). ‘National media as actors are not 
independent of these issue cultures nor are they separate from the political culture that 
prevails within one country’ (Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner 2008: 468). This importance 
of national level is underlined by the studies of Diez-Medrano (2004); Perer and de 
Vreese (2004); Peter et al. (2004) and Adam (2007a, 2007b). 
Assuming that these national political cultures are significant elements of how various 
issues (concerning external relations) are interpreted and presented, one can conclude 
that differences will occur. As different political cultures will be visible when talking 
about the European Union in the context of energy in pro-European Germany than in 
Euro-sceptic Great Britain, similar issues should be interpreted differently. The study of 
Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner (2008) points to a different variable – the level of 
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involvement of a country in the process of European integration. The coverage of the 
EU in Germany is different than in the United Kingdom.  
I measure the relevance of the EU through an interest-based analysis assuming that 
despite the various levels of involvement of a particular country into the process of 
European integration, the specificity of energy makes it an ideal facilitator for 
integration thus meeting various political cultures of the Member States. This range 
from the wish for economy-based cooperation and liberalisation (in the UK), to 
something very specific: security concerns over cooperation with Russia (in Poland). 
The role of these political cultures is further addressed below, when I discuss the threat 
perception of Russia. In addition, ‘already common political structures and institutions, 
even if they are not fully legitimized by a European electorate, stimulate the 
Europeanization of public communication’ (Pfetsch et al. 2008: 469). An important 
element of Europeanisation of public discourses is analysis of not only if discourses 
change, but whether convergence between different national public discourses occurs. 
2.1.3.2	  Convergence	  
 
The verb converge, in the Collins English Dictionary, means ‘to move or cause to move 
towards the same point; to meet or cause to meet; join to tend towards a common 
conclusion or result’ (2003: 368). Convergence is explained as ‘the act, degree, or a 
point of converging; concurrence of opinions, results (2003: 368). Convergence is also 
understood as an opposite of divergence, which is an ‘act or result of diverging or the 
amount by which something diverges; the condition of being divergent’ (2003: 481). To 
diverge means ‘to separate or cause to separate and go in different directions from a 
point; to differ; to deviate from a prescribed course’ (ibid).  
The Realist school tends to see convergence through the prism of conflict. The anarchy 
of the international system makes the assurance of the survival of the state its main 
interest. For realists, identities are fixed; therefore convergence is not a process of any 
interest for them. Liberals, on the other hand believe that the Enlightenment was the 
period that changed the old perceptions of an individual, state and war (Rousseau 2006: 
32). The optimism and progressiveness of liberal thought was further highlighted by the 
belief that human beings are able to shape their own reality and destiny (ibid). Some 
modern-day liberals even believed that convergence has been fulfilled, as the end of the 
Cold War was a sign of the victory of the Liberal Idea (Fukuyama 1992). 
Majority of theories of convergence tend to focus on convergence of policies. Norhardt 
and Hansen (2008), while answering the question of why member states of an 
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international organisation would decide to act alike, identify six main factors that lead 
to convergence of policies - (1) establishment of institutional field, (2) degree of 
resource dependency, (3) uncertainty, (4) professionalisation, (5) role of 
intergovernmental organisations, (6) supranational law (2008: 3-6). The first factor 
refers to the concept of isomorphism, applied to sociology studies by DiMaggio and 
Powell in 1983. Isomorphism, a biological concept, in sociological terms refers to the 
similarity in the structure or in processes of an organisation. Isomorphism in 
DiMaggio’s and Powell’s perspective increases ‘the likelihood for initiatives towards 
greater homogeneity of organisational forms and practices’ and is higher following the 
establishment of an ‘institutional field’ (2008: 3). The degree of resource dependency 
refers to dependency on other units within the same organisation, where cooperation is 
encouraged by uncertainty, leading to a growing level of exchange through 
professionalised institutions. Norhardt and Hansen link these assumptions to European 
counter-terrorism. The EU Member States unable to foresee the forthcoming threat of a 
terrorist attack increase the level of cooperation and exchange of information (also on 
the professional level, through cooperation of the ministers of interior affairs of EU 
states). The problem of terrorism, not bound by borders of states, further facilitates 
dependency on each other (ibid). This approach can be also visible in common EU 
energy initiatives – not being able to foresee the forthcoming threats (cuts in supplies? 
climate change?) encourages the Member States to cooperate on matters allowing them 
to address/avoid them (e.g. energy interconnectors; de-carbonisation of energy, etc.) 
How does it apply to discourses? Todorov (1992), in his study of the Spanish conquest 
of the Americas, identifies two dominant discourses. The first is of Hernan Cortes, who 
saw the native Indians as savages and sub-humans. The second is constructed by the 
priest Las Casas who assumes that Indians can still be saved through religious 
conversion (whilst still applying the ‘savage’ label to them). Todorov invokes an image 
of a fresco from Mexico, showing Las Casas protecting Indians from Cores with a cross 
(1992: 176; 178), which may suggest that both discourses were different. The first 
discourse postulated for the extermination of all Indians and the conquest of their lands, 
whilst the second argued for spreading Christendom amongst them. Todorov points to 
one element where these two diverse discourses converge – the Indian is the one who 
has to be transformed (either by death or by religion). Should, as Hansen claims (2006: 
43) the analysis concentrate only on the sign ‘savage’, but without the links it had to 
other signs (in this case to transformation) it could fail to notice important aspects of 
identity construction – two diverse (theoretical) discourses had a point of convergence 
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suggesting similar construction logic. This points to an important aspect of discourses – 
their dependence on how the central element of the construction of the discourse is 
linked to the other signs. Similarly, different indicators in different EU Member States 
might have been (as I will argue here) constructed around the sign of a perceived 
‘threat’. This is why I will analyse convergence in terms of (1) problems defined (signs 
of threat(s)) and proposed solutions. 
Consequently, within this research, I understand convergence here as a process of 
narrowing of differences amongst different entities over time, in this case three different 
case studies. How exactly does it apply to the analysis of elite discourses? I identify 
convergence when a discussion of common issues takes place at the same time across 
national borders, when one can clearly identify similar frames of reference and language 
used and then as the process of change in the longer term. My research shows that 
convergence is indeed observable, but in terms of an ‘episodic convergence’ – it is 
linked with specific spatiotemporal events, with the key one being the January 2006 
energy spat between Ukraine and Russia (further explored in each of the case studies, as 
well as in Chapter 7).   
Having explored the discourse analysis, Europeanisation, and my particular approach to 
convergence of elite discourses I will now move to the key concepts and indicators 
through which I will attempt to answer my research questions. First I will explore 
various understandings of energy security in the existent literature.  
 
2.2	  Energy	  security	  
	  
2.2.1	  Understanding	  energy	  policy	  
 
What is energy policy? What is EU energy policy? What is energy security? What is EU 
energy security? How can all of them be explained, other than what Ciuta (2010: 135) 
has suggested as energy security being ‘security of everything, everywhere and against 
everything’? How do we establish where energy policy ends and where energy security 
starts? The existing literature only adds to this uncertainty. A report by the Energy 
Policy Group at the University of Exeter, in an analysis of key energy policy issues for 
energy security in the UK is one of such examples (Hoggett, Mitchell, Woodman, Baker 
2011). It argues that energy security is not only about the security of supply, but also 
about the whole energy system: its technical and non-technical aspects (e.g. people, 
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technologies, etc.), the response of governments to threats, and it ‘has to be considered 
alongside climate security, with the aim of trying to ensure that both of these issues are 
collectively addressed’ (2011: ii) In addition to this, energy security is also about 
international relationships, due to its global nature (ibid). Energy security here is 
virtually indistinguishable from energy policy. Such a wide understanding of energy 
security leads many scholars and analysts to a trap, where they use this concept 
interchangeably with energy policy leading to a confusing conclusion that every energy 
policy is in fact energy security.  
This is the reason why, for analytical clarity, I will try to differentiate between energy 
policy and energy security, considering the latter as only one element of the former; not 
as an interchangeable description of the same phenomenon. Understanding that energy 
policy is the overall approach of a given government (or other authority) to address the 
problems of energy and the whole energy system (and its parts, such as the sources, 
networks, delivery, distribution, consumption, development, investment, etc.) through 
available tools (legislation, treaties, agreements, taxation, preferential treatment, 
funding, etc.) (Hoggett, Mitchell, Woodman, Baker 2011).  
 
2.2.2	  Understanding	  energy	  security	  
	  
‘On the eve of World War I, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill made an 
historic decision: to shift the power source of the British Navy's ships from coal to oil. 
He intended to make the fleet faster than its German counterpart. But the switch also 
meant that the Royal Navy would rely not on coal from Wales but on insecure oil 
supplies from (what was then) Persia. Energy security thus became a question of 
national strategy. Churchill's answer? "Safety and certainty in oil," he said, "lie in 
variety and variety alone."’(Yergin 2006: XIII).  
 
This story is often cited whenever an academic or a scholar is addressing the topic of 
energy security, to underline how much the extent of the definition is dependent on the 
context. Whereas in Churchill’s era oil was the answer (for the United Kingdom), it is 
now frequently seen as one of the problems (Yergin 2006; 2011). Energy security in 
general is a term by and large understood as a sufficient supply of energy at a 
reasonable price, from the perspective of an energy importing country (consequently, 
from the perspective of a large majority of EU Member States). The perspective of the 
energy exporting country is that energy security is about the ability to sell its oil or gas 
and the reliability of its customers. One can argue that the division between these 
perspectives does not make much sense due to the asymmetric consequences of both 
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(lack of energy supplies for one and lack of revenues for the other). The fact is that 
economies of the majority of energy-exporting countries depend on revenue from oil 
and gas. In the case of Russia it ranges from 60% - 80% according to various estimates 
(Grachev 2012). Analysts (e.g. Schuman 2012) point out the importance of the price of 
oil; it is estimated that for the Russian budget to balance its books, the price has to be at 
the level of 120 USD. Adapting the Crisis Group approach (see Chapter 1) one could 
argue that a significant drop of the price of oil could become an existential threat to 
Russia. The drop in the price of oil starting in the early 1980s is oftentimes mentioned 
as one of the catalysts for the fall of the Soviet Union. Analysing these processes from 
today’s perspective may lead to a conclusion that the fall of the price of oil was in fact 
an existential threat for the Communist regime which materialised with the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. These historical experiences have, according to some observers 
(e.g. Hill and Gaddy 2012), heavily influenced  the policies of the Russian Federation 
under Vladimir Putin and are visible e.g. in the way Kremlin contests the shale gas 
revolution, seen as a threat to exports of its own conventional gas (Gronholt-Pedersen 
2011). Russian energy security thus focuses on exports of resources, their prices, 
reliability of their recipients (Aalto 2007, Baev 2008; Perovic, Orttung and Wenger 
2009) and concentrates on oil, gas and uranium.  
But these are not the only approaches. An example of this is the United States’ whose 
energy security is synonymous with energy interdependence (Stokes and Raphael 2010; 
Pascual and Elkind 2010) and for many years, until the shale gas ‘revolution’ (second 
part of the 2000s) was based principally on oil. Energy security however can be further 
broken down. Haghighi (2008) underlines the importance of differentiating between oil 
and gas, with the former being an adequate supply at a reasonable price, and the latter as 
a guarantee that all the gas demanded by customers will be supplied (though again at a 
reasonable price). Global markets of both of these commodities explain these 
differentiations. Whereas the global gas market is based on bilateral agreements, and in 
the case of supply disruptions has an option (theoretically) of having it substituted by 
coal or oil, the oil market is regulated by international pricing and supply systems. 
Supply disruptions can cause crises, as sectors dependent on oil may not be able to 
switch to other resources (hence the importance of adequacy) (McElroy 2010). One has 
to bear in mind that this is a global market – in the case of any disruption of supplies 
from one source there is the opportunity to look for different suppliers. Prices may 
consequently rise, but the fact of oil as a global commodity and the existence of a global 
oil market regulating prices means that it is possible (for example) to re-route oil 
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tankers heading to Japan back to Europe (and vice versa). Unless of course the demand 
for oil falls, this in 1998 has led to a Russian default on its foreign debt. In the case of 
gas it is much more complicated. Gas can mainly be supplied through an existing 
pipeline system, directly from the supplier to the recipient. There is an option of 
receiving gas in a liquefied form (LNG), but this requires advanced infrastructure, such 
as special ports that allow such conversion. As a result, disruptions of gas supplies 
cannot be replaced as fast as any interruption to the supply of oil, unless a system of gas 
interconnectors is in place, which would allow it to be supplemented from another 
source. The gas sector provides therefore more stability to the energy provider 
(pipelines; long-term contracts) but less flexibility to the energy recipient. Whereas in 
the case of the oil market the situation is almost exactly in reverse. 
As one can see, the existing scholarship presents a wide variety of interpretations of 
energy security. All contain a particular understanding (and interpretation) of energy 
security based on a mixture of economic, social, political, technological and historical 
indicators.  
Unsurprisingly therefore, the definition which seems to encompass all of these 
variations is the definition of the World Economic Forum (WEC) and Cambridge 
Energy Associates (CERA), according to which energy security is an umbrella concept 
covering aspects related to energy, economic growth and political power (WEF/CERA 
2011: 9). What this means is that energy security can mean (almost) anything. The actor 
invoking the meaning usually defines its context. So even though Mr Barroso, Mr Putin 
and Mr Obama can talk together about energy security, they may differ in their 
understanding. To Mr Barroso it may be about uninterrupted supply, whilst for Mr Putin 
it could be about reliable recipients. For Mr Obama it may be about the impact of fossil 
fuels on the environment. 
How does this translate to the level of the European Union? Does it translate at all? 
Following an analysis of the existent literature, one may conclude that EU energy 
security should be understood within its two frames; the external and the internal. The 
first deals with the external supplies of resources. Member States of the European 
Union are not energy self-sufficient, and are dependent on supplies of both gas and oil 
from countries being ‘more’ (Norway) or ‘less’ (Russia, Algeria, Egypt, Middle East) 
democratic. This area of EU energy security is dominated by the Member States, and 
although a number of external initiatives voiced by Solana (2006) were raised (e.g. the 
Southern Corridor), only one of them materialised (new link with the already dominant 
supplier, Russia, via the North Stream). Nevertheless, in the material dimension, 
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security of external supplies remains the sole responsibility of Member States. By 
security of external supplies I understand the ability to assure the physical supply of 
energy resources (either oil or gas), unaffected by unexpected price fluctuations or 
disruptions in delivery. The other important feature of the external dimension of energy 
security is diversification of supplies. EU energy security can therefore be increased by 
diversification of sources of energy and their geographical origins; and, what is closely 
related to geographical locations of resources, through diversification of the supply 
routes. It is an important factor for external EU energy security to assure reliability of 
supply routes, e.g. in terms of maintenance and improvements of infrastructure 
(pipelines) as well as development of new infrastructure (new pipeline routes; LNG 
terminals). This explains the ambition of diversifying supplies through resources 
coming from North Africa, the Middle East and the Caspian basin next to the already 
existing (and dominant) Russian and Norwegian routes. These new routes would not 
only diversify suppliers, but also increase the capacity of the imported energy in the 
domestic energy mixes of EU Member States, thus gradually encouraging Member 
States to reduce the share of burned coal, and consequently reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions. The external dimension of EU energy security is predominantly focused on 
gas, and the ambitions to diversify its supplies. 
The second area of EU energy security focuses on the internal energy market. This is 
the area where EU institutions (in particular the European Commission) dominate, 
hence its supranational character. Its main ambition is for a liberalised common energy 
market, with Member States linked with each other via energy grids. One of the main 
goals of the common energy market is to guarantee safe and reasonably priced energy 
supplies for customers. They mainly lead to an open energy supply, but also influence 
potential investments (through the ability to forecast growth), but also diminish the 
impact of potential energy shocks (e.g. cuts of supplies from external suppliers). The 
main benefactors of an open energy market are the customers, who should be able to 
choose a provider from a number of options, and the producer who can benefit from a 
transparent business environment. Finally, an open energy market, in contrast to a 
market based on bilateral agreements, should theoretically be able to diminish the risk 
of disruptions such as the 2006 and 2009 energy crises. In addition, the internal energy 
market is closely linked with the ambitions of de-carbonisation of energy resources, i.e. 
through the promotion of green energy and energy efficiency (e.g. via preferential 
centralised funding).  
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Both dimensions, the external and the internal, are mutually constitutive; one structure 
does not exclude the other. They require consistent policies in terms of legal 
regulations, financial support and political initiatives (in particular in its external 
dimension). As energy security, in the case of the European Union, cannot be enhanced 
only through security of external supplies – it requires simultaneous EU-internal 
processes.  
The question however remains – should it all be called energy security in the first place? 
	  
2.2.3	  Where	  is	  security	  in	  energy	  security?	  
	  
The word ‘security’ with its qualifying adjectives and its relative phraseology indicates 
the content of the concept and its relationship with other ideas. When considering 
language in this research, the focus is more on the production of symbolic meaning, on 
connotation (meanings are generated by connecting signifiers to wider cultural codes of 
meaning, syntax and pragmatics) rather than denotation (descriptive and literal, 
semantics) (Barker and Galasinski 2001: 5). Security is hence not only a word or a 
definition. It is a concept that is communicated in a discourse made up of complex and 
interconnected elements. In the field of security studies, this approach is best epitomised 
by the Copenhagen School and their reference to a ‘grammar of security’ with different 
dialects according to the specific sector or dimension of security (Buzan, Waever, De 
Wilde 1998: 33). Language filters perceptions and channels cognitive structures (Gariup 
2009: 49), and discourse can be understood as a contextualised use of language. 
‘Security is a practice, a specific way to frame an issue. Security discourse is 
characterised by dramatising an issue as having absolute priority. By labelling this is as 
a security issue, the actor has claimed the right to handle it with extraordinary means, to 
break the normal rules of the game (e.g. in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or 
conscripts, limitations on otherwise inviolable rights)’ (Waever 1998: 80).  
 
Security is a speech act. ‘It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat 
to a designated reference object. The special nature of security threats justifies the use 
of extraordinary measures to handle them’ (Buzan 1998: 21). The Copenhagen School, 
despite challenging the objectivist nature of threats and referent objects, maintained the 
traditional understanding of security as a matter of survival. It is when an issue is 
presented as posing an existential threat to a designated reference object. The special 
nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Hence securitisation, as a concept, had negative connotations. 
‘Our belief (…) is not the more security the better’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Security in 
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its most basic form can be seen as a negative; a failure to deal with issues as normal 
politics (1998: 35). What was suggested was a strategy of de-securitisation: de-labelling 
themes, removing them from the framework of security, therefore disempowering 
securitising actors from taking extraordinary measures. The Copenhagen School saw the 
European integration process exactly as a result of de-securitisation (Waever 2003: 13).   
Security in the Copenhagen School’s scholarship is a product of discourses (linguistic 
transformations of an issue - speech acts) rather than an exogenous phenomenon 
(Gariup 2009: 66). Securitisation underlines the intersubjective character of security, 
 ‘securitization studies aim to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who 
securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what 
results, and not least, under what conditions (Buzan et al. 1998: 32).  
 
Securitization Theory therefore underlines the importance of both actors and topics on 
the formulation of perceptions of threat(s). Securitisation can be considered successful 
when accepted by the audience (1998: 25). By securitising, an issue is being moved to 
the field of emergency politics, ‘where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the 
normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making’ (Taureck 2006: 55). While 
securitised, energy is being contextualised, that is referred to certain situational 
context(s), linked with cognitive and cultural processes, and possible references to other 
sources (co-texts).  
The actual ‘presence’ of securitisation has also been contested. This contestation was 
based on two main questions – what are the existential threats and extraordinary 
measures that would confirm securitisation of energy? Radoman (2007) and Perceival 
(2008) provide two particularly interesting examples of scholars identifying 
securitisation whereas McGowan (2011) and Bosse (2011) reject the notion of 
securitisation arguing that what one can observe is in fact the politicisation of energy. 
Radoman (2007) analyses EU – Russia relations through the prism of a security 
dilemma. In his assessment, Russia presented its actions (cutting off Ukraine’s gas in 
2006) as defensive, while the EU saw them as offensive. At the same time, the EU’s 
plans of diversification of energy supplies through alternative routes (e.g. the Nabucco 
pipeline plan) was seen as a threat by Moscow, which, as the author claims (2007: 9) 
was trying to reduce its dependency on European energy recipients by switching to new 
clients (primarily to China). What is interesting in Radoman’s analysis is that the EU is 
seen as a unitary actor able to project a security dilemma towards Russia. Although a 
significant part of the article focuses on the EU-Russia energy relationship, the example 
of energy securitisation used by Radoman is the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga (2007: 8), 
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with references to a speech of American senator Richard Lugar suggesting redefinition 
of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (‘the parties agree that an armed attack against 
one or more in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all’) to 
energy. No explanation about any EU – NATO link in the energy sphere is provided 
here. Radoman therefore equals securitisation with a securitising speech act, itself 
giving vague reference as to what the existential threat is which would require (again 
vague) extraordinary measures. Secondly, Radoman concludes that the current ‘energy 
dilemma’ between the EU and Russia may lead ‘into a security dilemma not unlike that 
of the Cold War and with unforeseeable consequences’ (2007: 10). If they are 
unforeseeable, where then is securitisation? Securitisation of energy, according to 
Radoman, is limited to the securitising speech act. He sees the invocation of security 
language as securitisation itself. The texts clearly relates to the New Cold War narrative 
(see Chapter 1).  
Also Percival asserts that in the energy sector ‘risk of securitization is a dangerous 
development and should be avoided at all cost’ (Percival 2008: 2). In Percival’s view, 
energy should be dealt with in market-based transactions, while increasing 
dependencies on energy imports, bilateral energy agreements and the rise of National 
Oil Companies (NOC) remove energy from its original sphere into the security 
framework (2008: 4). NATO and the EU are playing the securitising actors’ roles 
(2008: 5). The author elaborates on the Polish initiative of ‘Energy Article 5’, a 
reference to the above mentioned article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, seeing it as a 
particularly dangerous idea as,  
‘by involving actors such as NATO, and by elevating the status of energy as one 
synonymous with e.g. nuclear weapons, or something that could threaten the existence 
of a state, the nature of securitization become increasingly military in nature, and 
increases the possibility of escalating existing distrust and suspicion into conflict’ 
(2008: 7).  
 
Yet again, a given speech act (in this case, an initiative of the Polish authorities) is 
equalled with securitisation. For Percival, securitisation of energy is almost an 
existential threat to Europe, as it may significantly change Russian policies to the point 
where ‘it may be forced to resort to the use of traditional ‘hard’ methods of getting its 
way’ (2008: 9). By ‘hard methods’ the author means military threats. A potential 
consequence is the same as in the case of Radoman’s analysis – new Cold War. As 
Percival concludes,  
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‘securitizing an issue such as gas or oil, in the face of increased demand and increased 
capacity of one of your producers to supply this demand, will only serve to increase the 
potential for conflict’ (2008: 10).  
 
Yet again, the author identifies the only element of securitisation – a securitising speech 
act. The text itself, mirroring the previous one, is based on the New Cold War story line. 
What is also common for both articles is the placement of European energy policy 
within the framework of external relations, with limited (or no) reference to the internal 
market. As a consequence, securitisation is applied as a direct consequence of a given 
speech act, without a deeper analytical insight as to what exactly the threat is (other than 
a very general analysis of Russian policies) and what the proposed measures aimed at 
containing this threat are. Neither author offers any solutions or outcomes of energy 
securitisation other than New Cold War. Neither (finally) pays bigger attention to the 
Russian foreign energy policy in general. In both cases, the EU is considered a unitary 
actor, and the perception of the Russian energy policy towards the EU is opinionated 
against the Kremlin, without any elaborations on why. Finally, securitisation is seen as 
the Copenhagen School suggests – negatively. Both authors therefore contribute to the 
New Cold War narrative within energy discourses, assuming an impending conflict 
between the EU (or selected Member States) and Russia. 
Others, in particular for McGowan (2011), but also Casier (2011a), Butler (2011) 
contest the presence of securitisation in energy. McGowan (2011) analyses two energy 
crises – in the 1970s and 2000s, applying the concept of securitisation. He analyses the 
debates during both energy crises, looking at the reactions of the European Community 
(in the 1970s) and the European Union (in the 2000s). He argues that although the 
salience of energy increased in both of the analysed periods, the EU Members did not 
face an existential threat; they did not adopt extraordinary measures and therefore it is 
not possible to talk about securitisation of energy. Energy however, undoubtedly, 
became a highly politicised issue in Europe in both instances (2011: 488). Yet, in 
McGowan’s opinion, neither the European Community nor the EU were interested in 
securitising energy (ibid), despite voices arguing that the possibility of supply 
disruptions posed an existential threat requiring extraordinary measures. Butler (2011) 
on the other hand focuses on the geopolitics of merger and acquisition in the Central 
European energy market. He argues that an increased threat of merger and acquisition 
for energy companies from the region, leads to an increased economy nationalism, 
which reflects an increased securitisation of energy. Butler sees the increased 
nationalisation of the energy policies of Hungary as a reaction against a possible 
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investment of the Russian company Gazprom. However, the Hungarian government 
was not interested in securitising energy, but merely its politicisation. Finally, Casier 
(2011a) looks at changing perceptions from the perspective of the EU-Russia agenda 
and the fact that energy is increasingly becoming a top issue in the bilateral relations 
between both. Again however, the argument is that what we see is increased 
politicisation, rather than securitisation of energy, as neither actor had interest or 
capability to do it, due to high interdependency between both. The changes in 
perceptions were linked with a number of factors, one of them being the raising prices 
of energy and subsequent self-confidence of the Kremlin (Casier 2013). 
The main question therefore remains – how to define existential threats in any other 
way than ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because 
we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)’ (Buzan et al. 
1998: 24)? Going back to the argument that ‘security should be seen as a negative, as a 
failure to deal with issues of normal politics’ (1998: 29) one can conclude that an 
extraordinary measure (a response to an existential threat) would be something that 
would have to lead to abnormal (or undemocratic) politics. How does this apply to 
energy?  
Neorealist - based Crisis Group, with Michael Klare being one of its foremost authors, 
explores this trend. The basic principle of their work is the assumption that energy 
security is all about having access to resources or not having them at all. They argue 
that the demand by rapidly growing populations for scarce resources will intensify. The 
narrative they produce sees energy as a field of an emerging global rivalry – 
conventional resources are peaking, new supplies of oil and gas may be difficult to 
extract. Thus, the logic goes, countries will compete for them. This will lead to wars for 
resources between them. The Crisis Group operates around linguistic formations such as 
‘resource wars’, ‘the end of oil’, ‘peak oil’, ‘out of gas’, ‘corporate oil barbarians’, etc. 
to maintain the perception of the on-going crisis and forthcoming catastrophes that may 
lead to an energy ‘clash’ (‘clashes’) mirroring as  suggested earlier, Huntington’s Clash 
of civilisations. Consequently, the Crisis Group’s work can be used as a reference point 
for what can be labelled as an extreme example of an existential threat in energy – a 
threat of not having access to energy resources which can lead to an armed conflict (or 
war) which in turn could be used as an excuse for undemocratic or disproportionate 
responses.  
The Crisis Group operates on a prediction of the future; on the assumption that energy 
resources will eventually run out which has to, eventually, lead to conflict. There are 
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however other examples of existential threats with Vladimir Putin’s policies being the 
most adequate European example. 
Policies of Vladimir Putin since taking over as president in 2000 may be interpreted as 
an extraordinary response to an existential threat. Recent studies (Hill and Gaddy 2012; 
Judah 2012, Ledeneva 2013) of the period of Putin’s presidency and premiership (first 
decade of the 21st century) suggest that his actions have been motivated by, firstly the 
experience of the fall of the Soviet Union and secondly the experience of life in Russia 
in the 1990s. The drop in oil prices is oftentimes mentioned as one of the catalysts of 
the fall of the Soviet Union (Hill and Gaddy 2012: 154). Although the oil production 
levels remained the same the growth rate declined.  
‘Much of its oil windfall was spent to support the satellite countries of Eastern Europe 
and to expand production in defence industries and other manufacturing sectors inside 
the USSR. These industrial plants became even more energy inefficient than they had 
been in the past’ (ibid) 
 
At the same time the global oil prices were gradually falling, from 35 USD for barrel of 
oil in 1980 to 10 USD in 1986 (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Price of a barrel of oil between 1940s and 2000s 
Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/business/worldbusiness/03cnd-
oil.html?hp&_r=0, date accessed 11.07.2013 
 
Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms were not able to save the falling economy, which 
contributed to the fall of the USSR. The second experience relates to the realities of life 
in the 1990s, in particular after the 1996 presidential elections which mark the rise of 
the oligarchs in Russia (Hoffman 2003). Also, the 1998 financial crisis when again the 
decline in the price (and demand for) oil (Figure 2) impacted Russian foreign exchange 
reserves leading Russia to default on its debt.  
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Putin’s ‘lessons learned’ were outlined in his dissertation (quoted by Judah, 2012: 58), 
where he argues: 
’Mineral and raw material resources represent the most important potential for the 
economic developments of the country…In the 21st century, at least in its first half, the 
Russian economy will preserve its traditional orientation towards raw materials…Given 
its effective use, the resource potential will become one of the most important pre-
conditions for Russia’s entry into the world economy’.   
 
Resources therefore were what Putin, ‘the survivalist’ (Hill and Gaddy 2012: 78-112) 
was to use as tools to mitigate the threat of ‘Yugoslavization of Russia’ (Judah 2012: 
30), that is repetition of the fate of the Soviet Union, the ‘greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the century'. What Putin meant however was not the fact that he would 
seek a restoration of the USSR. His argument was related to a complete fall of the state 
and its institutions (Trenin 2011). This was an existential threat for the country in his 
assessment, a threat that has already materialised in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
This, in his view (as concluded by Hill and Gaddy 2012) justified the measures 
undertaken in the first decade of 2000s (concentration of energy resource ownership 
under the control of the state; the fall of Yukos) which could be labelled as 




Disproportionate and undemocratic however, despite of the example of USSS/Russia, 
should not be considered as always unequivocal. Extraordinary actions can also be 
understood as falling outside of conventional politics or existing institutional 
mechanisms but not necessarily outside of the democratic processes. Floyd (2007) gives 
two examples of a ‘positive securitisation’: the high profile of the ban on land mines or 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court since ‘both antipersonnel 
landmines and those actors subject to the ICC pose existential threats to human security’ 
(2007: 44). Consequently, calls for establishment of international institutions (designed 
on the principles of democracy and not contesting the existing democratic systems) 
could also be considered as similar extraordinary moves. My research has shown only 
one such instance – the proposal of a Musketeer’s Pact, an international arrangement 
copying the principles of the Article 5 of the Transatlantic Treaty; ‘one for all and all for 
one’ to the energy sector. I will further discuss it in Chapter 5. 
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Responses to extraordinary threats can therefore be both democratic and undemocratic. 
In both instances however they are highly dependent on the threat they aim to address. 
Security, in the constructivist understanding, is a socially constructed phenomenon, 
which is intersubjective, and dependent on a contextual framework. The Copenhagen 
School applies a strong normative characteristic of security as a negative outcome of an 
inability to deal with a certain issue with the use of ‘normal’ politics (Buzan et al. 1998: 
35). I argue in this research that the contextual framework of energy security of the EU 
Member States influences positive outcomes of securitisation (or, to be more specific, 
politicisation of energy, since the presence of the actual securitisation is debatable, as I 
have shown before), as it helps to develop shared (and acceptable by the public) security 
meanings (Gariup 2009: 122). The European Security Strategy another example of an 
integrative influence of securitisation. ‘[T]he Security Strategy was born when 
Europeans acknowledged that we are stronger when we have a common perception of 
the threats we face and how to deal with them. Threats are never more dangerous than 
when we are divided (Solana, quoted by Gariup 2009: 140). In brief, common 
understandings/definitions of threats can translate to common initiatives. Accordingly, 
the function of security can change, from ‘negative’ (as indicated by Buzan) to 
integrative (Solana) or ‘positive’ (Floyd), depending on the discursive context, 
perceptions and reference objects, as  
‘when an issue is securitized, this has implications both ‘internally’ (for instance by 
inhabiting debate and democracy) and ‘externally’ by often stimulating conflict, 
security dilemmas and escalation. However, different reference objects engender 
different dynamics’ (Waever 2003: 18). 
  
Securitisation provides the theoretical framework for the explanation of the changing 
discourse, as it allows necessary flexibility. It is a theoretical tool facilitating practical 
security analysis (Taureck 2003: 55). In the case of energy in the EU, development of 
common (or at least similar) understandings or definitions or perceptions of threats has 
a fundamental role in bringing different perceptions of problems closer together. This 
was played by the policies, statements and actions of the Russian Federation under the 
presidency (and later premiership) of Vladimir Putin, as it will be argued further in this 
study. An argument could be made that an increased saliency (and politicisation of 
energy in the EU) was a response to the securitisation of energy in the Russian 
Federation. Addressing this hypothesis unfortunately falls outside of the limits of this 
research but provides an avenue for potential future studies. 
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Securitization Theory highlights the importance of two elements: actors (both those who 
securitise, as well as those who affect securitisation) and topics (which influence 
decisions to securitise or are given as reasons for it), as well as existential threats and 
extraordinary measures. In my thesis, as I have already argued, I will focus more on 
what particular actors say rather than who they are. I will focus on other, equally 
important components allowing one to assess the presence of security in the elite 
discourse. First, it is a specific event, which can trigger the whole process of 
development (or re-development) of a given perception; a ‘pivotal event’. Such events 
are known in the discourse analysis literature as discursive events. Second, it is the 
actual language. And finally, as suggested before, perceptions of actions of two key 




2.3.1	  The	  importance	  of	  events	  
 
Discourses construct problems, subjects and objects, while concurrently communicating 
policies to address them. ‘Policies are thus particular directions for action, whereas the 
construction of identity in discourse is seen more broadly as a political practices (2006: 
21). Since discourses are inherently subjective and unstable, it is possible that several 
discourses are constructed to the same sign (e.g. energy security) but to different effect 
(e.g. integrationist discourse, and geopolitical discourse) linguistically promoting 
various policies (consequently, furthering integration or rivalry, economically or 
geopolitically motivated initiatives). This competition between discourses can lead to 
different readings of particular events, with the 2009 energy crisis providing a vivid 
example, seen by some as yet more evidence of Russian neo-imperialism (Economides 
2009) or as a consequence of market-based reasoning (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 
2009). This shows the significance of events, which can trigger various discourses. ‘All 
events are rooted in discourse. However, an event only counts as a discursive event if it 
appears on the discourse plains of politics and the media intensively, extensively and for 
a prolonged period of time’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 48). One of the main reasons for 
the importance of discursive events is the fact that they influence the development of 
the discourse. Wodak and Meyer use the example of the Chernobyl incident in 1986, 
which influenced the nuclear discourse in Germany - discourse about new technologies 
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(e.g. need to develop alternative energy sources). Another example is the success of 
Joerg Haider FPO in the 1999 parliamentary elections in Austria, influencing discourses 
on the extreme right (2009: 49). The mapping of national energy discourses against 
particular events within the 2000 – 2009 timeframe allows us to see whether they 
initiated similar (or different) narratives and debates. This will be further supported by 
an analysis of ‘newsworthiness’ of events, based on 12 criteria identified by Galtung 
and Ruge (1965; see Chapter 2.1.3). In all of the identified events I have discovered 
various readings of the events. This research does not go as far as to claim the 
dominance of a particular discourse directly affecting policies, which both the 
Copenhagen School and Epstein (2008) seem determined to show. It is interested only 
in discourses, and the process of their change, looking for signs of convergence. 
Securitisation remains an observable social practice, though not in every country and 
not in the form the Copenhagen School would see it. It is also difficult to identify 
subject-positions within discourses on energy, as discourses are undergoing a constant 
process of formulation and reformulation. What I am doing is looking at all of the 
instances when energy security was invoked, trying to identify the threats and 
responses, as well as to assess what a given actor understands by energy security in a 
given spatiotemporal context. 
 
2.3.2	  Security	  language	  
 
Poststructuralists maintain that the language has social character; thus it socialises 
sounds with specific objects, for example the sound of the word chair as an object on 
which a person can sit. The same logic can be applied to themes such as national 
security, or democracy (Hansen 2006: 18). Things are given meaning through language, 
through a process of differentiation and linking (Waever 2002). Language is an unstable 
system of signs producing meaning, which implies that policy language is based on 
particular subjective constructions (Hansen 2006: 17). 
Language is the first important element of any given discourse. Taking language as a 
basic component of discourse, and assuming isomorphism as an inherent feature of 
convergence within a certain institutional field, one can conclude that the language used 
within this specific institutional setting is affected by similar processes of isomorphism, 
which can be dubbed ‘language isomorphism’ (Lewis 2002). Language isomorphism or 
‘organisational language’ is the discourse produced by a certain organisation. 
Documents (declarations, White Papers, communications, speeches, etc) produced by 
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organisations for internal and external purposes (applying this logic to the European 
Union, documents issued by the European Commission) aim either at the promotion of 
particular policy initiatives within the EU, or for the purposes of external EU policies 
(i.e. for the Doha round of negotiations, Climate Change summit, or the Serbia-Kosovo 
crisis). The degree of isomorphism (that is, the degree of similarity between discourses) 
determines the degree of linguistic convergence between national discourses. Ureland 
(2003: 11) points out the contrapuntal character of language contacts in Europe; 
Europeanisms result from contacts between a certain language and the European source. 
Eurolinguists are placed in the centre of bilateral contacts between a particular language 
and the European centre; ‘this symbolise[s] the interlingual processes and concepts: 
transference, integration and translation of common European structures as well as 
phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases, word formation patterns, phraseologisms, 
syntactic patterns etc’ (ibid). The influence of Europeanisms on national languages can 
be compared to ‘newspeak’ – as the language of the propaganda in the former Soviet 
bloc was dubbed. It was based on the influence of Russian-Communist linguistics, 
through translations or imitations, affecting the lexicon, syntax, morphology and 
phonetics of Central and South European languages (Weiss 2003). As particular 
examples of world formation converged to national languages, one can mention such 
truncated compounds as Euro-jargon (in its national translations): Eurozone, Eurocrat, 
Euroland, Eurosceptic, Eurotariffs, Eurocorps; acronyms such as Europol, Eurostat, 
Euromed, Eurobureaucracy; sobriquets, such as the use of specific towns and cities 
significant for particular policy initiatives, in particular smaller ones like Schengen 
(understood not only as a town in Luxembourg, but as a system allowing freedom of 
movement within the EU), Nice, or  Maastricht; loanwords from Member States’ 
languages, as aqcuis communautaire; or syntactic structures such as the democratic 
deficit.  Interestingly enough, while the United Kingdom had arguably limited influence 
over the process of European integration, it is the English language that is the dominant 
point of reference to Eurolinguistic constructions, rather than French or German. 
What seems particularly important is the actual presence of the language of security. As 
I have shown before, many authors (to bring back the examples of Radoman and 
Perceival) saw securitisation by merely observing the speech act – an application of 
security language (or references to security – based concepts) into the theme of energy 
as this, following the Copenhagen School’s approach, is the initial element of 
securitisation. It is the language that makes particular actors ‘existentially threaten’ 
specific recipients. Copenhagen School sees the key role of the language, and language 
73	  
	  
only, with others pointing to the importance of e.g. images (Williams 2003) or cartoons 
as was the case of the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark in 2005 (Eide, Kunelius, 
Phillips 2008). The limitation of the analysis of securitisation to language only may 
therefore be considered one of the main limitations of the theory itself.  
Security, in terms of words, is centred on expressions related to protection of a given 
environment, whether it is a state, a sector, a community or even an individual. 
Consequently, protection requires specific responsibilities to counter the potential 
threats. It is therefore linked with vocabulary addressing adjectives like safe, secure, 
protected, avoidable, preventable, safe, defence. It is also linked with words describing 
potential threats such as harm, alarm, damage, loss, danger or risk, as well as related 
phrases (e.g. to pose a threat). Security, in terms of vocabulary is also related, as in the 
case given above, to various phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases, word formation 
patterns, phraseologisms, syntactic patterns. These words, and their synonyms, will be 
the basis of my analysis of the presence of the security language in texts. The given 
examples refer to the English language, whereas my research will be based also on the 
analysis of Polish and German-based texts. I will therefore refer to the translations of 
the given examples and their synonyms in my assessment of the presence of the security 
vocabulary in texts. Historical contexts will be particularly important here, to give an 
example of a sobriquet Yalta in the case of Poland (Chapter 5) associated in the Polish 
context with the 1945 conference in Yalta and subsequent loss of sovereignty. 
Still, as Buzan has argued,  
‘the security speech-act is not deﬁned by uttering the word security. What is essential is 
the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures 
and the acceptance of that designation by a signiﬁcant audience’ (Buzan et al. 1998:27).  
 
It is important therefore to explore other indicators through which the presence of 




Two main patterns are visible through the analysis of national energy discourses. The 
first is the application of particular frames when addressing energy in national contexts, 
frame, that is either the same, or similar in one or more countries. The second is a high 
level of salience of the issue being the object of a discourse over an extended period of 
time, which is observable. 
By using the concept of ‘frame’ I refer to what Rein and Schon defined as  
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‘a way of selecting, organising and interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality 
to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading and acting. A frame is a 
perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made 
sense of and acted on’ (Rein and Schon 1993: 146).   
 
In the case of the energy discourse, the frame is built around the securitisation; that is 
the framing of an issue as a security threat. Energy, by being placed within the security 
discourse is moved higher on the list of priorities in national agendas.  
In terms of the second pattern – different EU countries started to frame energy 
discourses along similar lines, raising its priority among other issues on the political 
agenda(s). I argue that the origins of that process are observable at the beginning of 
2000s, with the beginning of the change of Russian political (and energy) elites. 
Prioritisation of energy has been exemplified by consecutive presidencies of the EU 
who were putting the topic of energy security on their agendas, with some giving it high 
priority (Germany 2007; Czech Republic 2009), with others (predominantly Portugal in 
2007) disregarding it. This signifies the asymmetric aspect of the national energy 
debates in analysed countries. To put it simply, certain countries are more interested in 
raising energy to the top of the EU agenda than others, for different reasons e.g. 
geographical proximity to Russia and level of dependence on energy imports. This in 
turn is reflected in their national discourses. The Treaty of Lisbon however provides a 
vivid example of high salience given to the energy security in the EU as a whole. Some 
countries (in the case of this research embodied by Poland) had the issue of energy 
security higher on their agendas than others (United Kingdom, and to some extent 
Germany), at the beginning of the analysed period (year 2000). This shows that the 
process of Europeanisation of national public discourses for the United Kingdom was 
different than that of Poland. If one decided to pursue a detailed case study of energy 
discourse of all EU Member States, it would most probably be easily observable that 
countries generally perceive the idea of common energy policy (and energy security) 
differently. Still, I argue that although countries had different starting points in the 
overall EU energy discourse, they had a tendency to move to similar positions, by 
adopting similar rhetoric, language and framing issues (or reading signs) in similar 
ways. The Treaty of Lisbon is but one example of this claim; the actual language (and 
particular linguistic and contextual constructions) provides discursive evidence of this 
phenomenon.  
As previously mentioned, any analysis of energy (including analysis of discourses) 
cannot be made without reference to two key actors – Russia and the EU institutions. I 
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offer a specific approach to both, analysing Russia through the tone of the coverage and 
resulting threat perceptions of Russian policies (and statements). I look at the EU 
institutions through an interest-based approach: whether, in the elite discourses, 
cooperation with these supranational institutions in the energy sphere is of benefit for 
them, or to the contrary. 
 
2.3.4	  Tone	  of	  coverage	  of	  Russia	  and	  threat	  perceptions	  of	  the	  Kremlins’	  policies	  in	  
the	  energy	  discourse	  
 
One of the indicators is the perception of the threat of Russia; or to be more specific, 
the tone of this perception. I will go into more detail as to how I will assess the tone of 
the coverage of Russian policies in the next chapter. Here the objective is to explain 
why Russia is important for the analysis of energy security of a given European state. 
Although Russia has already been addressed earlier, when I was talking about 
existential threats, this part of the chapter focuses on the importance of Russia (and its 
perception) for the EU Member States.  
Why Russia? The dependency of the European Union on Russian energy supplies is 
constantly rising, and according to careful estimations may rise up to over 80% within 
the next twenty years (Paszyc 2007: 2). Europe therefore needs Russian gas, as 
transmitted through pipelines it is much cheaper than Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) that 
can be transported on special tankers (but which also require investment in 
infrastructure, in particular in specially adapted ports where LNG could be transferred). 
It emits less carbon dioxide than oil, is less controversial than nuclear energy and 
(owing to its easy delivery and distribution through the existing pipeline system) is 
cheaper than renewable energy. Furthermore, the existing (Russian) pipeline system is 
Europe-oriented – which, in the material realm, makes European markets the desired 
option for Russian gas and oil exporters, in contrast with a potential and desirable (but 
not connected through pipelines) Asian markets of China and Japan (Lo 2008). 
This relationship attracted a number of different narratives, ranging from two extremes 
– narrative of the New Cold War (Lucas 2008, Ciuta 2010, Klinke 2011), to the 
narrative of mutual dependency and inevitable cooperation (Yafimava 2011, also in 
Ciuta 2010, Klinke 2011). The Cold War narrative, as indicated earlier, frames Russia 
as the ‘bad’ character using various tools (in particular its own resources, oil and gas) 
to (in its most extreme approach) ‘blackmail’, ‘bribe’, ‘extort’, ‘bully’, and ‘divide and 
rule’ (Lucas 2008) EU Member States.  
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The narrative of mutual dependency underlines how Europe is dependent on Russian 
hydrocarbons and Russia on European investments and money. The European Union 
countries - the biggest importers of Russian gas in Europe, want Russian gas. One 
variable within this narrative is the attitude towards the transit countries, where some 
do not take them into consideration at all, while others seek friendly (presumably 
democratic) regimes in their closest neighbourhoods, in countries such as Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. This is significant since one of the 
important factors of the previously discussed EU energy security is also the 
maintenance and security of the supply routes, which cross (or could cross) the former 
Soviet republics. 
To a large extent therefore, the relationship between the EU (and EU Member States) 
and Russia is based (in the ideational realm) on mutual perceptions and interpretations 
of various policies (and statements). Since, as indicated earlier, I will be looking at the 
way energy security is present in the discourse, I will associate an increasingly negative 
tone of the coverage of Russia with an increased threat perception. Conversely, a more 
positive tone of coverage will imply a reduced (or non-existent) threat perception of 
Russian policies.  
The classical theories undertaking the topic of threat perceptions are balance of power 
(Waltz 1959, 1979), balance of threat (2005) and security dilemma (Booth and Wheeler 
2008). This research, following the work of David Rousseau (2006) puts the 
constructivist interpretation at the forefront. I do have to point out however the 
presence of realism and neorealism in the texts analysed in my case studies. They 
identify two important factors, one being geographical proximity and the second – 
uncertainty. Geographical proximity is an important element of geopolitics-based story 
lines and strongly influences the threat perceptions of Russian energy policies, in 
particular in the case of the Polish energy discourse. 
 
Constructivist perspective 
The suggestion that norms constitute interests belongs to a constructivist understanding 
of world politics. This has led some constructivists, notably Alexander Wendt, to argue 
that the security dilemma itself is a social construct, and that it is possible to mitigate it 
by changing the identities of two previously hostile states such that the welfare of one’s 
former enemy becomes part of how the self is defined, (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 93). 
Standing in opposition to ‘rationalist’ theories, where identities are seen as fixed, Wendt 
claimed that interests are constituted by shared knowledge. Focus on the material base 
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done by Waltz (and later Mearsheimer) falls short of an acknowledgement of the role 
played by shared ideas (Wendt 1999: 135). Wendt does not exclude transformation of 
the identity. ‘Actors (…) are able to engage in critical self-reflection and they can 
transform or transcend roles’ (Zehfuss 2002: 46). States can change their identities, as 
they have an ability to reflect on the past. Paraphrasing this assumption, critical self-
reflection allowed Central and Eastern European states to change their perceptions both 
of Russia, as well as of cooperation, away from the negative aspect (integration against 
Russian influences) towards a positive one (integration for certain benefits).  
What Wendt does not address, and what is criticised by Copeland (2000: 203) is the 
lack of recognition of present and future uncertainty. ‘Wendt’s analysis offers no basis 
for saying as to when peaceful gestures should be taken at face value, and when they 
should be discounted as deceptions’ (ibid). The constructivism of Wendt also sees the 
state as a unified actor, disregarding any changes that may happen on the domestic 
level, with other constructivists adding it into their theories (Zehfuss 2002: 84 – 93). As 
Copeland concluded, ‘it is constructivism’s very emphasis on the mutability of interests 
and identities, when taken down to the domestic level that reinforces why anarchy 
forces states to be on guard’ (Copeland 2000: 204). As neither of the states can foresee 
a significant change on the domestic level, cooperation, or identity formation cannot be 
permanent within Wendt’s framework. Also, by marginalising the role of the language 
in identity formation, Wendt becomes exposed to both realist (Booth and Wheeler 
2008: 96), as well as constructivist (Zehnfuss 2002) criticisms. As Zehnfuss has 
concluded, ‘Wendt’s actors do not speak. They only signal each other (…). The 
problem is that, in order to be able to reflect and interpret, actors have to be capable of 
using language (Zehfuss 2002: 48).  
While uncertainty is one of the key factors influencing perceptions of Russia, fear of 
what Russia might actually do is the second major uncertainty. While analysing the 
topic of threat perception among liberal and realist theorists, Rousseau concluded that 
both differ to a large extent when naming factors contributing to fear of other states, 
namely material factors (arising from military power) and ideational factors (shared 
values). The perspective that is presented is the constructivists’ first attempts to answer 
the question of perceptions of identity, and the interests that derive from that; whether 
the ‘other country’ is from the ‘in group’, or is it classified as the ‘out group’ 
(Rousseau 2006: 4). Rousseau postulates (5) that there is a need to put the centre of 
attention on the line drawn by people that make the division of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Along 
which assumptions this division is being created, and what the implications are of this 
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division for both cooperation and conflict, in Rousseau’s opinion, should form the basis 
of a research project (ibid). 
Various combinations of all of these theories are visible in the energy discourses in all 
three countries. Rarely do they exist independently of each other; usually they are 
interconnected.  I will identify the presence of these lines of thought in our analysis, 
when de-constructing the concept(s) of energy security and looking at the narratives 
present in the energy discourses. 
 
2.3.5	  Benefits	  and	  disadvantages	  from	  cooperation	  with	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  energy	  sphere	  
 
What makes the European Commission, among other EU institutions, so important for 
energy discourses in Member States? The influence of EU institutions on the national 
energy discourses affects the context of the discourse in its Member States: the more 
powerful and influential the supranational structure (both institutional as well as legal), 
the more significant are the changes in the reading of particular signs in energy 
discourses. Consequently, it will attract various interpretations and readings in the 
discourse – seeing cooperation with these supranational structures as beneficial or as 
disadvantages for each country.  
So what exactly makes the European Union institutions so influential (and impactful) 
on the energy sector? 
The European Coal and Steel Community established in 1951 began the post-war 
unification of Europe. The idea was to create a common market for coal and steel. Six 
years later, EURATOM – the European Atomic Energy Community was founded. Here, 
coordination of the peaceful use of nuclear energy was the main motivation. Energy 
policy was therefore one of the cornerstones of integration in Western Europe.  
The European Commissions’ involvement in promotion of the common energy policy 
of the whole Community can be traced back as far as the 1970s, when Europe was 
seeking ways to avoid another energy crisis, comparable with the one caused by OPEC 
in 1973-74. Different options were discussed, with ‘the obligation for member states to 
take measures to enable them to cope with possible difficulties of hydrocarbon supply in 
a coordinated manner for the whole Community’ (Spaak 1973: 36). The position of the 
European Commission however, within the then-existent legal system of the European 
Community, was far too weak to effectively promote any common energy policy of the 
Community. It does not mean that there were no attempts to unify the energy policies of 
the Member States. Here, all initiatives aimed at common energy policies were top-
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down, rather than bottom-up, as Member States did not seem to be concerned with 
cooperation in the energy sector when there was no crisis forcing them to do so 
(Andersen 2000: 3). Consequently, the influence of the EU institutions on the 
discourses was limited. Diversification from oil coming from an unstable Middle East 
post the 1973-74 crisis, the fear of a repeat and a need to secure new supplies have been 
the driving forces behind energy initiatives in Western Europe. Two particular events 
have marked this period. The first was the discovery of gas and oil fields in Norway, the 
second – agreements with the Soviet Union over gas and oil supplies through pipeline 
systems. In the Western Europe of 1974 – 1985, gas was the answer to the growing 
dependence on oil, as a source of diversification. The significance of the year 1985 is 
caused by an initiative of the European Commission, in the form of a comprehensive 
blueprint. This called for the fragmented national markets to be joined into a single 
market by 1992, which as a consequence led to the year 1986 and the adoption of the 
Single European Act. The Single European Act radically changed the decision-making 
processes within the Community, as it allowed for certain decisions to be taken by a 
majority vote in the Council of Ministers, rather than unanimously. Firstly, it was the 
first amendment to the Treaty of Rome. Secondly, it provided a basis for the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Finally, it allowed the creation of the European Council, composed of heads 
of Member States. On one hand, the institutions of the community have been given 
greater power (Qualified Majority Voting), on the other an institution including heads of 
states has been established as the most powerful and influential organism within the 
Community. With the institutional change within a consolidated Western Europe, the 
discursive context started to change – a new institutional and spatial sub-context was 
created.  
The European Commission was further empowered with the three consecutive treaties 
of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. Article 211 of the Maastricht Treaty gave the 
Commission exclusive formal competence to initiate and draft legislation in the EU, 
increasing the linguistic impact of the Commission within the EU. Although other 
institutions (the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament) can request an 
initiative to be drafted by the Commission, the Commission can refuse to do so. The 
European Commission has to protect European interests (Article 213.2 in Maastricht 
Treaty), as well as remain formally independent from the governments of Member 
States. Secondly, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was introduced. 
What makes CFSP particularly relevant is the fact that the EU is highly dependent upon 
imports of both oil and gas from outside of the Union. This is due to increase in the 
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coming decades. Indirectly this may have increased the capacity of the Community to 
deal with supply issues. The CFSP, the second pillar of the EU (next to Economic and 
Monetary Union and Justice and Home Affairs) constituted the framework for 
cooperation between Member States of the EU. The CFSP was due to be carried out by 
a particular intergovernmental pillar of the EU in which the Heads of State and 
Government, voting unanimously, would take all (ultimate) policy decisions. Foreign 
policy, though ceded to the EU level, still remained in control of member states. Not 
only did the European Commission have a commissioner responsible for external 
relations, it also had an additional person responsible for the foreign policies of the 
European Union (Article J8), in the form of a Commissioner’s portfolio of external EU 
relations. Although his influence on the actual policies was constrained by the influence 
of Member States, this created an important speaker within the sphere of the EU-level 
discourse.   
The influence of these changes to common energy policy initiatives and discourses was 
significant. Despite a lack of a common threat, or a common challenge that would force 
rational actors to cooperate rather than compete, as happened in the 50s, 60s and 70s, a 
supranational institution started to take the initiative. Theories provided by traditional 
realism and neorealism failed to provide accurate answers which could explain this 
phenomenon.   
Andersen (2000: 2) identified three main facilitators of common energy policy 
initiatives: internal market programme, environmental policy and finally the European 
Energy Charter. Both the internal market programme and the European Energy Charter 
initiatives have been largely interconnected. The European Energy Charter has been 
built on four main pillars: protection of foreign investment, non-discrimination, 
resolution of disputes and energy efficiency. It also provides an example of the 
influence of CFSP initiative in the common energy policy project. One has to mention 
here the historical context of the European Energy Charter. The year 1991, when it was 
originally signed in The Hague was also the year of the Persian Gulf War, which again 
destabilised the oil-rich Middle East. Secondly, in 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed. 
What seemed a secure alternative to Middle Eastern oil – gas from the USSR, had 
suddenly become dependent on new countries (Belarus, Ukraine) as well as former 
satellites of Moscow (Poland and Czechoslovakia). These examples would seem to 
confirm that realist and neorealist thinking has prevailed over the on-going integration 
process, and European Energy Charter is a result of a coalition of rational actors. 
Andersen however (2000: 15) traces the European Energy Charter back to the Lubbers 
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Plan of the European Commission presented back in 1990. The idea was to use the 
experience of the European Community to deepen the cooperation between Western 
Europe and the Soviet Bloc. The basis of Lubbers’s idea (who was at the time the Prime 
Minister of the Netherlands) was to create a Unified Energy System based on the 
experiences of the European Community of Coal and Steel. Energy was to be the sphere 
of particular importance for both parties involved but also because the ‘energy sector is 
well qualified for integration on account of the strong participation of the State’ 
(Waelde 1996: 156). This initiative had one main aim – cheap access to energy for the 
European Community (Andersen 2000: 15). Linking the need to secure energy supplies 
with other sectors of the economy was supposed to allow the European Community to 
not only access cheaper energy, but to also influence the democratisation processes in 
Russia. The European Energy Charter was therefore an example of overlapping interests 
between the supranational authorities (European Commission) aiming at the 
empowerment of the internal European market and Member States, pursuing their own 
agendas. 
 Environmental policy was another facilitator of common energy initiatives. Contrary to 
energy policy, it was present in the Maastricht Treaty. The European Commission’s 
influence has been particularly important in the application of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Within this, the European 
Commission is pursuing European energy policy where greenhouse gases emissions 
will be reduced by 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 (Lauvergeon 2007: 53). Despite 
that, any initiative in EU energy policy was based on two articles of the Treaty of the 
European Union: one devoted to the internal market (Article 95) and the other focusing 
on environment (Article 175). It changed with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Energy is mentioned in the following passages of the Treaty: 
‘In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with 
regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy 
shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: (a) ensure the functioning 
of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; and (c) promote 
energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms 




‘Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 
1. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social 
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Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Such measures shall not affect a Member 
State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply without 
prejudice to Article 175(2)(c).’ (Title XX, Article 176 A) 
 
In addition to EU energy policy, the Treaty of Lisbon establishes measures that will be 
undertaken in the case of a disruption of delivery, in Article 100, where: 
“Without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the Treaties, the Council, on 
a proposal from the Commission [underlined by author], may decide, in a spirit of 
solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic 
situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, 
notably in the area of energy." 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon formally places energy within the internal market programme 
(which was not clearly stated in the previous treaties). It highlights the importance of 
the environment (consequently promoted by the European Commission from the early 
1990s), and gives the Commission the tools allowing it to recommend policies related to 
the sphere of external policies.  
Common energy policy initiatives starting from the late 1980s provide an example of a 
spillover, where Eurocrats were trying to exploit on-going integration in other spheres. 
EU Treaties provided frameworks for such action. Andersen (2002: 18) points to 
differences between this spillover, and its neofunctional definition. Schmitter (2004: 
46) defined it as a situation where  
‘regional bureaucrats in league with a shifting set of self-organised interests and 
passions seek to exploit the inevitable ‘spillovers’ and ‘unintended consequences’ that 
occur when states agree to assign some degree of supranational responsibility for 
accomplishing a limited task and then discover that satisfying that function has external 
effects upon other of their interdependent activities’.  
 
Andersen (2000: 18) However, in the case of the energy initiatives of the European 
Commission, there are claims that this neofunctional approach shows no concern with 
contextual factors. He sees the dynamic between different policy contexts and the 
momentum of general development impetus as the explanation for the direction of 
energy policy in the EU. The European Commission, following the Single European 
Act (and consequent treaties) can define energy in its relation to the internal market 
(which is clearly stated in the Lisbon Treaty). Here, the decision-making process is 
based on Qualified Majority Voting. A high concentration of energy in the hands of 
national champions provides a strong case for the Commission to define energy policies 
from the principle of the internal European market. The European Commission also 
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attempts an answer to the energy crises through internal market initiatives. The EU 
Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan provide an example of an initiative initiated 
by the European Commission as a response to the reoccurring energy cuts from Russia. 
The action plan proposes five points: investment in infrastructure, external energy 
relations, creation of oil and gas stocks as well as mechanisms of response to crises, 
energy efficiency, and maximization of the use of indigenous energy resources. As 
such, the Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan suggests focusing on six pipeline 
projects: the Baltic Interconnection Plan, Nabucco, LNG facilities, the Mediterranean 
Energy Ring, North-South gas and electricity interconnections within Central and 
South-East Europe, the North Sea wind offshore grid. ‘External relations’ are directly 
linked to these infrastructure initiatives. Here, another European Commission’s 
initiative – the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – is the crucial tool. Energy 
cooperation has been fleshed out in the ENP Action Plans established with countries of 
this programme (Bendiek 2007: 31). Issues like increased dialogue, convergence of 
energy policies, legal and regulatory frameworks, interconnection networks 
development, energy efficiency, renewable and nuclear energy are the basic energy 
frame of these Action Plans. The flagship initiative of diversification from Russian 
supplies – the Nabucco pipeline – was projected through ENP Action Plans, as the 
potential route would link the Caspian Basin with Azerbaijan, Georgia (ENP), Turkey 
(Candidate Country), and then EU Member States (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, up to 
the hub that is planned to be set up in Austria). Also the Mediterranean countries 
participating in the ENP are important energy partners of the EU: Egypt (gas), Libya 
(gas, oil), Syria (gas hub), the Magreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and Mashreq 
(Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian Authority) energy markets (Bendiek 
2007: 32).  
All of these initiatives, though responses to an external threat (the possibility of energy 
supply limitations), are providing answers from the internal European market 
perspective, allowing the European Commission to take full initiative. While in the 
European Council national interests play the main role, and countries are willing to use 
their veto power (vide Polish veto on the new EU – Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement), the European Commission can, within its prerogatives, pursue initiatives 
facilitating common energy policies, suggesting that common approaches can give the 
most effective solutions. In a Eurobarometer poll from 2007, 62% of respondents 
answered that the European level provides the best space for solving energy-based 
problems, while only 32% saw the national level as the best place where such issues 
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should be addressed. The EU institutions, facing the ‘enlargement fatigue’ of the 
European Union and failed attempts to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, struggles to 
receive endorsement from all Member States for the Treaty of Lisbon. They find energy 
integration as a sector where pursuing integration seems to be widely accepted by the 
EU public. Energy issues, addressed by the European Commission in a triangle of 
security of supply – competitiveness – and climate change (Lauvergeon 2007: 52) 
provide an on-going catalyst for the furthering of the internal European market, 
consequently pushing the integration processes forward.  
The European Council, as has been already mentioned, is the highest decision-making 
body of the EU. While the Council focuses mainly on budget or institutional 
amendments (treaties), external relations are not high on the agenda. Its importance as a 
facilitator for convergence towards common European energy discourse is  impacted by 
the agendas of particular presidencies, as was in the case of the presidencies of Finland 
(in the second half of 2006), Germany (first half of 2007), Czech Republic (first half of 
2008) and Sweden (second half of 2008). While the Finnish presidency underlined 
sustainability and criticised geopolitically and economically motivated approaches, 
insisting on dealing with environmental threats and climate change in particular, the 
German presidency focused on geopolitical aspects of common energy policy as well as 
on the promotion of renewable energy sources. The Czech presidency was forced, due 
to the Russian – Ukrainian energy crisis of January 2009, to move energy to the top of 
its agenda. Sweden focused on energy efficiency and climate change. Energy therefore, 
although in its various aspects, was becoming a top issue on the agendas of EU 
presidencies. 
Coordinated European energy policy has to be seen as a result of both European 
Commission and European Council initiatives. Geden (et al. 2006: 10-11) sees four 
main signposts of this common approach towards energy within the EU. The first is the 
Constitution for Europe (later modified into the Treaty of Lisbon, with the passage 
referring to energy remaining the same in both documents). 
The second is the Hampton Court summit of 2005, where the EU leaders agreed that the 
Union ‘needs to diversify sources of energy and approach current major energy 
suppliers in a more coherent manner; but it also need to pursue energy efficiency and 
clean technologies and develop a genuinely open energy market’ (Straw 2005).  
The third is the EC Green Paper European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy published in March 2006. This document underlined the EC’s position 
that ‘Europe has to speak with a single voice on the international scene’ (Geden 2006: 
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11). The paper concluded that an agreement should be reached within the EU on the 
aims of an external energy policy, and methods of achieving it both on the national as 
well as on the EU level. This document also suggested regular meetings at the 
Community level allowing for the coordination of any common initiatives. 
The fourth (and final) area is the European Council Summit of March 2006, where the 
EC, the Secretariat General (SG) and the High Representative (HR) of the Council were 
asked ‘to work closely together on the important issue of external energy relations and 
to provide input for an EU strategy’ (ibid). What is significant is that the Commission 
has been ‘limited’ here by the inclusion of the SG and HR, signalling Member States’ 
willingness to remain in control of common energy policy initiatives. This led to the 
development of a joint paper An external policy to serve Europe’s energy interests, 
released in June 2006. 
The last initiative provides a merger between external and internal factors, as one 
objective aims at a well-functioning market, the other underpins geo-strategic and 
security considerations. Further to that, the paper suggests that this policy should be 
jointly implemented by the EU, the Member States and industry (in contrast to NEC 
promoted in energy-rich countries); a tool suggested by the joint paper, the Strategic EU 
Energy Review for the Council and the European Parliament. The aim of this review is 
for ‘Europe’s political leaders (…) to give clear messages on the energy strategy’ as 
stated in the first paragraph of the review (2008: 1).   
The results of this research point to one more signpost – the January 2006 energy crisis 
between Russia and Ukraine, and its impact on the perceptions of Russia and on 
cooperation within the European Union. I further explore this point in Chapter 7. 
Following Geden’s (2009: 25-26) conclusion:  
‘a functioning pan-European energy market combined with solidarity obligations would 
lead to ‘Europeanization’ of the Member States’ respective energy policy perspectives. 
Today, countries like Portugal and Spain do not have to care much about EU-Russia 
energy relations, because they do not import Russian gas. But in the case of solidarity 
obligations they would have to think more about the energy security challenges the 
Central and Eastern European members are facing, and vice versa’.  
 
This seems to be the all-encompassing summary of the European Commission’s 
ambitions in the energy sphere.  
All of these show not only the changing role of the European Commission as a source 
of institutional influence within the EU, but also that the growing role of the 
Commission and its initiatives were influencing national actors’ rhetoric and languages.  
My approach is to look at the Member States and see whether they saw (in the ideas 
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produced in the discourses) cooperation with these institutions as beneficial for the 




The aim of this chapter was to look at the key concepts, which will be present 
throughout the thesis. The chapter explored the differentiation between energy security 
and energy policy, often blurred in the existent scholarship. I have defined energy 
policy as the overall approach of a given government (or other authority) to address the 
problems of energy and the whole energy system (and its parts, such as the sources, 
networks, delivery, distribution, consumption, development, investment, etc.) through 
available tools (legislation, treaties, agreements, taxation, preferential treatment, 
funding, etc.). I have looked at energy policy through the existent grand theories of 
European integration. I have also looked at Europeanisation understood as a process of 
change between levels of government (a bottom-up, or ‘uploading’) variation as the 
most relevant one for the assessment of how nationally-constructed and developed ideas 
can influence the ideas of the supranational institutions of the EU. I have then moved on 
to the concept of energy security, exploring its different dimensions (perspective of the 
energy-exporter and energy-importer). I have also talked about the presence of security 
in energy security.  
I have concluded that due to the particular analytical approach offered (discourse 
analysis) I will understand energy security as what those invoking energy security label 
as such. I will not however take it as given; I will seek to inevstigate who securitises, on 
what issues, for whom, why, with what results and under what conditions (Buzan et al. 
1998: 32). I will analyse the presence of security through the approach offered by 
Securitization Theory. This will allow me to assess whether what I was observing was 
in fact securitisation of energy, or merely its politicisation – although in any case, it 
raised the profile of energy on the political agendas. I have explored different 
understandings of existential threats in the case of energy, establishing two extreme 
examples of such instances. The first one based on the literature of the Crisis Group 
arguing that the increasingly growing population will find scarce resources which in 
turn may lead to violent conflict. The second one based on the influence of energy raw 
materials on the fate of the Soviet Union in the 1980s as well as their influence on the 
policies of Vladimir Putin in the first decade of 2000s.  
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Folllowing Gariup’s (1999) research, I have defined contexts of energy discourses 
(situational, cultural, co-text and cognitive), allowing the researcher to narrow down and 
systemise limits of this particular discourse analysis. I have also linked this research 
with the debates over Europeanisation of discourses. Finally, I have looked at some of 
the indicators: discursive events; presence of the security language; discursive frame; 
and finally the importance of the Russian Federation and of the EU institutions. 






























Chapter 3 - Operationalisation of the research – data and 
research design 
 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the way in which this research is operationalised, 
which is how the hypothesis and research questions posted in the earlier parts of this 
research will be answered. I will also specify the body of data that will be used for this. 
I will also explain the frames of this research – the time frame (years 2000 – 2009). 
 
3.1	  Research	  design	  
 
This thesis will be based on a comparative approach of three case studies. I am focusing 
on the content analysis, a method of textual investigation where I establish a set of 
categories and tally the number of cases falling into each category. I have identified 
texts relevant to the problem I address further narrowing their number (sampling texts). 
I have created a coding frame based on my research (as shown in Chapter 2; codebook 
can be found in Appendix 1). All texts selected in my sample have been coded. Details 
of the coding method are further described below, as well as in Appendix 1.  
The main requirement for a content analysis is to enable a different coder to reach the 
same conclusions with the same amount of material collected (Silverman 2011: 64). The 
research is designed to follow the method and logic of a structured and focused 
comparison (George and Bennett 2005: 67). The ‘structured’ aspect related to the fact 
that I ask two general questions reflecting the objectives of my research in three 
different case studies. They provide the guidance and help in standardisation of the data 
thus supporting a systematic comparison between all of them. The ‘focused’ aspect 
relates to the fact that my research deals only with particular, specific aspects of the 
cases I examine, within a strictly defined temporal perspective. I will not provide the 
reader with a full historical analysis of the energy discourse in the UK, Poland and 
Germany between 2000 and 2009; to the contrary. I will focus only on specific aspects 
of these cases, guided by my research questions. The aim of this approach is to identify 
common characteristics, ‘making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings 
of the cases possible’ (ibid).  
All three case studies within this research address Member States of the European 
Union. In this thesis I will seek casual mechanisms, understood as ‘particular 
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circumstance that makes some outcome more likely to occur, or have a tendency to 
occur’ (Pawson and Tilley 1997; Olsen 2012). Following Olsen (2012: 200)  
‘one gathers relevant data around the broad hypothesis or claim, and then examines the 
data and asks what the world must be like in order for these data patters and 
configurations to have emerged’.  
 
What has to be underlined here is the importance of contexts which allow these casual 
mechanisms to work. As Olsen noted, there are three  
‘distinct conclusions about causality: (1) a mechanism can be sufficient to cause an 
outcome in some circumstances; (2) a group of conditions may be sufficient together to 
cause an outcome, but each one may not be sufficient on its own; (3) the data gathered 
ex post are likely to show a mixture of the outcome of sufficient and non-sufficient 
causal tendencies. Therefore care must be taken not to exaggerate the definitiveness of 
conclusions that can be reached using constant conjunctions of data’ (2012: 189-199).  
 
In my research I follow what Silverman (2011: 60) suggests for a theoretically defined 
data analysis: I start with what is said by the participants (authors of texts), what I have 
read in the texts, then shifting the focus to the exploration and explanation (to ‘distil’) 
the essence, meaning, patterns, structures. ‘The resulting conceptual description 
therefore emerges from, is based on, or is grounded in the data about the phenomena’ 
(Rapley 2011: 276).  
 
Case studies 
The analysis will cover three case studies of three energy discourses – in the United 
Kingdom, in Poland and in Germany. The selection of all three countries is based on the 
‘most different’ approach. They are all Member States of the European Union (in the 
case of Poland – from 2004); they have all established democratic system and market – 
based economy. There are however observable differences between them, in particular 
in their approach to European integration.  
In order to present a systematic comparison of all three selected countries, I have used 
the results of the Eurobarometer polls. The figures refer to the the only question 
consisetently asked throughout the decade – ‘Generally speaking, do you think that 




Figure 3. Response to the question ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s 
membership of the European Union is a good thing?’ asked in Eurobarometer polls between 2000 and 
2009. Results pertaining to Poland started to appear only since the second half of 2004 
 
Results of Eurobarometer polls show visible differences between the perceptions of EU 
among citizens of all three countries. The results from Poland and Germany are more 
closely aligned (results for Poland before 2004 are unavailable). Results from the 
United Kingdom clearly show a smaller degree of enthusiasm of its citizens towards the 
European Union. This data however would reveal much without the context, in 
particular the different reasons for the support (or lack thereof) country’s membership in 
the European Union. I have briefly touched on this subject in two previous chapters; 
each country case study (Chapters 4 – 6) further explores the distinctive cultures and 
attitudes towards the EU of the UK, Poland and Germany. A short summary of the 
approach of each country towards the EU would be as follows:  
 
United Kingdom 
UK is considered to be a Eurosceptic state, at least since the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Rub 2002; Watts and Pilkington 2005; Jones 2007; Geddens 2013). Geddens (2013: 
19-42) argues that a more pragmatic approach may be observable in the case of British 
membership in the EU. He notes that British support for European integration is more 
likely in the areas that recon with domestic political preferences. If however this is not 
the case, reluctance towards integration may be forestalled. He notes the main 
controversial aspects of the EU for the UK are: 
• Supranationalism (key controversy: EU law overriding national laws) 
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• Sovereignty (supranational institutions make laws; UK is subject to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union; thus UK sovereignty is limited) 
• National identity (EU seen as a threat to a distinctive British identity) (2013: 19-
42) 
 Geddens sees the awkwardness (2013: 28) of Britain’s engagement with the EU firstly 
as a result of the geographical location, in the North-West corner of Europe. He notes 
how the language itself separates the UK from the rest of the continent, when British 
people refer to ‘going to Europe’ or ‘to the continent’ whenever they travel to another 
EU country (2013: 29). Secondly, he points out the ‘functional interdependence’ (ibid) 
– links with the Commonwealth, ‘special relationship’ with the USA or the permanent 
seat at the UN Security Council. Thirdly, the role of the mass media, especially daily 
newspapers such as The Sun, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, The Times and Daily 
Express, all ‘have been consistently and vocally eurosceptic’. And finally there is the 
aspect of domestic politics and its influence over the direction of European integration, 
with particular reference to the role (and ambitions of) Members of the British 
Parliament (e.g controversies over European issues within the Conservatives – Liberal 
Democrats coalition following the 2010 elections). Risse (2001) adds an additional 
dimension when he points to identity and the aspect of ‘Englishness’, arguing that there 
is not much space for ‘Europe’ there.    
Geddens concludes that British European policy has three core elements – 
intergovernmentalism, market liberalisation and Atlanticism. The biggest challenge for 
consecutive British governments has been however how to turn these preferences into 
priorities of the Union. 
 
Germany 
‘Exaggerated multilateralism’ was what Anderson (2007: 80-107) described as the 
course taken by West Germany since 1949 (quoted by Miskimmon 2007: 23). Bonn 
became ‘particularly interested in, and increasingly adept at, not clearly articulating 
distinctive national positions, but rather feeding its own special German concerns and 
priorities into a common approach’ (Garton Ash 1993: 262, also in Miskimmon 2007: 
24). This distinctive type of an ‘alibi function’ (2007: 24) was a consequence of the 
experiences and legacy of the Second World War.  
‘European Political Cooperation and NATO represented a two-pronged strategy by 
which West Germany could secure its territorial safety, while at the same time work 





West Germany has been at the core of the on-going process of political and economic 
integration of West European counties ever since the European Coal and Steel 
Community. West Germany (and then from 1990 reunified Germany) was a strong 
proponent of deepening integration. Despite concerns (Bach 1999: 15; Mearsheimer 
1990; Miskimmon 2007: 33-36) German reunification did not lead to instability in 
Europe. To the contrary, Germany became one of the main advocates of the European 
enlargement process (e.g. a strong advocate of the membership of Poland).  
 
Poland 
Grabbe (2003) observed that Poland could be a ‘new awkward partner’ in Europe due to 
the combination of factors – its size, ambitions, links with countries East of Poland, 
difficult relationship with Russia as well as strong euroscepticism of the government 
ruling between 2005 – 2007. Szczerbiak identifies eight key elements of the Polish 
approach to and philosophy of European integration: 
• Size (largest member of the 2004 enlargement group thus giving it influence in 
the European Parliament and a bigger part of the EU budget) 
• Relative economic backwardness (thus importance of the EU budget for the 
economy and development of Poland) 
• Large agricultural sector (influence of the parties representing farmers and 
support of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy) 
• The need for an ‘Eastern Perspective’ (support of the European path of Ukraine, 
Georgia, Moldova; calls for a more coordinated approach to relationship with 
Russia) 
• Transatlantic relationship (close relationship with Washington) 
• High levels of religiosity and strong Catholic identity (impact on domestic and 
foreign policies; impact on societal and secular aspects of integration) 
• A mixture of Gaullist ‘Europe of nations’ and integrationist approaches (‘big 
state’ aspirations but calls for more integrationist approach to economy, Eastern 
dimension of EU external policy, support for future enlargements of the EU) 
(2012: 42-47) 
Overall therefore, Polish approach to the European integration (and its European policy) 
have been a result of the interplays between leaders’ ambitions, country’s size and 
geographical location, determination to be an important player in EU’s Eastern policies 
and its economical backwardness. As in the case of the UK, the use of the adjective 
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‘awkward’ was noticeable (e.g. in Grabbe 2003); as in the case of Germany, European 
integration was increasingly becoming a part of the state’s identity. 
On the last note, according to the autumn 2007 Eurobarometer poll (when the research 
frames of this thesis have been established) 63% of Poles felt attached to the European 
Union, compared to 52% of Germans and 27% of citizens of the United Kingdom. 
 
3.2	  Time	  frame	  
 
It has begun with a momentous change in Russia, the biggest energy supplier of the 
European Union with the ‘unknown’ of the new president – the former KGB officer. It 
followed with the oil prices shock, where the price jumped from $10 to $30 per barrel. 
There was the Californian energetic crisis, which put into doubt the paradigm of 
liberalisation of energy markets. Then there was global warming, and climate change 
policies entering the mainstream, whether in the form of a Green Paper published by the 
European Commission, or domestic variables, such as the report calling for cuts in 
carbon dioxide emissions (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 2000 report 
in the United Kingdom). All of these factors point to the importance of year 2000 in the 
analysis of energy (in general) and energy discourses (in particular) as it was a year of 
change, where many dominant discourses (and the way they were reading the signs and 
linking them with others) begun to alternate. The end date of the analysis is December 
2009, and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the last EU Member State, the 
Republic of Ireland. The importance of the Lisbon Treaty for energy in the EU has 
already been explored in Chapter 2. 
 
3.3	  Data	  collection	  
 
The empirical data for the three cases I analyse is based on the material collected from 
six broadsheet newspapers from the United Kingdom (The Guardian, The Times), 
Poland (Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita) and Germany (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung and Sueddeutsche Zeitung). The main methodological approach therefore will 
focus on the analysis of newspapers, with print media serving as a source of data. I have 
selected these newspapers on the basis that they represent the elite discourse in all three 
countries, produced by what Chomsky (1997) called the elite media. Their audience is 
mainly privileged people – politicians, businessmen, government officials and ‘other 
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journalists who are involved in organizing the way people think and look at things’ 
(1997) – thus they are not only the agenda-setters, but also reach  (or influence) other 
agenda-setters. And as such contribute (next to other types of media) to the elite 
discourse in their countries (van Dijk 1990). In all the countries selected, one newspaper 
represents the centre-left perspective, whilst the other represents the centre-right. 
The research follows the principle of a top-down approach, starting from the ‘universe 
of possible texts’ (Mautner 2008: 36) and progressively narrows the choices. All of the 
texts taken into consideration refer to energy. The texts are sampled according to the 
Relevance Sampling Method, also known as ‘purposive sampling’ (Krippendorff 2004: 
119). They are sampled according to the timeframe (only texts from 2000 – 2009 are 
included), theme (energy + country) and certain relevance criteria (e.g. focus on 
broadsheet newspapers).  
‘The resulting units of text are not meant to be representative of a population of texts; 
rather, they are the population of relevant texts, excluding the textual units that do not 
possess relevant information’ (2004: 119).   
 
The texts considered to possess relevant information are texts that include the keyword 
energy (in each analysed language i.e. in English, German and Polish). They were 
collected by download from Lexis-Nexis (in the case of the UK newspapers) and other 
relevant web sites (archives of the Polish and German newspapers) on the basis of a 
key-word research. I have excluded from the search newswires and non-business news, 
such as sport or obituaries as well as repeated texts. The relevant sample was further 
reduced by narrowing it down to texts where the keyword energy appeared at least three 
times. In the second reduction of the sample I have excluded irrelevant or redundant 
articles (such as, for example sponsored texts or articles describing how to limit energy 
consumption of houses).  After all of the reductions, the final relevant sample included 






















2000 25 8 70 66 93 62 
2001 31 17 46 50 90 45 
2002 23 20 59 37 80 67 
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2003 27 17 42 41 107 48 
2004 24 29 54 100 104 46 
2005 33 47 59 59 182 90 
2006 69 79 156 119 187 115 
2007 65 36 121 121 77 130 
2008 84 81 150 155 214 110 
2009 55 53 109 67 108 137 
Table 2. Quantitative results of the search – the analysed sample after excluding texts for relevance 
Abbreviations: GW – Gazeta Wyborcza; R – Rzeczpospolita; SZ – Suddeutsche Zeitung; FAZ – 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
 
The texts have been coded according to the codebook (Appendix 1). I have developed 
the codebook as well as all of the categories on the coding scheme based on two factors. 
Firstly, I have included my observations following the review of the existing literature 
on energy, energy policy and energy security (as outlined in Chapters 1 and 2). 
Secondly, I have initially read through 10% of the relevant sample, establishing the first 
basic coding scheme. The coding scheme had been gradually updated following a 
detailed reading (and analysis) of all of the texts from the relevant sample. Once the 
final version of the coding scheme had been established, I have proceeded with the 
coding process. 
I have tested the reliability of codes, following the principle that future researchers 
should be able to repeat the same results with the same set of material given. I have 
conducted an ‘inter-rater reliability test’ on my sampled material. It has been conducted 
by an independent analyst able to communicate freely in all of the languages involved 
(English, German, and Polish). He was asked to analyse the same data according to the 
same set of categories and the same coding scheme. The coder received a preliminary 
coder training. I have selected a representative sample of units (40 units) for a pilot test 
of inter-coder reliability. An inter-rater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was 
performed to determine consistency among raters using the SPSS software. 
The coding has been done independently and without any consultation or guidance from 
my side. The pilot test resulted in a coefficient of .833. Then the coder proceeded to the 
coding of the full sample. I have used another representative sample to assess the 
reliability for the full sample to be coded. I have selected a subset of the full sample 
(10% of the relevant sample, randomly selected; 460 units). Each coder had the task to 
code four main categories: topic1, topic2, actor1, actor2 according to the codebook. 
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Consequently I have performed the inter-rater reliability Kappa test using the SPSS 
software for the raters for each of these four categories. Cohen’s Kappa coefficient for 
each qualifier had been established at: 
1) Topic 1 – Kappa=0.78 (<0.001) 
2) Topic 2 – Kappa=0.87 (<0.001) 
3) Actor 1 – Kappa=0.79 (<0.001) 
4) Actor 2 – Kappa=0.933   
The mean Kappa for the analysed sample is=0.843 (<0.001), which indicates a very 
good agreement between the raters and the results can be viewed as reliable. Therefore, 
the result and conclusions derived from this qualitative analysis are objective (in a sense 
that they are insensitive to the raters' biases). 
In the final version of this research I did not use however the results of the analysis of 
the category of ‘actors’.  
3.4	  Answering	  the	  research	  questions	  
 
I will explain the way each research-guiding question will be answered with the use of 
the analysis of a given indicator. I have to point out however that I will be using the 
evidence provided by one research question in the case of the other research question, 
should such a necessity occur. All of my research questions are linked with each other; 
this is also the case of my indicators. It might happen therefore that an indicator 
originally assigned to one research question may help in answering the other.   
 
Question 1: To what extent and how is energy policy used as security in national 
discourses?  
 
1) Existential threats, extraordinary measures and the presence of the security 
language 
In order to measure securitisation, all texts coded as addressing the ‘energy security’ 
will be further analysed, in terms of actors and referent objects; as well as levels of 
securitisation. Primarily I will be looking for existential threats and extraordinary 
measures. It will be done through the identification of three basic points: 
A – who is being threatened?/ what is being threatened? 
B – who is seen as a threat?/ what is seen as a threat? 
C- what is the extraordinary measure? 
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I did not apply all of the indicators of Securitization Theory, only the elements relevant 
for my particular research. 
In this way I will assess as to what the existential threats are and the extraordinary 
measures used to address them, thus following the principal structure of Securitization 
Theory as outlined by the Copenhagen School. Secondly, the levels of securitisation 
will be measured by their ‘strength’ in terms of the language used. By ‘strength’ I 
understand the frequency of use of security-related language in a given text. All texts 
will be measured on a scale from +1 (high; security-related words used more than four 
times in unrelated sentences) to 0 (limited; security-related words mentioned more than 
two times in unrelated sentences). Thirdly, all texts will also be measured in terms of 
their length, with ‘short’ texts (up to 300 words), ‘medium’ texts (301-800 words) and 
‘long’ texts (more than 801 words).  
 
2) Discursive frames 
A frame is the central organising idea for making sense of relevant events and 
suggesting what is at question. News and information have no intrinsic value unless it is 
embedded in a meaningful context that organises and lends it coherence. News 
messages not only transmit facts, but also certain implicit ideas (Vliegenthart, Schuck, 
Boomgaarden 2008). A number of existing studies (Bennett and Chaloupka 1993; 
Dryzek 1997; Byrne, Toly 2006) point to the existence of the environmental 
consequences frame in energy discourses - arguably the dominant frame till the 2000s 
(Goldthau 2011). Others put forward the existence of the economic consequences frame. 
This frame reports an event, problem, topic or issue in terms of the economic 
consequences it will have on an individual, groups, organisations, or countries. 
(Neuman et al. 1992, Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). Yorgason and Chen (2008: 483) 
identified two types of geopolitical content in newspaper discourses – the creation of 
‘spatialised otherness’ and the depiction of a spatialised threat or possible threats thus 
recognising the frame of geopolitics. An and Gower (2008: 6) add the frame of conflict. 
The use of this frame is to reflect the disagreement and conflict between individuals, 
groups or organisations. Details as to the coding procedure can be found in the 
codebook (Appendix 1).  
A randomly selected sample (10% of the relevant sample of texts from each country) 
will be coded according to these four types of frames. Results of the analysis will show 
the distribution of these four frames as well as the frequency of their presence. Detailed 
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information as to how I will assess the presence of the frames is further described in 
Appendix 1. 
 
Question 2: How do discourses converge (if at all) across three selected countries?  
 
1) Discursive events 
The question will be answered by exploring three main indicators. Firstly, I will 
establish a frequency of all of the texts in each separate case study. The total number of 
texts, sampled on the basis of ‘energy’ through Lexis-Nexis software, and online (and 
paper) archives of all newspapers will be put on a scale and measured on a monthly 
basis in each year (2000: January, February, (…) 2009: January, February). This will 
show the temporal moments within the analysed timeframe with the highest frequency 
of articles relating to ‘energy’, presenting peaks of attention. I will then analyse all of 
the texts from a given peak point, identifying specific events which could have acted as 
catalysts for these spikes in frequency. I will analyse the events which attracted the 
highest newspaper attention through the application of ‘newsworthiness’ criteria of 
Galtung and Ruge (1965). The fact however that these particular events have caused 
increased coverage does not automatically imply that they can be considered as 
discursive events as ‘an event only counts as a discursive event if it appears on the 
discourse planes of politics and the media intensively, extensively and for a prolonged 
period of time’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 48). Any event deemed as ‘discursive’ will 
have to be referred to in other texts after the event took place. I will evaluate it through 
a detailed analysis of the sampled texts following a given ‘peak event’. Not all attention 
‘spikes’ on the frequency curve therefore can be considered discursive events. 
 
2) Tone of the coverage of Russia in the energy discourse 
This variable was operationalised by reference to direct quotes of actors (journalists, 
analysts, officials, politicians, businessmen and scientists), whilst assessing whether the 
language used was positive, negative or neutral, and whether the text was overall 
expressing positive, negative or neutral considered opinion. All of the texts from the 
sample will be coded according to the topics they address. All of those that address 
Russia (commenting on the involvement or various initiatives of the Russian authorities 
in the energy sphere) will be coded as ‘Cooperation with Russia’. All texts expressing 
positive and negative opinions were put into two clusters, and further ranged on a scale 
from -2 (very negative) to +2 (very positive). 
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Adding up all positive evaluations and then subtracting all negative evaluations 
computed the scale. The remaining focus codes were neutral. Values ranged from -2 
(very negative), -1 (somewhat negative), 0 (neutral), 1 (somewhat positive), +2 (very 
positive). The difference between 2 and 1 (and consequently -2 and -1) was based on the 
number of arguments used for or against. If the text contains two or more 
positive/negative arguments about Russia in two separate sentences or paragraphs, it 
qualifies for 2/-2.  
 
3) Benefits/disadvantages from cooperation with the EU in the energy discourse 
This part of the analysis focuses on the framing of texts addressing the EU in terms of 
benefits or disadvantages (in relation to the energy sphere). All of the texts from the 
sample will be coded according to the topics they address. Those that address the 
European Union (commenting on the involvement or various initiatives of the EU 
institutions) will be coded as ‘Cooperation with the EU’. My approach will therefore be 
based on the study conducted by Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgarten and De Vreese 
(2008: 423). 
Prior to this analysis I will identify whether the EU features prominently at all, 
assessing as to whether there is an increasing proportion of texts on energy which 
discuss the involvement of the EU? This will be done through mapping all texts coded 
as addressing the topic of cooperation with the EU. One this will be established, I will 
measure the influence of the EU through the application of two frames – the benefit 
frame and the disadvantage frame. The benefit frame was assessed by the following 
item (a) did the author or any kind of actor mentioned in the article express/argue that 
one’s country benefited/will benefit from the EU either generally or specifically (or that 
the situation in one’s country has improved or will potentially improve because of the 
EU)? The score per article ranges from 0 to 1. The disadvantage frame has been 
assessed following the item (b) did the author or any kind of actor mentioned in the 
article express/argue that one’s country has been/will be negatively affected from the 
EU either generally or specifically? Here the score also ranges from 0 to 1 per article. 
All texts that will receive 0 will be classified as ‘other’.  
All of the results will be presented in a separate table showing the distribution of texts 






The aim of this chapter was to outline the operationalisation of my research. To explain 
the content analysis and the way three separate case studies will be compared according 
to the research-guiding questions. I have explained the time frame of the research (years 
2000 – 2009) as well as reasons for the selection of three case studies: United Kingdom, 
Poland and Germany with special focus on their approach to the European integration 
process. Finally, I have explained how all of the sampled material (4596 texts) will be 
operationalised through coding. I have also explained how all of the information 
obtained as a result of the coding process will be used to answer my research-guiding 
questions.  
The next three chapters will address three case studies; Chapter 4 – United Kingdom, 
Chapter 5 – Poland and Chapter 6 – Germany. 
I will begin each chapter with a brief outline of the context of energy policy in each 
country, so that the reader has a clear idea about the starting point for the analysis. This 
will be important to show that the process of changes in energy discourses was not 
identical in all three cases. They all had different starting points. It will be also 
important to acknowledge the reader with the developments in the energy policy in the 
1990s (an important reference point for each of the further studies). Finally, I will 
provide the reader with information about each of the newspapers providing units for 
analysis. 
Each chapter will be structured in exactly the same way in order to assure the most 
adequate comparative study. The elements will be: 
- Discursive events 
- Energy security (existential threats and extraordinary measures) 
- Analysis of frames 
- Coverage of Russia in the energy discourse 
- Coverage of the EU in the energy discourse 
In order to provide the reader with the full picture of the key elements of the energy 
discourse I will provide the reader with information about the key topics addressed 
throughout the analysed decade.  
Chapter 7 will include a comparative analysis of all of these elements, structured 
according to the research-guiding questions. 




Chapter 4 – United Kingdom 
	  
	  
This chapter presents the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the 
energy discourses in the United Kingdom from the 1st of January 2000 to 1st of 
December 2009. The chapter focuses on the coverage of the energy-related issues in the 
two main British mainstream newspapers, The Guardian and The Times, showing how 
their coverage of energy changed during the first decade of the 21st century. The chapter 
is structured according to the research-guiding questions; first I address the presence of 
security in the energy discourse, then I move to the question of convergence of 
discourses, looking at frequencies of texts, and the coverage of Russia and the EU 
within the energy discourse. The linkages between the research-guiding questions and 
the research methods are further discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3.  
The chapter begins with a short overview of British energy policies at the beginning of 
the analysed period – year 2000. In the case of the United Kingdom energy sector, the 
importance of the markets is especially great. The control of the government over 
energy was gradually reduced through the 1980s and 1990s, through the promotion of 
the liberalisation of electricity and gas markets. The security of supply was increasingly 
an outcome of the market forces rather than a result of government involvement. This 
started to change in the first decade of the new century, especially after 2007. This year 
marks an important initiative: the setting of the 20/20/20 targets by the EU leaders 
(further explained in Chapter 2.3.5) and the subsequent Energy White Paper. Two 
critical elements of these targets were to increase the share of green energy to 20% (in 
2007 they were at 2%) and a decrease of the emissions of carbon dioxide. These could 
no longer have only been an outcome of market forces and they have led to the 
establishment of the Department of Energy and Climate Change in 2008. The 
government was gradually ‘returning’ to the energy sector, with energy increasingly 
becoming politicised in the elite newspaper coverage.  
Besides the gradual return of government to the energy sector, security was also 
becoming increasingly present in the elite newspaper coverage of energy. The turning 
point was year 2005 and the Hampton Courts meeting, followed by the outcomes of the 
2006 energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine. Ultimately however climate change 
had become a referent point for the invocation of the phrase of energy security. It was 
pictured differently by both analysed newspapers. Whereas The Times focused on the 
possible conflicts arising from the changes of the climate and on the costs that they 
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would induce, The Guardian emphasised moral obligations arising from the need to 
react to the changes of the climate. Climate change therefore became a salient topic both 
in the elite newspaper coverage of energy in the United Kingdom and in the policy 
sphere (e.g. which was reflected in the name of the newly established institution, the 
already mentioned Department for Energy and Climate Change). 
An important finding of this chapter is the manifestation of the fortress(es) in the 
analysed energy discourse. Firstly, the fortress was to be a part of Britain’s national 
security as a response to the new frontiers emerging from concerns such as climate 
change or energy supplies. Secondly, the fortress was to protect the UK’s liberal 
democracy and capitalism from the threat of the pressures of the European Union, 
threatening British identity. The first aspect of the fortress was observed in the coverage 
of The Guardian whilst the second was observed in The Times. Both reflected the 
attitude of the elite newspapers to the events happening overseas– the first focused on 
global challenges and ill-defined borders; the second focused on the borders of the 
United Kingdom and the perception of threat of the European Union. This example also 
points to another finding of this chapter – a limited body of evidence suggesting a 
national discourse. It was easier to find differences than similarities in the coverage of 
energy between both newspapers.  
	  
4.1	  The	  Energy	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
 
In his summary of the beginning of the 2000s, Helm (2008: 388) asserted that ‘a process 
of reassessing energy policy had begun, but with no further immediate crisis it gave 
every appearance of being a long, dragged-out affair’.  
The significance of the year 2000 in the UK for the energy discourse is two-fold. 
Firstly, it marks the date of the publication of the European Commission’s Green Paper 
Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply. Secondly, it also marks 
the publication of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollutions (RCEP) 22nd 
Report The Changing Climate; two of the topics that have affected the energy elite 
discourse and the energy policy sphere in the United Kingdom in the 2000s. 
The United Kingdom had a very specific approach towards energy at the beginning of 
the analysed period. Helm (2008) traces it back to the early 1980s. The basis of the 
subject-position reflected the long process of energy liberalisation and market-oriented 
energy policy initiated by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. It put energy into the hands of market forces, as they were 
103	  
	  
thought to provide the most efficient mechanism of supply (2008: 2). The Department 
of Energy, established in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, was the main institution within 
the British Government to promote the new approach. David Howell, the first 
Conservative Secretary of State for Energy (1979 – 1981) outlined the principles of the 
new approach: it was to stimulate greater efficiency in nationalised industries; increase 
competition in the energy sector through new legislation; and to encourage investments 
in new energy resources using the North Sea oil revenues (Pearson, Watson, 2012: 5-6). 
One of the methods used in order to achieve these aims was to break the power of the 
unions (National Union of Mineworkers, NUM, in particular). It was Nigel Lawson 
however (Howell’s successor) who became the face of the new energy policy of the 
British government. 
The central idea of the new approach was outlined in Nigel Lawson’s (Energy Secretary 
since late 1981) speech in June 1982 to the British Institute of Energy Economics in 
Cambridge (Helm 2008: 57) seen as the most significant articulation of the 
government’s approach to energy policy, 
‘I do not see the government’s task as being to try to plan the future shape of energy 
production and consumption. It is not even primarily to try to balance UK demand and 
supply for energy. Our task is rather to set a framework which will ensure that the 
market operates in the energy sector with a minimum of distortion and energy is 
produced and consumed efficiently’ (quoted by Pearson, Watson 2012: 7) 
 
Lawson outlined the priorities of the new approach to energy, all of them based on the 
earlier points sketched out by Howell. The basis for the new system was to be the 
markets (not the government) – they were to set the prices, in contrast to energy 
monopolies existing before. The second priority was competition in the energy market – 
thus a momentum for privatisation in the energy sector. The final priority was to 
promote alternative energy sources, such as a push for nuclear energy, despite the 
massive opposition from the nuclear disarmament movement. The rhetoric was put into 
legislation through the Energy Act in 1983. These were followed by the Electricity Act 
(1989) and Gas Act (1995) setting out transition from monopolies of electricity and gas 
to an open market. 
The same mechanisms were actively promoted both domestically and internationally 
(promotion of liberalisation of energy markets in mainland Europe has been one of the 
main objectives of the United Kingdom) as it saw nationalised resources of continental 
EU states as an obstacle to its own energy policies. This meant that market-orientation 
was seen as the ultimate answer. This was present in all Conservative governments, 
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throughout the era of Thatcher (Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990) as well as during the 
premiership of John Major (Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997). This was initially also 
followed by the Labour government that took power in 1997, which however ‘hoped 
that energy would drop off the political agenda’ (Helm 2008: 386). By the end of 
Conservative rule, private ownership had control over most of the assets of the major 
energy industries.  
While in 1997 the Labour Party seemed uninterested in energy markets, it was also 
content with the dominant liberalised market. John Battle, the Labour Energy Minister 
outlined the approach of the Labour Party:  
‘commitment to competition and determination to ensure that the unbundling of costs 
does not hit hardest those least able to pay (…) [and] commitment to tackling our 
environmental objectives’ (Pearson, Watson 2012: 18).  
 
The new government had an ambition of adding a social dimension to the policy of 
energy liberalisation. It is also worth pointing out the last argument, related to an 
increasingly salient topic of climate change, especially in the wake of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.  The 
environmental dimension of energy was increasingly present in the policy sphere. 
The importance of the environmental aspect of energy had been further emphasised in 
the following years especially in the 2007 Energy White Paper. The first chapter – 
‘Climate change and energy security – A global challenge’ – has outlined the agenda of 
the government. Although the phrase energy security has appeared, the policy approach 
remained market-led. The paper pointed out determination to further open the energy 
markets in the EU, as well as improve transparency in the energy sector outside of the 
EU. The latter point was already visible in the previous years, and was linked with the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) launched by Tony Blair during a 
summit on Sustainable Development in the Republic of South Africa in late 2003. The 
main focus of the initiative was to ensure transparency in the energy sector in terms of 
the ways countries were managing their resources in particular in their relations with 
energy companies. 
The publishing of the 2007 Energy White Paper happened at the time when the EU 
leaders agreed for 20/20/20 targets, further described in Chapters 1 and 2; targets 
aiming at the reduction of 20% of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels, 
increasing the share of renewable energy in energy mixes of Member States to 20% and 
a 20% improvement of energy efficiency. The promotion of renewable energy was 
included into the Energy White Paper, since at the beginning of 2007 their shares in the 
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UK energy mix were at a level of 2% (Pearson, Watson 2012: 32). Both the 20/20/20 
targets as well as the 2007 White Paper set out objectives for the British energy sector 
for the following years. At that time, the energy mix was based on gas (38%) and oil 
(36%), followed by solid fuels (16%) and nuclear energy (9%). Despite the market – led 
approach, the involvement of the government in the energy sector had increased, 
especially in relation to the ambitious agenda of increasing the share of renewables from 
2% - 20% and to decrease Co2 emissions. The growing importance of the climate 
change agenda was reflected in October 2008, when the government created The 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) which took responsibility for the 
implementation of the 20/20/20 targets in the United Kingdom. Low carbon energy 
supplies were emphasised by the first head of the Department, Secretary of State Ed 
Miliband. They included nuclear power, renewables and carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) (2012: 35) thus focusing on low carbon electricity as a means of achieving the 
EU-set targets. These policies were largely followed by the new Conservative – Liberal 
Democrat coalition government following the May 2010 elections. This however falls 
outside of the timeframe of my research (years 2000 – 2009) and will not be further 
analysed here. 
In terms of the energy security aspect, as I have already mentioned, British governments 
remained firmly market-oriented. Although the UK started to become a net gas importer 
(due to the depletion of North Sea gas), investments in pipelines, interconnectors and 
LNG terminals had increased, assuring a range of sources of supply.  
On one side, the United Kingdom had the legacy of leaving energy governance to 
market forces, whilst on the other, the year 2000 provided several important signposts 
challenging that view, with issues of energy supply (the depletion of the UK’s own 
resources), and climate change becoming possible variables of the then-dominant 
subject-position. The market-led approach was further challenged in 2007, with the 
introduction of the 20/20/20 targets and the Energy White Paper.  
This short overview of the state of energy policy affairs in the United Kingdom at the 
beginning and during the 2000s was aimed at providing the reader with reference to 
some of the key observations from the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the 
energy-related texts from The Guardian and The Times as well as to offer some of the 
key notes from these analyses. The results of my analyses are further summarised at the 




4.2	  Analysed	  newspapers	  
 
In order to understand how energy was presented in two of the daily mainstream 
newspapers from 2000 onwards, qualitative analysis of newspaper texts was 
undertaken, with the sample collected based on the Lexis-Nexis search engine. The 
sampled material came from The Guardian and The Times. An important note about the 
selected newspapers concerns their specific political take on the events they cover. 
The Guardian, founded in 1821 as The Manchester Guardian, is according to the Mori 
poll in June 2001 (on election preferences) a newspaper perceived to be a significant 
supporter of the Labour Party (according to 57% of respondents), and a noteworthy 
opponent of the Conservative Party (according to 57% of respondents). The Guardian is 
also seen as moderately supportive of the third major British party, the Liberal 
Democrats (according to 31% of respondents). The choice of The Guardian for the 
purpose of this research is therefore important, as it is the biggest daily broadsheet 
newspaper representing the centre-left political opinions and moderately pro-EU 
coverage.  
The Times is a daily national newspaper published from 1785, and from 1981 has been 
part of News Corporation owned by Rupert Murdoch. The same 2001 Mori poll showed 
that the readership of The Times tends to support the Conservatives (37%). The poll 
identified 26% of the readers opposing the same Labour Party. The newspaper is seen as 
moderate in comparison to the more openly partisan (and pro-Labour) The Guardian. 
What is important for this research is the ideological (Eurosceptic) preference of the 
editorial board of The Times towards the European Union. 
The sampled material obtained was further reduced manually, leaving an overall 823 
texts between 2000 and 2009. The process of sampling has been explained in Chapter 3. 
Following this brief introduction of the state of affairs in the energy sector in the United 
Kingdom at the beginning of 2000s and the main policy initiatives in the 2000s I will 
move to the analysis of my research-guiding questions. 
I will first address the presence of security in the energy discourse produced by two 
mainstream daily newspapers. I will then move to the analysis of indicators which could 
have influenced the process of convergence of discourses in all three analysed countries. 
This will be further addressed and compared with the results of other case studies in 




4.3	  Is	  energy	  supply	  seen	  as	  highly	  threatened	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  
extraordinary	  measures	  are	  necessary?	  
 
As I have explained in the previous chapters, I will look at the presence of security in 
the elite newspaper discourse by examining two key elements of Securitization Theory: 
the existential threats and extraordinary measures. In addition, I will look at the 
presence of the security language in text, assessing its relative strength, measured in 
terms of the phrases as well as the occurrence of security/military language. Finally I 
will look at the frames through which messages have been interpreted. For a more 
detailed description of how it will be done, please see the relevant part of Chapter 3. 
To what extent was energy security present in the UK energy elite discourse throughout 
the decade? Energy security started to enter the mainstream discourse following an 
informal meeting of the European Council at Hampton Court in October 2005, during 
the UK presidency of the European Union. Shortly before the Summit, Blair presented 
his five-point plan. Among coordination of reforms of European universities, increasing 
spending on research and development, control over migration and improvements in 
work-life balance, Blair proposed a plan allowing for the creation of a common EU 
energy policy, that would involve setting up a single energy grid for Europe. This was 
intensely criticised by the Tories, as this was the point Britain had rejected during the 
negotiations over the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TEC). Energy 
security therefore was to be linked with a higher degree of energy cooperation with the 
EU. How did it look in the daily mainstream newspapers? 
I have looked at the presence of the topic of energy security through my quantitative 
analysis of texts, based on the codebook attached to this thesis as Appendix 1.  
Overall, I have coded 92 texts from my UK sample as those that address energy 
security. The Guardian has published 44 of them; The Times 48. 




Figure 4. Texts from both The Guardian and The Times 
 
The distribution of texts addressing energy security has been relatively equal, although 
it is worth pointing out that prior to the increase in the coverage in 2006 The Times was 
more often writing about energy security. Still, the overall number of texts before 2006 
remains very small in comparison to the years 2006 – 2009. I have identified only 10 
texts from The Times and only 4 from The Guardian in the period 2000 – 2005. 
Prior to years 2005 – 2006 security was barely present in the newspaper coverage of 
energy. Two years that stood out were 2006 and 2008. Based on the qualitative reading 
of texts coded for the presence of energy security I was able to support the results of 
quantitative analysis identifying year 2005 and the Hampton Court meeting as an 
important event for the presence of energy security. This could be symbolically labelled 
as a shifting point in the energy discourse and a moment since when energy security has 
started to become a salient topic at least at the level of elite newspapers. As, following 
the qualitative reading of the texts I have observed that this is where the debate started 
to move from issues of mainly domestic reach (internal energy mix of renewable and/or 
nuclear etc.) to those of international significance – relations with Russia, gas imports 
and energy security, seen in its external dimension (e.g. security of supplies) and (most 
importantly) to climate change. 
A look at the headlines provides examples as to how the security language started to 
enter the energy discourse. It also shows the examples of existential threats associated 
with energy security: 




- ‘Climate change a bigger security threat than terrorism, says report’ (The 
Guardian, 12.06.2006) 
- ‘Beckett warns that climate change will increase risk of war’ (The Times, 
25.10.2006) 
- ‘Climate change could lead to global conflict, says Beckett: Foreign secretary 
warns of battle for scarce resources UN vote on Zimbabwe taking environment 
chair’ (The Guardian, 11.05.2007) 
 
Threats identified varied, from domestic, such as gas supplies, to global such as climate 
change, a threat described (by The Guardian) as bigger than terrorism. The overall 
presence of energy security in the coverage of The Guardian seemed to underline the 
very broad definition of energy security – a wide range of perceived threats linked with 
energy were automatically seen as an energy security issue. This was the case with 
energy supply (threatened by disruptions); with the environment (threatened by the 
changing climate). The analysis of contents of texts seemed to bring back the words of 
Ciuta (2011) of energy security as a ‘total security’– security of everything against 
everything. The Guardian primarily focused on the threats posed by climate change. 
Although other topics (such as gas supplies) have also been linked with energy security, 
it was predominantly the threat to the natural environment where authors writing for 
The Guardian have invoked the phrase energy security. 
The Times seemed to have a different focus in its coverage of energy threats. Contrary 
to the coverage of The Guardian, the environmental aspect of energy security (linked 
with the threats posed by the global warming/climate change) was not of much concern 
for the authors writing for The Times. These observations are supported by an analysis 
of contents of all texts where energy security had been invoked (48 texts in the case of 
The Times). The Times focused on the perceived threat(s) stemming from Russian 
energy policies. It was increasingly seen in terms of enmity discernible both in texts as 
well in the headlines, to provide few examples: 
- ‘Gazprom may offer security of supply, but at a price - the price that a 
monopolist can set, at a level of its own choosing. If that is security, then the UK 
should plan to make sure it never depends on Russian gas.’ (‘Threat posed by 
Russian power’, The Times 16.03.2006).  
 
- ‘You don't have to be a Cold War zombie to see that the European Union has 
been utterly complacent about its energy security. The spooks were right. Their 
prediction that the Kremlin would use energy as a foreign policy lever was 
premature, but it was right all the same. They were right about the need to 
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develop and promote Norwegian gas (it has come on stream in the UK in the 
nick of time, and no thanks to Whitehall). They were also right about the need 
for oil and gas pipelines linking the Caspian Sea to Europe, projects ridiculed by 
some a decade ago as uneconomic and politically adventurous. Oil from the 
Caspian is now flowing down BP's pipeline to the Mediterranean, a route that 
avoids the stranglehold of Transneft and provides a vital alternative to the weak 
flow of oil from Iraq’ (‘Spooks were right on energy security’, The Times 
10.01.2007) 
 
- ‘Power supergrid plan to protect Europe from Russian threat to choke off 
energy’, The Times, 13.11.2008 
 
- ‘How the West is losing the energy cold war’, The Times 08.08.2008 
 
All the examples above include references to the Cold War – this was the lens through 
which the energy relationship between the UK/Europe and Russia was frequently 
portrayed by The Times. It referred directly to the New Cold War narrative of a revived 
rivalry with Russia discussed in more detail in Chapters 1 and 2. I have to point out 
however that there was not a single unified approach towards energy security across the 
whole board in The Times; climate change was also portrayed as an existential threat. 
Yet in contrast to the coverage of The Guardian, The Times presented climate change as 
a threat which may lead to unprecedented conflicts. It did not focus on the impact on the 
environment; it seemed to mirror the Crisis Group’s (see Chapter 1 and 2) approach, 
where the future of the globe was to be decided by forthcoming energy-based conflicts. 
They have focused, in particular, on the costs of the climate change and of these 
conflicts, e.g.:   
- ‘How to win the climate war: dig into your pocket for victory; Going green will 
cost billions. The way to raise the money is to issue modern war bonds and raise 
an army of investors’, The Times 02.03.2009 
 
- ‘Europe begins to freeze as taps are turned off in energy war; Countries call a 
state of emergency and fears of price rises are growing as the dispute spreads’ 
The Times 07.01.2009 
 
I have underlined the most vivid examples of the security language present in the 
energy discourse. In some cases (texts referring to the New Cold War in Europe – 
Russia relations) this language was also borderline militant; although my analysis of the 
strength of the texts shows that this was relatively low (Table 3). By strength I refer to 
the presence of security language (further addressed in Chapter 2) in texts which I have 
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measured on a scale from +1 (high) to 0 (low) assessing the frequency of the use of 
security-related words in the texts. 
 Reporting Analysis Interview Opinion 
Strength 0.34 0.2857 0 0.588 
Table 3. The level of presence of security language in sampled material from The Guardian and The 
Times 
N=82 texts (or 10% of the overall sample; randomly selected) 
 
The presence of the security language was mainly observable in The Times in their 
references to the New Cold War. The overall strength in texts published in The 
Guardian was at the level of 0.2; in The Times of 0.4. According to the nature of 
reporting in The Times newspaper, ‘we’ had to be protected from threats posed by 
Russia, energy Cold War, (forthcoming) climate war through super-grids, modern war 
bonds, armies of investors. The latter examples show how what seemed to be a market-
led argument (bonds, investors) could be militarised through linking it with war and an 
army. 
One of the features visible both in The Guardian and in The Times was setting frontlines 
and boundaries. The Guardian’s fortress referred to the publication of the Institute for 
Public Policy Research (IPPR), a think-tank based in the UK, arguing that,  
‘threats to Britain's national security go far beyond terrorism and traditional concerns 
about military defence and include climate change, energy supplies, and disease (…). 
New frontlines are emerging in the battle to safeguard our security’. (‘Think-tank warns 
of new threats to Britain’s national security’, The Guardian 13.02.2008).  
 
It should be pointed out that IPPR is a left-leaning UK think-tank associated with the 
Labour Party. Broadening of security, in terms of the discourse, was therefore done by 
the authors representing the centre-left side of the political scene in the UK.    
Frontiers and fortresses were increasingly visible in the texts. A topic which would 
seem to have limited relevance to security, such as investments in alternative energy, 
was experiencing these phenomena. But does the presence of security language confirm 
securitisation? The presence of the security language was observable (Table 3). Energy 
security was also a topic increasingly present in the media coverage. Whereas at the 
beginning of the decade it was barely mentioned, it was gaining prominence with time, 
as one can observe in the coverage of The Guardian and The Times (Figure 4).  
The identification of existential threats was very broad in both analysed newspapers. In 
the most salient examples, The Guardian emphasised the threat to the climate stemming 
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from  climate change and global warming; The Times seemed to centre on the threat 
posed by Russian policies and future conflicts (and costs) resulting from climate 




The advocacy of extraordinary measures however was largely missing, with one 
observable exception. The case was promoted by The Times, and the exceptional 
measure was to introduce the modern war bonds and the army of investors as a response 
to the need of increasing the presence of green energy in the energy mix.    
With the exception of this one instance, the presence of security was limited to an 
increased presence of security language, and a very broad approach to the identification 
of potential threats. The promoted solutions (a move towards a more open market in the 
EU; improving transparency; energy efficiency) were hardly of an extraordinary 
character as the example of the 2007 White Paper (discussed in the introduction of this 
chapter) has shown. This was a matter of day-to-day politics rather than an exceptional 
case of an existential threat requiring exceptional actions. The only instance where one 
might seek both existential threats and extraordinary measures was climate change – 
with the existential threat being irreversible changes to the climate (in The Guardian) or 
forthcoming conflicts and costs (in The Times) and an extraordinary measure – the 
redefinition of the energy mix and promotion of green energy. Securitisation of the 
climate is however a broad (and multidimensional) topic outside the limitations of this 
particular research (I explore it further in Chapter 8). Its focus is more on the climate 
rather than on energy; energy merely plays a role of one of the variables, hence one can 
often find their co-presence in a single sentence: climate change and energy security 
issues. This did not however mean that both problems should be treated as one. 
Nevertheless, I have to point out that energy security was often put into the context of 
climate change both by The Guardian and The Times next to other threats, thus 
contributing to the totality of energy security as a concept.  
 
Frames 
As I have explained in Chapter 3, I have also looked at the presence of the frames in 
order to add an additional indicator measuring the presence of security in the coverage 
of energy in the elite newspapers. In Chapter 3 I identified four potential frames which 
should be identifiable in the energy discourses. These were 1 – environmental 
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consequences; 2 – economic consequences; 3 – geopolitical; 4 – conflict. The selected 
texts have been analysed following the process outlined in Chapter 3, in order to 
identify one of the four frames.  In order to proceed with the frames analysis, I have 
randomly sampled 10% of the texts (82 texts) from the overall UK sample (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Results of the frames analysis, United Kingdom 
A table detailing numbers of texts can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
Overall, the frame most present throughout the decade was that of economic 
consequences, present in 34 texts, followed by the frame of conflict (15 texts) and then 
of geopolitics (13 texts). The frame of environmental consequences gained a 
considerable presence of 12 texts in the sampled material, with an increase observable 
from 2006 onwards. The graphic representation of the frames analysis is presented in 
Figure 5. 
The debates within the energy discourse were centred on the economy, economy-based 
arguments and economy-based language and rhetoric. The frames of conflict and 
geopolitics were raised mainly in relation to the New Cold War (in The Times) and the 
European Union, where the UK was portrayed as a fortress – of liberal democracy and 
capitalism, against a European superstate run by bureaucracy, not held accountable to 
any electorate. One could observe here a very peculiar application of a neo-colonial 
narrative (in The Times in particular), where the UK was portrayed as feeling the need 
to create a border and a frontier, to protect itself from the neo-colonial pressures coming 
from Brussels, bringing foreign business and cultural practices, which would threaten 
the British identity. This was visible in particular in the coverage of The Times, 
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primarily in various texts referring to continental countries as Europe, notwithstanding 
the fact that the UK is (both geographically and politically) a part of Europe too. Both 
geopolitical and conflict frames were also visible in the coverage of climate change 
(seen as an existential threat).  
 
Conclusions about the first research-guiding question 
The increasing use of security (and sometimes military) language and the growing 
presence of the phrase energy security (see Figure 5) may indicate that energy discourse 
in the United Kingdom was influenced by the process of securitisation. But there are 
many points where the results of my analysis would disagree with this 
oversimplification. 
Firstly, as explored in Chapter 2, ‘securitization can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. 
If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the 
response and sense of urgency becomes institutionalized’ (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 
1998: 27). In the case of the analysed energy coverage, securitisation did not become 
institutionalised. It remained an issue of politics-as-usual where all initiatives were 
going through the same policy mechanisms as any other. No exceptional measures 
(understood as measures contradicting the existing law or normal practices, see Chapter 
2.2.3) were presented, argued for (or implemented), bar the idea of modern war bonds 
and the army of investors to promote green energy. Secondly, going back to Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde (2008: 25), ‘a discourse that takes the form of presenting 
something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create 
securitisation – this is a ‘securitizing move’, but the issue is securitized only if and 
when the audience accepts it as such’. As any assessment of whether these ‘securitizing 
moves’ were in fact accepted by the audience is difficult within the collected sample, it 
is safe to deduce that several elements of securitisation were in fact in place: the 
increasingly visible role of the government; use of the security language; 
contextualisation of the UK energy sector in terms of threats resulting from increased 
dependability on supplies resulting from the depletion of North Sea resources; 
increasing presence of a link energy and security. Yet, the example of energy discourse 
in the UK falls on the crucial element of presenting these threats as existential threats; 
and offering any extraordinary measures. The UK energy coverage therefore, according 
to the approach offered by the Securitisation Theory, was not securitised. It was 
increasingly politicised, with an increasing presence of security (and sometimes 
militant) language.  
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European energy policy is one example of the politicisation of energy coverage. As 
politicisation is not only the question of the level of involvement of the government (or 
politicians in general), it is also a question of how contentious an issue is between 
different parties. The question of a closer coordination of European energy policy was 
one of the most antagonising issues when comparing the coverage of The Guardian and 
The Times; contentious in terms of interpretation of the events but also on a ‘what 
should be done’ question. It was politicised in particular from the early 2007, which was 
linked with the 20/20/20 EU targets and the Energy White Paper. I explore this issue 
further in the latter part of this chapter; the reference to it here is to underline my 
argument of politicisation rather than securitisation of the coverage of energy.  
Energy has not been framed as an existential threat. But it did get more attention as a 
problem of public policy. The analysis of the opinion poll data of the Eurobarometer 
shows how energy has been elevated as an important issue. In response to the question 
of the most important issue facing the country, energy has started to appear as a 
response from the beginning of 2007 (see Table 4). Energy related issues were not 
present in the Eurobarometer opinion polls data prior to the 2007 spring wave. In the 
spring of 2007 4% of respondents considered energy related issues as an important issue 
facing the country. In the autumn of 2009 the number had increased to 11%. This may 
signify that although energy had not securitised in the elite newspaper discourse, its 
increased presence in these newspapers had led to an increased saliency of energy for 
the broader audience. 
Year Spring Autumn 
2007 4% 4% 
2008 6% 8% 
2009 6% 11% 
Table 4. Eurobarometer opinion polls data: Energy related issues as a response to the question ‘name two 
most important issues facing their country’ in the UK 
 
Having examined the presence of security in the energy discourse produced by the elite 
newspapers I will move to the second research-guiding questions focusing on the 
potential convergence of discourses. For this purpose I will look at three separate 
indicators – analysis of the frequency of texts, coverage of the energy policies of the 




4.4	  Indicators	  of	  convergence	  	  
 
I will be looking at convergence as a process taking place in time, with the focus on the 
years 2000 – 2009. The flow of discourses in time can be graphically explained with a 
comparison to the line, going from point A to point B. At some points, three lines 
representing three analysed discourses (UK, Poland, and Germany) will be closer to 
each other, whilst at other points they will be further from one another. There will 
however be points where these discourses will be aligned (or almost aligned). This is 
where discourses would converge. In order to be very specific as to what type of 
convergence I am seeking here, as I have explained in the previous chapters (1, 2 and 3) 
for problems defined and the solutions offered within the analysed timeframe. Analysis 
of the frequency curves will allow me to establish specific peak points and identify 
particular events which caused an increased media attention. I will qualitatively analyse 
the contents of the texts from these identified periods in order to pinpoint specific 
phenomena/observations/conclusions. This will be supported by a detailed qualitative 
analysis of all of the texts from the sample, in order to isolate discursive events. 
The definition of the discursive event has already been discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, 
but in order to provide the reader with a brief summary, I will refer to the discursive 
event as ‘an event only counts as a discursive event if it appears on the discourse planes 
of politics and the media intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time’ 
(Wodak and Meyer 2009: 48). The full assessment of a discursive event required 
therefore an analysis of the contents of texts. I have to point out however that the fact 
that a particular event may receive an increased coverage does not mean that it is a 
discursive event; to the contrary, an event that may receive limited coverage at the time 
of its occurrence may become ‘discursive’ through its influence on the latter 
publications. The Yukos case proves to be exactly that in this particular chapter. 
In Chapter 7 I will compare the results of my qualitative and quantitative analyses in 
order to see whether the frequency curves of all discourses had aligned at any point 
within the analysed period; but also to see whether I was able to identify any specific 
discursive events. If so, I shall make comparisons between them. This together with the 
analysis of two other indicators – the coverage of Russia and the EU – supported by the 
results of the comparison of other indicators (from the previous research-guiding 




The first task here is to identify a discursive peak that appears in moments in the 
timeline between year 2000 and year 2009 when the largest numbers of texts have been 
published. This focus on the calendar is of particular importance as it should allow us to 
see that not only did the reporting intensify at similar times in all analysed countries 
(which would be easy to justify, as e.g. coverage of conflicts usually leads to their 
higher saliency) but also that the coverage itself (in terms of topics) was increasingly 
similar. 
The month-by-month analysis has shown the following results (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Frequency curve of texts from The Guardian and The Times collected in the final sample, years 
2000 – 2009.  
G – The Guardian; T – The Times. A table detailing numbers of texts per month can be found in 
Appendix 2.  
 
There were two years where the number of texts significantly increased in comparison 
to other years. Figure 6 identifies three months where the number of texts boosted – 
July 2006 (22 texts), January 2008 (22 texts) and August 2008 (25 texts). In order to 
assess the exact contents of these texts I have conducted a detailed analysis of all of the 
texts from the above mentioned months. This was repeated in two following case 
studies: Poland and Germany. 
In order to provide additional arguments to the research guiding question, I have looked 
at the contents of the texts published in the identified peak months. It was important to 
look at the similarities and/or differences between the coverage of The Guardian and 
The Times. As I have argued in the previous three chapters, the differences between two 
analysed newspapers in each country have been an important factor in the process of the 
identification of the sources of the material. It is therefore important, for the purposes of 
this research, to take a closer look at the contents of the texts in the case of each of the 
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three research-guiding questions; especially in terms of the assessment of discursive 
events. 
At the beginning of 2006, texts published in both of the papers concentrated on the cut 
of the flow of gas through Ukrainian territory by Russia; an issue that dominated the 
coverage of both The Guardian and The Times in the first trimester of 2006. 
What made the newspaper attention spike in July 2006 was an association with three 
major episodes, that is: 
- Gazprom’s plans to take over Scottish Power, and enter UK’s electricity market; 
(1st of July, 17th of July, 19th of July) 
- Rosneft’s ambitions to be listed on the London stock market (8th of July, 17th of 
July) 
- The G8 summit in St Petersburg (11th of July, 15th of July; 19th of July) 
Russia was therefore at the centre of attention in July 2006 for both The Guardian and 
The Times. But did the coverage differ? ‘"The Russians are coming. The Russians are 
coming." That was the call among the City's dealing rooms yesterday as both Centrica 
and Corus raced ahead on talk of bids from the east.’ (‘Market forces: The Russians 
advance on the energy front’, The Guardian 01.07.2006). The Guardian in its coverage 
presented a mixture of admiration and (mild) criticism, e.g.  
‘Despite accusations of anti-democratic tendencies, Mr Putin's personal popularity is 
unmatched by his G8 guests. His approval rating is roughly twice that of George W 
Bush or Tony Blair. And despite growing NGO and opposition criticism at home, many 
Russians seem to admire his readiness to challenge US global leadership 
assumptions.’(World briefing: Putin limbers up to flex new muscles at G8’, The 
Guardian 11.07.2006).  
 
The curious aspect was the comparison of the approval ratings between Putin with Blair 
and Bush. This is an important observation, as till 2006 the way in which Putin was 
presented (especially in The Guardian), was one of moderate admiration, despite 
‘flaws’ (e.g. ‘anti-democratic tendencies’). Finally, 2006 was the year of the UK’s 
energy review – a governmental agenda of cutting carbon emissions, building new 
power stations, boosting the renewable sector and energy savings in order to address the 
forthcoming depletion of North Sea resources. This was particularly seen in texts from 
July 2006, when the debate focused on the future of nuclear energy in the UK energy 
mix. 
For 2008, Figure 6 identifies two spikes in January 2008 and August 2008. In January 
2008, the texts dealt mainly with the on-going debate over the future of nuclear energy 
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in the United Kingdom. The discourse in The Guardian was critical of the revival of 
nuclear energy and endorsement of renewables: 
 ‘After fierce protests and much delay, the government finally came clean yesterday and 
announced that it will encourage more nuclear power plants. A success, ministers and 
civil servants may feel. But only in the narrowest terms. Strategically, the decision 
represents a huge failure: a failure to get a grip on the imminent shortfall in domestic 
energy supply; a failure to ramp up renewables early enough; and a failure to think 
creatively about how Britain gets and uses its energy. ‘(Nuclear power: The atomic age 
returns, The Guardian 11.01.2008).  
Also The Times presented a moderately negative view on the nuclear revival, through 
the focus on costs:  
‘Roger Higman, the policy director of Friends of the Earth, said: "Britain can meet its 
energy needs, maintain energy security and tackle climate change through a 
comprehensive programme of renewables, energy efficiency and cleaner carbon 
technology." We should invest in a safe, clean and sustainable future, rather than trying 
to breathe fresh life into the discredited dinosaur of nuclear power. The Government's 
public consultation was a sham. Nuclear power is not the answer to tackling climate 
change. It is expensive and leaves a legacy of deadly nuclear waste that remains 
dangerous for tens of thousands of years. UK taxpayers are already committed to a bill 
of up to £ 70 billion to clean up the nuclear mess we have already created. Adding to 
that cost would be financial madness and a diversion of resources that would be better 
spent on energy efficiency and renewables."’ (No limits for new nuclear power stations, 
The Times 08.01.2008). 
Both newspapers criticised the plans for the resurgence of nuclear energy. Renewable 
energy was seen to be the preferred option; though without much detail as to which of 
the options of green energy were preferred. The Guardian underlined the energy supply 
arguments whereas The Times emphasised the costs of nuclear energy. 
The concept of energy security starts to appear, though without much attention as to its 
meaning. It was however supposed to be met through a mixture of renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, and new clean carbon technology. 
Secondly on the matter of climate change, as the European Commission published the 
first draft of its 20/20/20 strategy (details of which can be found in Chapters 1 and 
2.3.5), the coverage became more negative of the EU,  
‘The British coastline is set for a dramatic increase in wind farms and tidal energy 
plants as the Government strives to meet a European target for renewable energy. The 
pressure to speed up plans for thousands of wind turbines and the controversial Severn 
barrage is likely to be intense. The EU is expected to order Britain this week to raise its 
game from 2 per cent of renewable energy to 15 per cent by 2020. The EU package, to 
be published on Wednesday, will also confirm a binding target for 10 per cent of all fuel 
to come from biofuel, despite the warning today from MPs about its drawbacks.’ (EU 
targets could force Britain to build thousands of wind turbines, The Times 21.01.2008).  
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The Times was also pointing to the economic consequences of the EU’s initiatives, e.g. 
in ‘20,000 wind turbines - plus a 15% rise in electricity bills’ (24.01.2008). The 
Guardian in its coverage at the same time underlined moral obligations stemming from 
the initiatives, e.g. in ‘Global Warming: EU aims for moral high ground with swingeing 
climate change package: Blueprint's binding targets for 27 member countries: Brussels 
wants deal with US, China and India’, The Guardian 24.01.2008). The Guardian’s 
coverage was marginalising the matter of financial consequences of this initiative.  
In August 2008 the energy-related coverage was primarily focused on Russia and its 
armed intervention in Georgia. The references to energy in these texts were frequent 
enough for these texts not to be excluded from the sample. This was related to the 
involvement of the government (and British companies, BP in particular) in the 
development of the BTC pipeline crossing Georgian territory. This only confirms that 
the conflict has been observably associated with energy in the coverage of both 
newspapers. The conflict has also become an element of the New Cold War narration. 
The texts in The Guardian were mixed in terms of the assessment of the events. Some 
of them were somewhat positive of Russia, e.g.  
‘This is a tale of US expansion not Russian aggression: War in the Caucasus is as much 
the product of an American imperial drive as local conflicts. It's likely to be a taste of 
things to come’, The Guardian 14.08.2008)  
 
or ‘Media: On the press: Georgia has won the PR war’, The Guardian 18.08.2008). It 
did however also publish texts with a tone critical of Russia, e.g. in ‘Beware the bear 
trap: Britain, like most of Europe, is at risk of being the target of Russia's energy export 
weaponry’ The Guardian 30.08.2008). During the same period, journalists of The Times 
presented a more critical stance towards Russia, e.g. in ‘Alarm bells sound at threat to 
vital link in the energy chain’, The Times 09.09.2008 or ‘Russia's Self-
Aggrandisement’, 11.08.2008) and ‘Divide and capitalise: Russia exploits a limp 
summit’, 02.09.2008) The coverage in August 2008 also dealt with the on-going debate 
over the nuclear energy and windfall tax on energy companies. 
Going back to the established definition of a discursive event as ‘an event only counts 
as a discursive event if it appears on the discourse planes of politics and the media 
intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 
48). It is difficult to single out one (or few) specific events which would influence the 
energy discourse in the United Kingdom for a prolonged period of time, which would 
respond to the definition set out by Wodak and Meyer (see a more detailed discussion 
on it in Chapter 2). Based on the qualitative analysis and contents of the texts from the 
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sample I have identified two events, whose significance for the next months and years 
was visible through the discourse. The first was the arrest of Khodorkovsky and the 
Yukos case (further addressed below, when referring to the tone of the coverage of 
Russia). The symbolic importance of the Khodorkovsky trial for Russia, the energy 
sector and (directly) for the United Kingdom was epitomised by an article in The 
Economist from the 10th of May 2007 (‘Business in Russia after Yukos’). Yet again it 
subscribed to the neo-imperial narrative of the rebirth of a Russian Empire and to the 
New Cold War narrative;  
‘Russian tsars often banished disloyal aristocrats who prospered under a previous reign 
and expropriated their wealth. What was new with Yukos was Mr Putin's pretence that 
all this was legal. That eroded democratic institutions and further discredited the law by 
using it as a political instrument. An attack late last year on Royal Dutch Shell 
(allegedly on environmental grounds) and an earlier economic blockade of Georgia, 
which was attributed to health regulations, were part of a pattern that began with 
Yukos’.  
 
The second was the EU climate change initiatives, obliging EU Member States to 
increase the share of green energy in their energy mixes, a direct result of the 20/20/20 
targets. Both of these events received an in-depth and prolonged coverage. My analysis 
has shown that both events can be considered as discursive events for both The 
Guardian and The Times. 
 
The coverage of Russia in the energy elite discourse  
The next point of the analysis focuses on the perception of the threat of Russian actions 
in the energy sector. In order to proceed with the analysis, I have pursued to narrow 
down my sample to the texts which have either addressed or referred to what I have 
labelled as ‘cooperation with Russia’. I have done it according to the steps outlined in 
Chapter 3, using the codebook (Appendix 1). All of the texts included in this narrowed 
down sample have been quantitatively and qualitatively analysed. Below I present the 
results of both analyses.  
Following the quantitative analysis of the sampled texts the newspaper coverage of 
energy between 2000 and 2009 can be divided into two periods: 2000 – 2005 and 2006 
– 2009 (Figure 6). Cooperation with Russia was a relatively insignificant issue within 
the discourse up until spikes of attention in 2006 and 2008. There was therefore a high 
conditional probability that the importance of cooperation with Russia would increase 
proportionately with an increased coverage of energy.  
122	  
	  
I have coded the sampled texts according to the guidelines set out in Chapter 3 with the 
use of the codebook (Appendix 1). The overall sample included 116 texts which 
referred to cooperation with Russia in the energy sphere. Forty-six of them have been 
published by The Guardian, 70 by The Times. This shows that the ‘Russia factor’ was 
more often addressed in the coverage of The Times, in particular in years 2007 – 2009. 
This is when The Guardian focused more (within the energy discourse) on the climate 
change, whereas The Times on cooperation with Russia.   
 
Figure 7. Breakdown of texts sampled as addressing cooperation with Russia collected from The 
Guardian and The Times; years 2000 - 2009 
 
The qualitative analysis of the contents of texts gives an overview of how the perception 
of Russian actions in the energy sector was shaped by both newspapers. 
Initially Russia played a limited role in the energy discourse (Figure 7). The early 
welcoming of Vladimir Putin by Tony Blair was intended to copy Margaret Thatcher’s 
approach to Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s (Shevtsova 2007: 214). His introduction 
by the British mainstream media was in the context of the legacy of his predecessor - 
Yeltsin’s – departure: ‘A man whose greatest love was power’; ‘Boris Yeltsin’s 
masterstroke – to boldly go’, ‘Rebel who won a people’s heart only to lose it again’, 
‘The end of Yeltsin’s era’ were the headlines of The Guardian’s issue from the 1st of 
January 2000. Both broadsheet newspapers in Britain initially focused on the transfer of 
power between Yeltsin and Putin, within the framework of the on-going war in 
Chechnya and forthcoming (scheduled for the 26th of March 2000) presidential elections 
in Russia. All analysed media were neutral in their comments on Tony Blair and Robin 
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Cook’s (UK Foreign Secretary 1997 - 2001) positive reception of the new Russian 
leader. British authorities were unequivocally supportive of Vladimir Putin, with Tony 
Blair meeting the Russian president just before his March 2000 elections. Putin made 
London the destination for his first trip to Europe in April 2000, adding five further 
meetings between both leaders in 2000 and five again in 2001, despite loud opposition 
over numerous violations of human rights by Russian troops in the North Caucasus.  
With the reference to Russia, two different pictures were created – the government 
supported a picture of Vladimir Putin being the man to do business with, whose 
authoritarian tendencies are ‘understandable’ within the overall 
historical/cultural/economical situation of the country, with Blair believing that Putin 
would be open to engagement and influence (Grachev 2005: 256).  
The overall picture painted by both The Guardian and The Times from January 2000 to 
October 2003 (imprisonment of Khodorkovsky) was somewhat neutral of the Russian 
president, and contrary to the image created by the Prime Minister’s office. The media 
introduced Putin through the prism of his KGB past and the on-going war in Chechnya 
(with references to him as the ‘butcher of Chechnya’ by The Guardian), whereas 
authorities and political analysts tended to picture him as a transactional leader, being 
more of a manager than a political leader (Pravda 2005: 25) or a consolidator, trying to 
manage raging transformation in Russia (Breslauer 2005). For some, Putin appeared to 
be an exceptional leader (exceptional for Russian history), as he managed to avoid two 
extremes – of being too strong or too weak (Pravda 2005: 23).  
Overall, in the first part of the decade, the tone of the coverage was neutral (Figure 8). 
By tone I refer to what I have explained in Chapter 3 that is in assessing whether the 
language used was positive, negative or neutral and whether the text was overall 
expressing positive, negative or neutral considered opinion. All texts expressing 
positive and negative opinions were put into two clusters, and further ranged on a scale 




Figure 8. Tone of the coverage of Russia based on the sampled material from The Guardian and The 
Times. 
A table detailing numbers of texts can be found in Appendix 2 
 
I have found observable differences between The Guardian and The Times, with the 
latter being more negative overall (-1) than the former (-0.333).   
This started to change in 2006 (Figure 7) and the tone of the coverage gradually started 
to become negative (Figure 8). In terms of the contents of the coverage, both 
newspapers were addressing the ongoing processes of re-privatisation of the energy 
sector in Russia and the dismantlement of Yukos, as disturbing for many of its foreign 
investors. They were not replaced by new ones, but by the interventionism of the state. 
Rosneft, a company that took over the majority of Yukos was, and still is, a 
government-controlled company. It led to a big debate in the newspapers, when Rosneft 
was considering to be listed at the London Stock Exchange. This led some of the 
authors (e.g. Frank Kane in The Observer, a Sunday edition of The Guardian, in 
‘Rosneft is a step too far for globalisation’, 13 November 2005) in both analysed 
newspapers to fear that through this, the Yukos break up would be legitimised 
internationally.  
These policies were seen as a clear redefinition of the previous rules governing the 
Russian energy sector and a powerful example of Putin’s doctrine of using the state’s 
resources for political gains, as tools in foreign policy. It caused a widespread irritation 
in the texts in Britain, for two main reasons. It firstly meant that the liberalisation of the 
energy sector, actively promoted by the UK throughout the 1990s, was abolished. It also 
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threatened the ongoing investment projects of two British energy giants – BP and Shell. 
The latter was a self-fulfilling prophecy as in July 2007, BP had to sell its majority stake 
in BP – TNK, a consortium developing Kovykta oil field, which ended the friendship 
between Blair and Putin; a friendship that originated in early 2000 (Shevtsova 2007: 
143).   
Shortly after Khodorkovsky’s arrest on the 4th of November 2003, The Guardian 
explicitly stated – ‘of course Putin’s crackdown on the oligarchs is causing panic in the 
West’. The text raised concerns whether the privatisation and liberalisation process of 
the 1990s was properly understood and appreciated by Russia:  
‘perhaps the reason the Kremlin feels comfortable about nationalising or even re-
privatising parts of supposedly privatised industries is that the Russian kleptocracy 
never really believed what the western advocates of privatisation so want us all to 
believe, that an industry which is privatised magically transforms itself into a lean, 
competitive, consumer-friendly beast run by risk-loving entrepreneurs.’ 
  
This narrative of Russian inferiority or inability to master the principles of market 
economy was contrasted with a neo-imperial narrative of a process of rebuilding of the 
Russian Empire, e.g. The Times (26th of April 2005) concluded that  
‘[f]or all his [Putin’s] talk about market reform, Russia's place in the world and 
friendship with George Bush, at heart Mr Putin still hankers for the empire into which 
he was born and for which he spied.’  
 
Overall, Russia was a ‘newcomer’ to the British energy discourse. It was largely 
invisible at the beginning of the decade, gaining presence throughout the years, and in 
particular after the events of 2005 and 2006 explained earlier. The coverage was also 
mixed in tone. The Guardian tended to present papers in both a somewhat positive and 
sometimes very negative tone. The Times tended to be more consistent in its coverage, 
which was mainly either neutral, or somewhat negative.  
 
The coverage of the EU in the energy elite discourse 
In order to narrow down the overall sample, I have collected all of the texts coded as 
addressing the topic of ‘cooperation with the EU’, following the principles outlined in 
Chapter 3, with the use of the codebook (Appendix 1). I have conducted a quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of the final group of texts, which led to the final observations. 
The analyses included both the analysis of frequency (number of texts per year) as well 
as an analysis of benefits frames vs. disadvantages frames, assessing whether an article 
expresses/argues that the country will benefit from cooperation with the EU or to the 
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contrary i.e. that it will be a disadvantage. I have further addressed this method in 
Chapter 3 as well as in the Appendix 1. 
Following the coding process I have identified 68 texts addressing cooperation with the 
EU: 42 of them published by The Guardian, 26 by The Times (Figure 9). The EU was 
therefore more present in The Guardian. The fact that the topic was covered in only 8% 
of the overall sample (or 68 out of 823 texts) points to limited relevance of the 
European Union to the energy reporting in both newspapers. 
 
Figure 9. Cooperation with the EU in texts sampled according to the codebook; United Kingdom. Years 
2000 - 2009 
 
Within the energy elite discourse, cooperation with the EU was mainly associated with 
the creation of a common energy market but also with other common initiatives, 
primarily tackling climate change (e.g. common green energy policies; common nuclear 
energy policies; common renewable energy policies; a common EU position for the 
Copenhagen Summit). Closer coordination of European energy policy was one of the 
most polarising cases – both newspapers discussed in different ways, with The 
Guardian pointing to positive outcomes of such cooperation and The Times on the 
negative consequences of common European agreements. 
In terms of specific events, the 2006 energy crisis led to a higher presence of EU actors 
in the texts, in relation to their involvement in solving the crisis. It was not so much the 
case of the Copenhagen Summit and negotiations within the EU for a common position. 
In the UK newspaper coverage, the Copenhagen Summit (and preparations for it) was 
presented more from the perspective of the UK and the US – the main forces behind the 
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then forthcoming negotiations, rather than from the perspective of the UK as a member 
of the EU. In both cases however, the benefits/disadvantages frames were not observed.  
The benefits frame (17 texts) was generally applied within the discussions over the 
liberalisation of the energy markets of the EU, which was particularly visible in 2002 
(Figure 10)  
 
Figure 10. Benefits/disadvantages of the EU in the energy coverage of The Guardian and The Times 
A table detailing numbers of texts can be found in Appendix 2 
 
The disadvantages frame (15 texts) was applied mainly in the contexts of rising energy 
prices, especially within the debate over the 20/20/20 strategy, seen as a potential 
facilitator of significant price increases. The EU involvement in two energy crises, in 
2006 and 2008 was seen neutrally, without either benefits or disadvantages frames. 
Thirty six texts did not have any of these frames. 
The UK, considered one of the most EU-sceptical countries among all 28 of the 
Member States (see Chapters 2 and 3), had a relatively limited coverage of EU 
involvement in the Energy sector, as shown in Figure 9. Despite such limited references 
to the EU in the energy – related texts, a high diversity of opinions between both 
newspapers was observable. 
The European Commission, with its pursuit of a common energy market (and hence 
liberalisation of domestic energy markets) seemed to be a natural ally of the United 
Kingdom with its own free energy market agenda. Yet attempts to introduce a single 
energy market, opposed primarily by France, were met in the newspaper coverage with 
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criticism of the approach based on negotiation, e.g. as it was in the case of a 2002 
meeting, where  
‘instead [of the pursuit of liberalisation] we have a messy compromise with the French, 
who have not only opposed energy liberalisation but whose state energy companies 
have been able to buy large chunks of British industry’ (‘Energy markets set to open up 
in 2007’, The Times 26.11.2002).  
 
Coverage of negotiations over the single European energy market are full of similar 
bitterness and subtle criticisms of the decision making process inside of the European 
Union, with liberalisation continuously opposed by large continental (often state owned) 
companies like Gas de France. This highly opinionated coverage was present in The 
Times. The basic reason for criticisms concerned prices e.g. in ‘Ofgem blames Europe 
as gas price soars to record’, The Times, 06.10.2004).  
The liberalisation of the EU energy markets has received mixed coverage in The 
Guardian. On the one hand it gave its space to the arguments suggesting a possible EU 
takeover of UK energy supplies, e.g. in: 
 ‘John Cridland [from the Confederation of British Industry, CBI], said (…) that the 
energy chapter could allow the EU to take control of energy supplies by giving it the 
potential right in times of crisis or scarcity to effectively share out reserves. "It's not that 
evil people in Brussels want to steal our oil and gas but we should not be signing a 
treaty with significant uncertainty or ambiguity," he said. The EU could take control of 
licensing and regulation’ (‘CBI fears Britain may lose control of the North Sea oil’, The 
Guardian 01.12.2003).  
 
On the other hand, liberalised energy market within the EU was seen in terms of 
potential advantages, as it would benefit British energy companies in particular, 
‘British energy suppliers will be able to offer their services right across the EU 
following a landmark deal struck yesterday to throw open the continent's power markets 
to full competition’. (‘British suppliers must wait after EU energy deal’, The Guardian, 
26.11.2002).  
 
By liberating the energy prices in Europe, consumers would also benefit, 
‘the European commission's aggressive proposals would create a UK-style market in 
energy across the entire EU in an effort to break up huge continental groups 
manipulating prices and squeezing out rivals and to bring greater consumer choice and 
security of supply.’(‘EU proposals: Package aims to cut billions from household bills’, 
The Guardian 20.09.2007).  
 
What was often visible in both newspapers (though more often in The Times) was the 
criticism of Member States pursuing their own national agendas, rather than thinking in 
terms of the EU as a whole. Germany met a lot of critique for its narrow approach to 
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diversification of energy mix and insistence on renewable energy, with disregard 
towards the nuclear sector: 
‘nuclear power is not good enough for the British or Germans, it seems. Fortunately for 
the climate and for oil prices, it is thought good enough for Asians. To stop carbon 
dioxide emissions and with demand for oil and gas rising, however, Europe and 
America would have to aim to replace most of their fossil fuel power with nuclear 
stations, allowing renewables to cope with extra demand. If Bonn's conference had 
promoted atomic power alongside renewables, it might even have changed the world. 
As it is, it will change nothing’. (‘Renewable energy is nothing without the atomic 
option’, The Times 04.06.2004).  
 
This national interest-based approach of key EU Members (France and Germany) and 
lack of support for liberalisation was increasingly seen as a threat (in The Times) to the 
United Kingdom, and especially to the energy prices as  
‘gas prices could be volatile for at least another decade as Europe's energy markets 
struggle to catch up with the UK on liberalisation’ (‘Britain is heading for ten years of 
gas misery, MPs say’, The Times 13.12.2005).  
 
As summarised by The Times in November 2005 European energy companies were not 
interested in any reductions in their dominant presence, 
‘what Europe's mega-utilities fear most is a loss of control in their domestic markets, the 
base of their power and huge cash flows. For one such as Gas de France, the diversion 
of marginal gas supplies to Britain would be unthinkable. It would create a tighter 
domestic market and higher prices, leading to consumer dissatisfaction, questions from 
politicians and, ultimately, calls for greater competition - a disaster’. (‘Britain pays high 
price for dream of free energy market’, The Times, 23.11.2005).  
 
The European Commission was seen by The Times as an institution only capable of 
‘waving sticks’, without any serious influence over continental gas monopolies.  
But next to the permanent frustration over the failure to liberalise the EU energy market, 
there was also an underlying assumption that the United Kingdom as a part of Western 
Europe is inseparably linked with its continental neighbours and the rest of the EU, 
hence sympathetic reception of ideas facilitating energy cooperation between Member 
States, e.g. through internal energy grids.  
‘Britain supports the first step of the supergrid scheme to connect all the wind farms in 
the North Sea, which will channel electricity into a central hub from the waters of 
several countries including the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and the UK. Supporters 
argue that a shared system will make each country less reliant on local weather 
conditions for renewable energy in the drive to replace Russian hydrocarbons’. (‘Power 





This quote epitomises, to an extent, The Times’s coverage of Europe. Britain was to be 
linked via the supergrid with other European countries; they were underlined as partners 
without any reference to the European Union/European Commission/EU legislation or 
initiatives whatsoever. The solution therefore was pictured by The Times as a set of 
bilateral agreements with other European countries; not cooperation via the EU. 
The support for EU cooperation was sometimes more vocal (and direct) as it was the 
case after the 2008 war in Georgia: 
‘But if energy supplies to the rest of Europe are under Russia's thumb, Britain's security 
is deeply compromised. The absurdity is that Europe should be laying down terms to 
Russia. Not only is the EU the Kremlin's largest customer, Europe's economy is more 
than ten times larger than Russia's, its population more than three times bigger. The 
magnet of European integration has brought peace to the western Balkans: if it is a 
choice between snuggling up to Russia or getting on track to join the EU, countries such 
as Serbia choose West over East. The same is happening, tantalisingly, in Belarus, 
where the autocratic leader Alexander Lukashenko is desperately flirting with Europe in 
the hope of staving off the day when his country is swallowed up in a new Russian-run 
superstate. Belarus has released all its political prisoners and is hoping that the EU will 
now relax sanctions. (…) British Eurosceptics react with garlic and silver bullets when a 
common European foreign policy is discussed. America is far away, bogged down in 
two other wars. It is not going to fight harder for Europe than Europe itself will do. 
Russia knows this, and believes it has a green light to push ahead. Turn down the 
heating: this is going to be a long winter’. (How the West is losing the energy cold war, 
The Times 08.08.2008).  
The Times was reporting on any endorsements of Britain by European leaders, e.g.  it 
quoted the endorsement of Britain by the President of the European Commission, ‘"[w]e 
need Britain in Europe for many reasons," [Barroso] said. One of the reasons is climate 
change, a passion that Mr Barroso shares with Mr Blair." (‘Britain becomes the 
inspiration for Europe’, The Times 03.03.2007). It also quoted the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel when she said 'we must have Britain on our side to make Europe work', 
The Times 09.01.2007).  
The coverage of cooperation with the EU in the area of energy was not substantial. The 
Times consistently followed its Eurosceptic tone (with minor exceptions). The Guardian 





The analysis undoubtedly showed change within the coverage of energy in The 
Guardian and in The Times. What started to change was the importance of the topics. 
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Some remained present throughout the whole decade, and primarily those of renewable 
and nuclear energy. Others gradually gained importance, influenced by particular 
situations, as was the case of cooperation with Russia. Energy security presents an 
intriguing phenomenon inside of the energy discourse, as it was not a fixed term 
applicable only to one certain situation (or context). The invocation of energy security 
was different when associated with a different topic or event e.g.: energy policy, the 
2006 energy crisis, North Sea oil and gas depletion, climate change, cooperation with 
Russia, national security, nuclear energy or with gas imports. The analysis shows the 
presence of energy security in the debates over the domestic (e.g. energy policy, North 
Sea, nuclear energy) as well as external (e.g. cooperation with Russia, climate change) 
affairs. 
At the same time the analysis showed that the coverage of both newspapers remained 
constant and linked with the ideological preferences of the editorial board. The Times 
remained to be Eurosceptic. In the case of examples of cooperation with other European 
countries, The Times underlined the bilateral dimension (e.g. interconnectors with 
France or the Netherlands). EU initiatives were met with criticism, in most of the cases 
associated with the argument of financial consequences for the UK stemming from 
them. The Guardian at the same time promoted a more multilateral platform, presenting 
cooperation with the EU in a more positive light. The European Union was a very 
polarising issue in the collected texts, presented in both extremes as the ultimate 
challenge for the UK energy sector (in The Times), as well as a desired 
alternative/solution (The Guardian). As one of the main driving forces of the EU’s 
initiatives in the energy sector was to promote liberalisation of energy markets, and 
since the United Kingdom already had a mature, liberalised energy market, the EU’s 
influence could not have been big. Although some initiatives (e.g. targets for renewable 
energy in Member States’ energy mixes) were met with disdain and opposition, others 
(inter-EU energy grids) found more support, even in the case of The Times. Still, in The 
Times some of these initiatives (e.g. supergrid) were pictured as a result of bilateral 
cooperation, not an EU-led initiative. The interrelation between the UK and the EU was 
most visible during the 2006 and 2008/9 energy crises between Russia and Ukraine, 
when the coverage seemed to acknowledge that all Member States can in fact have 
common energy supply problems and when the contents of the coverage of both 
newspapers were relatively similar. 
In addition to the disparities in the coverage of the EU in the analysed texts, particular 
discord was shown in the way energy security was addressed in both newspapers. The 
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Guardian focused more on the consequences of climate change and on the 
environmental dimension of energy. The Times focused on the Russian threat usually 
framed within the New Cold War narrative. The elite newspaper discourse therefore 
was characterised by an observable polarisation with different parts of the newspaper 
spectrum discussing energy in quite different ways. Limited examples of a ‘national 
discourse’ were found in the analysis.  
One of these examples was the identification of the threat of Russian policies. Although 
the coverage of cooperation with Russia was not identical in terms of the number of 
texts or in terms of the tone both newspapers have identified Russian energy policies as 
threats. The coverage of Russia was between neutral and moderately negative, in 
particular in years 2006 – 2008. The Guardian tended to publish texts with both a 
positive and negative tone towards Russian policies, whereas The Times seemed to be 
more coherent in all of its texts, presenting either a neutral or slightly negative 
approach.  
In addition, the majority of cases where the coverage was increased (in terms of 
numbers of texts) were associated with the coverage of cooperation with Russia. The 
study shows three particular months with peaks of attention in the analysed discourse: 
July 2006, January 2008 and August 2008. They were caused by: Gazprom’s ambitions 
to enter the UK energy market, the UK energy review and debate over the nuclear 
energy, investments of Shell in Russia and the G8 Summit in St Petersburg (in 2006); 
on-going debate on the future of nuclear energy, climate change and the EC’s 20/20/20 
strategy and its impact on the UK (January 2008); and the armed conflict in Georgia, 
together with the debate over nuclear energy (in August 2008). One common 
denominator in all three months was nuclear energy; although references to Russia were 
also exceedingly salient. In all three cases the numbers of texts between The Guardian 
and The Times were relatively similar (Figure 7). 
The event identified as a discursive event was also associated with Russian energy 
policies. It was the case of Yukos and its imprisoned chairman. Although it initially 
received a limited coverage (that is, was not considered to be of high impact on energy 
as such) its influence remained visible throughout the rest of the decade in various texts 
dealing with cooperation with Russia in both The Times and in The Guardian. In both 
newspapers references to the case were made in a relatively similar way, underlining the 
negative consequences.  
The second potential discursive event was the draft of the EC’s 20/20/20 strategy, as it 
led to heated debates about the new shape of the UK’s energy mix. Here the coverage in 
133	  
	  
both newspapers was far from unified – texts in The Guardian promoted renewable 
energy as a response to the threats of the climate change. The Times emphasised the 
financial consequences of the new targets. 
Yet, the energy elite discourse was not securitised. The analysis did not ascertain texts 
identifying extraordinary threats nor did it call for exceptional measures. The only 
exception one can point out is the topic of climate change. This however, as indicated 
earlier, would have to become a separate theme of analysis, due to the fact that energy 
(the focus of this research) was merely one of the variables within the climate change 
discourse. Secondly, the coverage of climate change was very different in both 
newspapers, although both did not contest it in the texts they published.   
What one can conclude based on the collected material and the analysis is that energy 
discourse became politicised; energy was increasingly becoming of political interest. 
This was seen through various narratives created and re-created within the discourse. 
Security language was present, sometimes in a radical, militaristic form (in The Times in 
particular), but was used only to raise saliency of a given topic or event, rather than to 
identify existential threats or suggest extraordinary measures. As mentioned earlier, 
threats as well as the responses suggested were falling within the traditional, day-to-day 
politics, and calls for specific legislation could hardly be considered exceptional. 
Politicisation was also reflected in the differences in coverage between The Guardian 
and The Times, most visibly seen in the case of the writing about a coordinated 
European energy policy. 
In terms of the language security vocabulary was visible, though stronger in The Times. 
The definition of threats was very wide. The security language was thus applied both to 
threats stemming from energy supplies (majority of cases, usually in The Times) as well 
as to those caused by climate change (relatively low number of texts, mainly in The 
Times but also in The Guardian). There was therefore not one referent object, but 
several of them. There were limited suggestions for extraordinary measures. The 
attitude towards the EU and Russia played an important part in the assessment, with 
protagonists of energy security calling for a fortress UK against not only an increasingly 
bureaucratic EU but also an increasingly neo-imperial Russia (again in The Times). One 
has to point out however, that at the same time, the EU was an important ally in a 
different aspect of energy security – in the pursuit of a liberalised single European 
energy market (both newspapers, though mainly in The Guardian). 
There was not one single construction of energy security in the case of the analysed 
mainstream daily newspapers in the United Kingdom; there were numerous energy 
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securities, some of them complimentary, some of them contradictory to one another. 
The analysis may point to a relatively coherent picture of energy security in The Times, 
based on the combination of Russian threat and a threat of financial consequences of 
changes (e.g. costs of changes in the energy mix; costs and consequences of the climate 
change). The energy security in the case of The Guardian is much more nuanced and 
the evidence suggests it was built on the topic of climate change. Yet still, as the 
analysis shows, the Russian threat was visible in their texts.  
The energy discourse in the UK was very specific (and creatively wide) in the 
identification of problems (sometimes labelled as threats) to the energy sector, yet no 
unified picture of energy security has been presented. Undoubtedly however, 
perceptions of both Russia and the EU were integral parts of a majority of energy 
security approaches in The Times and in The Guardian. The overall analysis however 
points to more differences in coverage between both newspapers than to examples of a 





Chapter 5 – Poland 
	  
The aim of this chapter is to present the results of the analysis of the elite energy 
discourse based on the sampled material collected from two mainstream daily 
newspapers, the centre – left Gazeta Wyborcza and centre – right Rzeczpospolita. The 
sample includes texts from both newspapers published between the 1st of January 2000 
and the 1st of December 2009. Research-guiding questions provide the structure of this 
chapter – it begins with the assessment of the presence of security in the energy 
coverage of the analysed newspapers. The second part looks at the frequencies of texts, 
texts about cooperation with Russia and cooperation with the EU, contributing to the 
other research-guiding question. A detailed exploration of the links between the 
research questions and the analysed indicators was made in Chapters 1, 2 and 3.	  
The beginning of the chapter addresses the Polish energy policies and energy landscape 
at the beginning of the 2000s. It looks at the consequences of transformation in the 
1990s from planned to market economy. Government was present in the energy sphere 
throughout the Communist period (1945 – 1989). This involvement was only slightly 
reduced in the 1990s and 2000s, largely as a consequence of the pressures associated 
with the European integration process. 
The analysis shows that energy was always tied to questions of national survival. This 
was the case in the 1990s (reflected by the government control over the energy sector) 
as well as in the 2000s (with a substantial inclusion of energy into the National Security 
Strategy in 2007). This was matched in the elite discourse – the coverage of energy was 
increasingly militarised, in particular following the 2006 energy dispute between Russia 
and Ukraine. The most vivid example of the militarisation of the language was the 
comparison of the North Stream pipeline with the Ribbentrop – Molotov pact by the 
Minister of Defence of Poland, Radoslaw Sikorski, in the summer of 2006. The 
discourse pictured by both newspapers (though more visibly in Rzeczpospolita) 
identified a fortress – a group of countries which ought to cooperate in order to respond 
to the challenge coming from the actions of the Kremlin. This fortress, best defined in 
the policy initiative of the Musketeers Pact – included not only the EU, but also the 
former Soviet republics of Georgia and Ukraine, and key transit countries such as 
Turkey. This fortress was also setting boundaries in order to divide broadly defined ‘us’ 
(European Union plus Ukraine and Georgia) from ‘them’ – Russia. Protection of these 
boundaries therefore becomes crucial – hence the increased importance of security. As 
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these boundaries will ensure stability, prevent crises (such as the January 2006 one) 
from happening and would solve the future problems with the supply of resources. The 
coverage of the Musketeers Pact provides therefore the most vivid example of 
securitisation within the coverage of energy and of the New Cold War narrative in the 
Polish case study.  
The coverage of energy in Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, whenever a threat was 
invoked, had a clear villain – the Russian Federation. The overall perception of Russia 
in the energy coverage of both newspapers has been identified as negative. The 
European Union on the other hand has received a mixed coverage. Although the overall 
picture has seen the EU in terms of benefits for the country, Rzeczpospolita tended to 
include Eurosceptic voices too. One particular topic stands out however – in terms of 
the coverage of the climate change, both analysed newspapers have seen cooperation 
with the EU as negative for the country, as it would negatively affect the domestic coal 
sector. This was linked with an ideologically polarised newspaper market. The political 
views and newspaper preferences are diverged: the line of division is established by 
references to history. Majority of the centre-left parties were linked with the post-
communists, whereas majority of the former communist opposition figures in the 
centre-right parties. This was reflected on the newspaper scene. The centre-right 
newspaper Rzeczpospolita was supporting centre-right parties, in particular after the 
change in the editorial board in 2006. The centre-left Gazeta Wyborcza tended to 
support centre-left parties (although itself being created by former dissidents and 
opponents of the Communist regime). 
 
5.1	  Energy	  policy	  in	  Poland	  
	  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the Polish energy sector was facing two main 
challenges. The first challenge was the extensive involvement of the state, through 
control that the authorities had over resource management, energy production and 
distribution. The second was centred on the interpretation of the energy relationship 
with Russia. By 2000, it had only been eleven years since the first semi-democratic 
elections and the first non-communist government. The relationship with Russia was 
still tense. Right and centre-right parties were supporting diversification of supplies to 
limit the country’s reliance on Russian gas and oil supplies (Sonik 2005) whereas 
centre-left parties (primarily the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance, or Sojusz 
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Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) pictured Russia as a reliable and cheap supplier (Kublik 
2009). 
Centralisation and political control of oil, gas and energy systems dominated the energy 
landscape in the 1990s. Privatisation, initiated in the United Kingdom under Margaret 
Thatcher in the early 1980s (and an important element of the context of the UK energy 
policy) was completely stalled in Poland. Consecutive governments, despite their 
political (or historical) affiliations, have continuously refused to privatise sectors of 
strategic importance, and the energy sector was considered by politicians as one of the 
sectors which should stay under an exclusive governmental control. Grzeszak (2008a: 
48) whilst analysing the energy sector in Poland referred to the ideological dogma, the 
need to maintain monopoly of PGNiG (Polskie Gornictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo, or 
Polish Petroleum and Gas Mining, the state-controlled oil and gas company) in the gas 
sector as the only guarantor of security of gas supplies. Energy, since the early 1990s, 
was tied to questions of national survival, even though it was not included in the 
strategies of national security (until 2007). Allowing foreign actors into this 
strategically important sector could lead to the destabilisation of a country in case of 
any crisis. The same ideological dogma was behind the lack of efforts to privatise key 
refineries (Lotos, Orlen), as well as limited privatisation of the electricity systems. The 
link between energy and national survival was also reflected in the National Security 
Strategy of the Republic of Poland established in 2007.  
The strategy pointed to:  
- Russia’s use of energy resources in order to strengthen their regional influences 
(paragraph 20),  
- identified a growing competition over energy resources (paragraph 22),  
- argued for investments in energy transmission and storage (paragraph 30),  
- observed a high degree of dependency on oil and gas supplies from a single 
source (paragraph 31),  
- called for energy security solidarity within the European Union (paragraph 44), 
-  identified priorities of energy policy as assuring stable and uninterrupted 
supplies of resources based on long-term contracts; development of interconnectors 
with Scandinavian countries; assuring supplies from the Caspian Basin; LNG 
terminal and membership in the International Energy Agency (paragraph 68),  
- consolidation of domestic electric energy (paragraph 69) (Strategy of National 
Security of the Republic of Poland 2007, Strategia Bezpieczenstwa Narodowego 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2007).  
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One of the main fears in the 1990s and in the 2000s was that of potential consequences 
of deepening of the energy relationship with Russia. That translated as a possible 
takeover of parts of the energy sector by Russian companies. This would be considered 
as a sign of weakening of Polish sovereignty and independence.  
‘[T]here is nothing to hide – we have a big problem with Russia (…). We want to 
develop our economic cooperation, but at the same time we are afraid of them’ 
(Grzeszak 2007: 40).  
 
Approximately 94% of all gas imported to Poland was coming from Russia (including 
gas supplied to Poland from Germany) (Kowalski 2010: 49) thus, the logic went, that by 
allowing Russian energy companies to enter Poland, the Polish market would become 
fully subjected to Russian control.  
The political scene in the 1990s was highly polarised; on the one hand there were post-
Solidarity political parties (Solidarity was a mass socio-political movement and trade 
union in the 1980s opposing the communist rule) who were deeply suspicious of any 
Russian investment after 1989. On the other polar there were post-communist parties, in 
particular the above-mentioned SLD, heir to the communist Polish United Workers’ 
Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) which dissolved in 1990. They 
have also refrained from promoting Russian investments in Poland, particularly due to 
the ambition of rebranding themselves into a Western-style Social Democratic party, 
not as an entity supporting Russian investments (Miller, Krasowski 2013).   
Secondly, politicians were seeking political (and economic) gains stemming from the 
state control of these enterprises, both in the 1990s as well as in 2000s. This control has 
allowed them to put their protégés into the boards of directors of all of these companies 
after the elections (following the logic of ‘the winner takes all’). Grzeszak (2008a: 48) 
invokes the example of the (previously mentioned) PGNiG used by the Minister of 
Treasury to buy shares in the newly privatized Azoty Tarnów (one of the largest 
companies of the chemical sector in Poland). This enabled a company formerly (and 
directly) controlled by the state, to remain under the influence of consecutive ministers 
(through the shares controlled by another state monopoly) despite its privatisation. Once 
again, new boards of directors were made available for new protégés.  
Thirdly, privatisation was drastically slowed down by the trade unions. Grzeszak 
(2008b: 36) writes about a very specific understanding of energy security in the 
electricity sector – as long as the trade unions are happy and are not threatening the 
government with protests, the country is secure. And as long as these trade unions are 
happy, consecutive Ministers (and Prime Ministers) were willing to fulfil any of their 
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requests (pension schemes, extra bonuses, pay rises, etc.). A mirroring process was 
taking place in the coal-mining sector (2008b: 37). Poland was therefore facing similar 
obstacles as Thatcher’s government had in the UK over a decade earlier. 
Finally, there was the role of gas. Whereas approximately two-thirds of the energy mix 
of Poland is based on coal and approximately 96% of electricity is produced from it; 
within the overall energy mix however, natural gas accounts for only 13% (Grzeszak 
2008b: 38; 2009: 45) with the majority of enterprises are based on natural gas. This is 
the case of heavy industry, refineries and some power stations. This was another legacy 
of the communist period and its system of distribution of wealth – natural gas was easily 
accessible and cheap, so no one was calculating its costs and about 25-30% out of that 
comes from domestic resources. Although gas cuts in the winter would not cause a lack 
of heating, they would drastically impact key enterprises. This, together with the very 
specific approach to Russia in general and Russian investments and resources in 
particular, was the main motivation behind the efforts of gas diversification of Jerzy 
Buzek’s government (1997 – 2001) at the turn of the century.  
All of this created a peculiar system of energy governance established in the 1990s, 
based on a high level of influence of politicians, promotion of state monopolies, 
geographical misbalance of power stations (based mainly in Southern Poland) and 
attempts to diversify gas supplies. This system continued into the new century, with one 
significant event that could challenge it – the forthcoming integration into the European 
Union. 
Following the 1997 European Council meeting in Luxembourg, Poland (alongside 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia) officially began the 
negotiation process for accession into the European Union. These negotiations were 
finalised on the 13th of December 2002 in Copenhagen; a symbolic date in the 
contemporary history of Poland (the martial law was announced on the 13th of 
December 1981). Poland signed the accession treaty in April 2003 and officially joined 
the EU on the 1st of May 2004. The key element of the accession process was appliance 
to the Copenhagen Criteria - a list of membership criteria any potential EU member 
should meet, named after the 1993 European Council summit in Denmark. These 
criteria included political pillars (democracy, rule of law, human rights, protection of 
minority rights), economic criteria and the legislative alignment (domestic laws had to 
be in line with EU legislation). These last two elements were of particular importance 
for the Polish energy policies, as they required substantial changes in the way the 
energy market was functioning in Poland, in particular over the privatisation of the 
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state-owned energy companies. The accession process (until 2002) and then 
membership (from 2004) were marked by continuous influence and pressure from the 
European Commission on the Polish authorities over the need to open the domestic 
energy market. 
 
5.2	  Analysed	  Newspapers	  
	  
The qualitative and quantitative analysis of the texts about energy was based on the 
sample collected based on the research through the newspaper archives of Gazeta 
Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. An essential feature of the selected newspapers is their 
ideological profile. 
Gazeta Wyborcza (GW) has been published in Poland since May 1989; a private media 
company, Agora SA, owns the newspaper. It was the first independent media source in 
Poland after the fall of Communism that closely identified with the solidarity 
movement. The political preferences of the newspaper were centre – left. It has asserted 
that  
‘the governments of the left would be best for Poland. Support for [the centre-left 
parties] was a confirmation of the leftist programme of the newspaper and of the 
support for the social - democratic ideas’ (Dobek-Ostrowska 2011: 135).  
 
This bias against the right-wing parties, and particularly visible during the 2007, 2009 
and 2010 election campaigns (Parliament, European Parliament and Presidential), was a 
reflection of the decision of the owner. It was also an expression of the autonomous 
character of the editorial office actively promoting left (or centre-left) arguments.   
The second major daily newspaper analysed in this research is Rzeczpospolita (RZ). 
Originally established in the 1920s, RZ was a Christian-conservative newspaper until 
1932. In 1944 it re-established itself as an organ of the Soviet-led administration in 
Poland and was published until 1950. Its second re-emergence is dated back to 1982 
when the communist authorities decided to create a formally independent newspaper (as 
a balance to the pro-governmental Trybuna Ludu or People’s Tribune). Its impartiality 
however was disputable during the communist years. In 1991 the government privatised 
RZ creating a Franco-Polish joint venture called Presspublica SA. In 1996 a Norwegian 
company, Orkla Media, bought 51 per cent of the shares in Presspublica, whilst 49 per 
cent remained in the hands of the Ministry of Treasury. Consecutive Polish 
governments did not interfere with the editorial office and did not try to take advantage 
of its shares in the newspaper. This however changed in 2006 with the new right-wing 
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government of Law and Justice. In contrast with the coverage of the GW that openly 
presented its opinions, RZ presented its political preferences in an oblique way, 
provoking the reader to ‘read between the lines’ (Dobek-Ostrowska 2011: 138) and 
supporting the right-wing Law and Justice party. 
Whilst analysing the Polish media system, Dobek-Ostrowska concluded that following 
2006 a bipolar system had materialised: an openly left GW and a conservative and anti-
leftist RZ (2011: 140). ‘Both publications are ideologically distinct and politically 
active, they are characterised by a significant intervention in the political process’ (ibid). 
Both have a defined readership, with potential conservative voters preferring RZ, while 
those of the left (or centre-left) and anticlerical preferences reaching out to GW. The 
centrist voter is to a large extent left without a neutral and balanced daily newspaper.  
The sampled material obtained was further reduced manually, leaving the overall 1681 
texts between 1st of January 2000 and 1st of December 2009. This is nearly a double of 
the sample collected from in the previous case of the United Kingdom. For more 
information on the sampling process, please go to Chapter 3. 
In the next part of this chapter I will move to the analysis of my research-guiding 
questions. 
Initially I will discuss the presence of security in the energy discourse produced by two 
mainstream daily newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. This will be 
followed by the second research-guiding question, that of convergence of discourses in 
all three analysed countries. Here I will discuss the indicators of the frequency of texts 
as well as of the specific aspects of the coverage of both Russia and the European Union 
in the elite newspaper coverage of energy. Results of these findings will be compared 
with other case studies in Chapter 7. 
I have provided all of the translation from Polish to English. All errors are therefore 
entirely my fault. 
The first research question I will look at relates to the presence of security in the energy 
elite discourse. 
 
5.3	  Is	  energy	  supply	  seen	  as	  highly	  threatened	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  
extraordinary	  measures	  are	  necessary?	  
 
The examination of the presence of security in the elite newspaper discourse is based on 
two key elements of Securitization Theory: existential threats and extraordinary 
measures. This will be supported with an analysis of the relative strength of the texts, 
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measured in terms of the phrases as well as the presence of security (or military) 
language in texts. In the last part I will look at the frames through which messages were 
interpreted. My methodological approach is further described in the first three chapters 
of this thesis.  
Energy security was an important topic in the coverage of energy by the mainstream 
daily newspapers energy discourse. It has been present in various forms throughout the 
1990s, largely in relation to the previously quoted allusion to the coal miners (Grzeszak 
2008b: 36) – satisfying them with additional perks was assuring energy security of the 
country. Energy security was therefore present in the Polish energy discourse from the 
very beginning of the decade. In the early 2000s the government led by the later 
President of the European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, was pursuing a plan to build a gas 
pipeline from Norway. According to Jerzy Steinhoff, Minister of Economy in Buzek’s 
government, the price of the investment would have been covered by the Norwegian 
side, and the price of the gas would be similar to the price paid at that time for gas 
imported from Russia (Steinhoff 2005). The political basis for the plan, as later 
confirmed by Steinhoff, and at the time underlined by the centre-right press 
(Rzeczpospolita), was to limit the monopolistic position of Russian gas in the Polish 
energy sector. The competing view (the one of economic benefits) argued that 
Norwegian gas will in fact be more expensive; and the country facing difficult reforms 
and strict Copenhagen Criteria will not be able to afford it. This view was mainly 
visible in the coverage of Gazeta Wyborcza, as it was at the time of the election 
campaign of 2001, where the newspaper was supporting the opposition party – the 
centre-left SLD. Debate around energy security was therefore, from the beginning of the 
decade, framed around Polish – Russian relations. 
I have looked at the presence of the topic of energy security through my quantitative 
analysis of texts, based on the codebook attached to this thesis as Appendix 1. Overall I 
have coded 207 texts, 82 of them from Gazeta Wyborcza and 125 from Rzeczpospolita. 




Figure 11. Texts from both Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, years 2000 - 2009 
 
Rzeczpospolita has published more texts addressing energy security, in particular in the 
second part of the analysed decade. The distribution of texts also shows that the last 
four years (2006 – 2009) have attracted significantly higher elite newspaper interest in 
energy security than in years 2000 – 2005.  
Before year 2004 energy security was barely present in the coverage of energy. Two 
years that stand out are 2006 and 2009. In both instances the coverage focused on the 
Russian – Ukrainian energy disputes. Based on the content analysis of texts coded for 
the presence of energy security was able to support the results of quantitative analysis 
pointing to year 2006 as the shifting point in the presence of energy security in the elite 
newspaper discourse. Years 2006 – 2009 are the period when energy security was most 
commonly used within the context of Russian actions – in Ukraine and Georgia – as 
well as a part of the EU-Russia dialogue. Two types of issues were closely associated 
with energy security: causes (pipelines, gas imports) and solutions (nuclear energy).  
Mirroring the previous chapter, a look at the headlines gives examples as to how the 
security language started to enter the energy texts. It also allows assessing the 
existential threats the authors of texts were identifying.  
- Gazprom threatens Europe (Gazprom grozi Europie) (GW 21.04.2006) 
- Musketeers have lost in Moscow (Muszkieterowie przegrali w Moskwie) (GW 
13.02.2006) 
- Gas Cold War (Gazowa zimna wojna) (GW 02.05.2006) 
- In pursuit of the energy security (W poszukiwaniu energetycznego 
bezpieczenstwa (RZ 14.07.2006) 
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- Best chance for security (Najlepsza szansa na bezpieczenstwo) (RZ 03.08.2006) 
- Become independent from Russian supplies (Uniezaleznic sie od dostaw z Rosji) 
(RZ 29.11.2006) 
- EU blackmailed with gas (EU szantazowana gazem) (RZ 03.01.2006) 
The main association for energy security, in contrast with the previous case of the 
United Kingdom, was on the energy relationship with Russia. Both newspapers 
therefore had a very narrow and specific approach to addressing and understanding of 
energy security. Russian policies were identified as a clear threat. 
What could be labelled as the most extreme example of the use of military language and 
application of geopolitical frames was the statement by then-Minister of Defence 
Radosław Sikorski in early 2006. It also received considerable coverage from both 
newspapers, becoming one of the most vivid (and remembered) statements in relation to 
the energy sector and to relationship with Russia: 
‘On Sunday, in Brussels, during an American – European summit the head of the Polish 
MoD compared the building of the pipeline from Russia to Germany under the Baltic 
Sea to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. ‘We are particularly cautious about any 
agreements made over our heads. In the 20th century we had Locarno, we had 
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. We do not want a similar repetition (…) Poland asked the 
new German Chancellor Angela Merkel to annul the contract for the pipeline, but she 
has refused. Such attitude of Germany undermines the basis for a common EU foreign 
and energy policies’ (Gas Cold War, Gazowa Zimna Wojna GW 02.05.2006).  
 
The newspaper was openly linking energy security with Russia, with strongly 
opinionated comments,  
‘Russians are becoming increasingly arrogant, it is more and more difficult to talk to 
them’ said one of the more important European politicians, sipping Georgian wine, 
brought to the occasion by the Georgian president - the same wine whose import Russia 
had recently banned, claiming it as ‘not healthy’. 
 
In the same article the author was quoting an anonymous source from NATO saying 
that 
‘cutting oil and gas supplies is the biggest security threat for us, next to terrorism’ (Gas 
Cold War, Gazowa Zimna Wojna GW 02.05.2006). 
 
The threat perception of Russian policies was framed around two signs – the first linked 
it with historical connotations from before the Second World War (Locarno, 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact), whilst the other set Poland within a specific spatiotemporal 
context, as a country which could not trust its neighbours (‘we asked Merkel, she 
refused’) and so implied the need for extraordinary measures such as seeking help 
among those who also see gas and oil cuts as equally important as terrorism. 
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Texts around 2006 provided examples of the militant language present in the energy 
coverage by mainstream newspapers. The threat was undoubtedly established in both 
newspapers – it was Russia, or to be more specific, perceptions of motivations behind 
Russian policies. Through the application of militant language, as well as historical 
references based on conflict and geopolitical frames (further discussed below) almost 
everything that Russian officials were doing or saying was interpreted in terms of 
threats to Polish energy security. Based on an analysis of the contents of texts I can 
determine that existential threats were identified, although not always explicitly. While 
Russian policies were perceived as threats, it is difficult to show as to what extent they 
were existential. Whereas Gazeta Wyborcza did not see them as such (at least not 
explicitly) the analysis of texts in Rzeczpospolita, in particular after 2006 was provoking 
the reader to ‘read between the lines’ (Dobek-Ostrowska 2011: 138). At the same time 
the dominant view was setting frontiers but not in terms of frontiers of the state, but in 
terms of a wider Europe (e.g. the Musketeer Pact), even including countries such as 
Ukraine or Georgia. This Wider Europe was contrasted with an authoritarian Russian 
regime. This view was a clear reference to the idea of Prometheism, a political and 
intellectual concept of the interwar period in the 20th century; a concept based on the 
support of independence of nations threatened by Soviet dominance, thus including 
Polish, Ukrainian, Georgian, and Azerbaijani intellectuals. A prominent politician close 
to President Kaczynski (and a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) Pawel Kowal 
admitted that this was in fact one of the ideas behind Polish policies towards the East 
(Kowal 2012). This was mirrored in texts authored by sympathetic journalists writing 
for Rzeczpospolita.     
Also the strength of the texts showed an increased presence of security language (Table 
5). By strength I refer to the presence of security language (as explored in Chapter 2) in 
texts measured on a scale from +1 (high) to 0 (low), investigating the occurrence of 
security-related words in the texts. 
 Reporting Analysis Interview Opinion 
Strength 0.686 0.857 0.909 0.923 
Table 5. The level of presence of security language in sampled material from Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Rzeczpospolita 
N=168 texts (or 10% of the overall sample; randomly selected) 
 
Security language was present in both newspapers, though the average strength was 
observably higher in the case of Rzeczpospolita (0.9) than in Gazeta Wyborcza (0.5). 
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Does the presence of militant language and identification of threat(s) confirm 
securitisation? Figure 11 confirms that energy security was a topic increasingly present 
in the coverage of energy by both mainstream daily newspapers. In particular, its 
prominence rose in the second part of the analysed decade. The language was 
observably militant, with strong presence of security language (Table 5), with a clear 
identification of the threat – perception of Russian external energy policies towards not 
only Poland, but also wider Central Europe (inspiration drawn from a mixture of 
Prometheism and neorealism). These threat perceptions were not only related to the 
security of energy supplies; they were also related to the fear of Russian investments in 
the Polish energy sector (either direct, or indirect via companies from other countries) as 
well as to any agreements made between the Kremlin and any of the EU Member States 
without going through the European Union (which, implicitly, would give Poland a 
possibility of a veto).  
The identification of threats in both newspapers was very similar – threats were linked 




The coverage of both Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita included one specific 
example of an exceptional measure, based on cooperation with other European (and not 
only) countries. With Russian policies identified as threats, Polish politicians were 
calling for specific extraordinary measures – a Musketeers Pact.  
‘This is a proposal for a treaty between members of the EU or NATO. The agreement 
would assume that in the case of a threat to energy security of one of the signatories of 
the treaty, the others will support the threatened one. This is a proposal for the 
establishment of a new organisation. We offer membership not only to the EU states, 
but also to members of NATO, because these proposals are also aimed at Norway and 
Turkey; countries situated in Europe but not members of the EU. They are very 
important for the whole project: the first country is oil and gas producer, the second is a 
transit country’, 
 
stated Piotr Naimski, Deputy Minister of Economy and the most influential actor 
responsible for energy within the PiS-led government (The government will not send 
tanks for oil, because it has Musketeers, Rząd nie pośle czołgów po ropę, bo ma 
Muszkieterów GW 04.03.2006). This position was therefore clearly built on the 
neorealist principles of an alliance against an identified threat – perception of Russian 
external energy policies. Furthermore this line of argument had strong geopolitical 
implications as it was referring to either Polish geographical position in between 
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Germany and Russia, or on a wider European context and identification of key 
geographical areas (thus the inclusion of Turkey as a transit country). This line of 
argument was producing a peculiar type of an energy fortress built to contain the threat 
coming from Russia – a fortress which included not only EU Member States, but also 
members of NATO, in particular Turkey with its transit potential. This fortress has also 
stretched to former USSR republics (led at the time by pro-Western governments) – 
such as Ukraine or Georgia. The line of thinking also had its goal – a new security-
based organisation to address energy security concerns. The approach, although 
associated with the right-wing government of PiS and with the coverage of 
Rzeczpospolita, was also visible in the texts of Gazeta Wyborcza. Security-based 
concerns and arguments were the basis of this energy fortress. 
The response to the perceived threat which this particular promoted story was not 
isolationism. It was cooperation with other European countries. These voices were 
visible in both analysed newspapers, even despite the increasing polarisation of the 
coverage of Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza from 2006.  
‘Energy security of us all in Europe requires an acknowledgement that the nature of the 
supply and transport systems makes us all dependent on each other’ (In pursuit of 
energy security, W poszukiwaniu energetycznego bezpieczeństwa RZ 14.07.2006).  
 
Frames 
The analysis of frames is an additional indicator measuring the presence of security in 
the energy coverage of Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. In Chapter 3 I identified 
four potential frames which should be identifiable in the energy discourses. These were 
1 – environmental consequences; 2 – economic consequences; 3 – geopolitical 
consequences; 4 – conflict. The selected texts have been analysed following the process 
outlined in Chapter 3, in order to identify one of the four frames. In a situation where 
the selected text did not fit into any of the frames; it was categorized as ‘other’ (Figure 
12). The selected texts have been analysed according to the rules set out in Chapter 3, 
with the use of the codebook (Appendix 1). In order to proceed with the frames 





Figure 12. Results of the frames analysis, Poland 
Frames: 1 – environmental consequences; 2 – economic consequences; 3 – geopolitical; 4 – conflict. A 
table detailing numbers of texts is in Appendix 3. 
 
The most dominant frame - geopolitical, was present in 45 texts. The second most 
visible, that of economic consequences, was present in 43 texts. They were followed by 
the conflict frame (25 texts), and environmental consequences frame (13 texts). 42 texts 
from the sample did not have any of the five frames. The geopolitical frame was 
particularly visible in 2006 (closely followed by the conflict frame) in 2008. 
The debates within the energy discourse were therefore clearly framed within the 
security-based frames. The frame of economy was raised mainly in terms of its 
relationship with the European Union and in particular, when discussing privatisation of 
the energy sector as a part of the European integration process in the first half of 2000s. 
Overall, the security-based frames were present in 70 texts from the sample, thus one 
can conclude that they have observably dominated the energy discourse. 
 
Conclusions about the first research-guiding question 
Russia was present in the energy discourse straight from the beginning of the period 
under observation. It was linked with issues of national security and sovereignty also in 
the 1990s, as I have shown in the introductory part of this chapter. The process of 
securitisation of the discourse can therefore be analysed only over time since security 
language and security-based rhetoric were present in the coverage of energy already in 
year 2000.  
The use of the language of security was at its highest when linked with specific Russian 
policies – whether it was the Nord Stream pipeline and the comparison of it to the 
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Ribbentrop – Molotov pact, or the coverage of the two Russia – Ukraine energy crises. 
In terms of the energy discourse (in both newspapers) topic coded as ‘cooperation with 
Russia’ (further discussed below) provided the strongest empirical evidence of instances 
of securitisation; especially when linked with the security-based energy fortress of 
Wider Europe. 
Although security was present in the coverage of energy from the very beginning of the 
analysed period, specific threats in both newspapers were constructed primarily based 
on the experiences of Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. The proposal of a new treaty-
organisation to be founded on the idea of the Musketeer’s Pact was the main measure 
promoted in Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita as a new mechanism to address the 
new challenges. This was also when the argument of establishing frontiers which would 
separate ‘us’ from the threat, from ‘them’ from Russia came to life. The rhetoric around 
the Musketeers Pact illustrates how security-based language and frames were 
progressively dominating the discourse on energy cooperation with Russia. Only the 
boundaries, the argument went, could protect ‘us’ from a repetition of the January 2006 
crisis by increasing the security of energy supplies within ‘our’ group of countries. 
Establishment of these frontiers therefore increased the presence of security language 
and security rhetoric. The January 2006 crisis therefore led to the identification of a 
clear threat and a security-inspired response: an institutional separation from Russia.  
Still, on the level of policies argued for as responses or extraordinary measures they fall 
short of the steps one would expect in an urgent situation. This political rhetoric did not 
institutionalise in terms of policies, contradicting the principles of Securitization Theory 
(discussed in Chapter 2). Kowal (2012) has argued that the presence of the clause of 
energy solidarity in the Lisbon Treaty is a direct consequence of the idea of the 
Musketeers Pact, based on solidarity in the case of a threat. This would point to a policy 
initiative uploaded from the level of a Member State to the level of the EU, as discussed 
in Chapter 2.1, thus not being something of an extraordinary character. Furthermore the 
Lisbon Treaty underlined solidarity between the EU Member States, not establishing 
boundaries with Russia, as was the case of the Musketeers Pact.  
An alternative explanation could suggest that a securitisation of energy cooperation with 
Russia was institutionalised in the 2007 National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Poland, discussed in detail in the earlier part of this chapter. It is difficult however to 
establish a clear link between the increased presence of energy security in the 
newspaper coverage and this particular policy; at least on the basis of the collected 
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evidence. Especially since energy was an issue of national sovereignty already in the 
1990s; National Security Strategy only institutionalised it.  
Securitisation therefore in the case of the energy coverage by Rzeczpospolita and 
Gazeta Wyborcza had less of a dichotomous outcome and should be seen more as a 
spectrum, with the use of the language of security more visible in terms of certain topics 
(and specific events) than in the others. The analysis did not identify examples which 
would point at antagonistic coverage. To the contrary, in terms of the presence of 
security in the analysed sample the analysis shows that national discourse was in fact 
observable.   
Energy however was not elevated as an important issue, at least according to the results 
of the Eurobarometer poll. In response to the question of the most important issue 
facing the country, energy related issues have been pointed out by 2% - 5% respondents 
between years 2007 – 2009 (Table 6). Although the evidence of the analysis of contents 
point to an increased politicisation of the discourse, and the quantitative analysis to an 
increased coverage of energy, it was not matched by an increased interest of the general 
public.   
Year Spring Autumn 
2007 3% 2% 
2008 4% 5% 
2009 3% 2% 
Table 6. Eurobarometer opinion polls data: Energy related issues as a response to the question ‘name two 
most important issues facing their country’ in Poland 
 
After the examination of the presence of security in the energy coverage of Gazeta 
Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita I will move to the second research-guiding question. It 
investigates convergence across all three selected countries by focusing on frequency of 
texts and discursive events and on the texts addressing cooperation with Russia and 
cooperation with the EU.  
 
5.4	  Indicators	  of	  convergence	  
 
The focus here will be on indicators which will help in measuring convergence over 
time, in years 2000 – 2009. In the previous chapter I have compared the discourses to 
lines running from point A (year 2000) to point B (year 2009). In Chapter 7 I will look 
at whether these lines will be aligned and whether the specific type of convergence – in 
terms of the problems defined and solutions offered – is observable within the analysed 
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sample. I have to point out however that Chapter 7 will take into consideration all of the 
evidence collected; including the indicators analysed for the purposes of the previous 
research-guiding question. 
I will begin with an analysis of frequencies of texts of both Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Rzeczpospolita to see when the attention was the highest; and which events have caused 
this increased reporting. Contents of all texts from the collected sample will be analysed 
in order to isolate discursive events. 
The definition of the discursive event has already been discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, 
but in order to provide the reader with a brief summary, I will refer to the discursive 
event as ‘an event only counts as a discursive event if it appears on the discourse planes 
of politics and the media intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time’ 
(Wodak and Meyer 2009: 48). As I have noted previously, the full assessment of a 
discursive event is based also on an analysis of the contents of texts; an event which 
may receive limited attention in a given newspaper at the time of its occurrence may 
have an impact on the future publications thus complying with Wodak’s and Meyer’s 
definition. Results of this analysis will be compared with similar results from the United 
Kingdom (Chapter 4) and Germany (Chapter 6) providing evidence for the second 
research-guiding question of convergence. 
The first task is to identify a discursive peak in the timeline between year 2000 and year 
2009 when the largest numbers of texts have been published. This focus on the calendar 
is of particular importance as it should enable me to see that not only did the reporting 
intensify at similar times in all analysed countries (which would be easy to justify, as 
e.g. coverage of conflicts usually leads to their higher saliency) but also that the 
coverage itself was increasingly similar. This will involve a qualitative analysis of all of 
the selected texts in order to show the differences (and similarities) between both 
analysed newspapers. 
The final sample included 866 texts from Gazeta Wyborcza and 815 from 
Rzeczpospolita. The frequency, looking on a monthly distribution of texts, showed the 




Figure 13. Frequency curve of texts from Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita collected in the final 
sample, years 2000 – 2009 
GW – Gazeta Wyborcza, RZ – Rzeczpospolita. A table detailing numbers of texts per month is in 
Appendix 3.  
 
The analysis of the sampled texts identifies two spikes in attention in January 2006 (49 
texts) and January 2009 (53 texts). The distribution of texts between both newspapers 
was relatively equal (January 2006: GW 29, RZ 20; January 2009: GW 28, RZ 25). In 
order to investigate the particular matters mentioned in these texts I have conducted a 
detailed content analysis of them. It was essential to look at the similarities and 
differences between the coverage of the two newspapers taking into account the 
differences between both newspapers outlined in the introductory part of this chapter. 
The main stimulant of the energy coverage in January 2006 was the gas dispute between 
Ukraine and Russia in the winter of 2005/2006. 
Regarding domestic energy security, investments in nuclear energy (Europe must return 
to nuclear energy, Europa musi wrócić do energetyki jądrowej, Rzeczpospolita 
02.02.2006), or increasing dependence on domestic deposits of coal (Oil will get more 
expensive, we have to choose coal, Ropa będzie drożeć, trzeba postawić na węgiel, 
Gazeta Wyborcza, 24.07.2006) were suggested. 
The peak in January 2009 was related to the second energy dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine, and the subsequent cut off supplies flowing through the pipelines crossing 
Ukraine. Both Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita were supportive of Ukraine with 
yet again, an opinionated and critical stance towards Russia: ‘Ukraine should not leave 
Ukraine alone in the dispute with Russia’ (Ukraina nie powinna zostawiać Ukrainy w 
sporze z Rosją, Gazeta Wyborcza, 03.01.2009), ‘Kwasniewski: let’s help Ukraine, it 
will not manage on its own’ (Kwaśniewski: pomóżmy Ukrainie, bo nie poradzi sobie 
sama, Gazeta Wyborcza, 08.01.2009), ‘Moscow vs. Kyiv’ (Moskwa kontra Kijów, 
Rzeczpospolita, 08.01.2009). Also, the contents of articles published by both GW and 
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RZ were highly critical of Russia’s policies, in e.g. ‘No gas because no gas’ (Gazu niet 
bo niet, Gazeta Wyborcza, 09.01.2009), ‘Gazprom sees the hand of the USA in the 
Ukrainian pipes’ (Gazprom widzi rękę USA w ukraińskich rurach, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
15.01.2009) or the above mentioned ‘Moscow vs. Kyiv’ (Moskwa kontra Kijów, 
Rzeczpospolita, 08.01.2009).  
The observable difference was in the coverage of the EU. Gazeta Wyborcza was 
presenting a position supportive of cooperation with the EU, and praising those 
politicians who were supporting it e.g. in ‘Sikorski: there has to be solidarity in the EU 
in the cases of energy and gas’ (Sikorski: w sprawie energii i gazu Unia musi być 
solidarna, Gazeta Wyborcza, 08.01.2009) while being mildly critical about those who 
opposed it, in e.g. ‘Kaczynski: EU is too soft on Russia’ (Kaczyński: UE za miękko z 
Rosją, Gazeta Wyborcza, 07.01.2009). The texts therefore were openly supportive to 
politicians from the ruling PO (Civic Platform), with criticisms directed at the President 
and PiS (Law and Justice), party associated with him. 
Rzeczpospolita on the other hand was much more critical of the EU in the context of the 
events of January 2009, e.g. in ‘Moscow teaches EU how to negotiate (Moskwa uczy 
UE jak negocjować, Rzeczpospolita, 13.01.2009). The language of texts (mainly of 
opinions) was also openly militant, yet again invoking the noun war; as in ‘Where the 
gas solidarity ends’ (Gdzie kończy się gazowa solidarność, Rzeczpospolita, 07.01.2009), 
‘Gas war continues’ (Wojna gazowa trwa, Rzeczpospolita, 08.01.2009), ‘The EU is 
fighting for its gas’ (Unia walczy o swój gaz, Rzeczpospolita, 08.01.2009).  
The main difference was in terms of the tone of the coverage, further explored in the 
latter part of this chapter. This was particularly visible in terms of the coverage of the 
EU as well as of Russia. Whereas in 2006 both Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita 
were supportive of the EU and critical of Russia, in 2009 the criticism of the EU was 
visible only in the texts published by Rzeczpospolita. 
Overall, the analysis of the frequency of texts in the case of Poland showed two 
significant spikes of attention; in January 2006 and January 2009, both associated with 
the Russian – Ukrainian gas disputes.  
Did any event fit the conditions set by Wodak and Meyer arguing that ‘an event only 
counts as a discursive event if it appears on the discourse planes of politics and the 
media intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time’ (Wodak and Meyer 
2009: 48)? Arguably the January 2006 energy crisis has played a pivotal role. Although 
this has to be linked with the domestic politics and an openly anti-Russian government, 
the events have observably increased the links between energy and Russia. The gas 
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crisis also became a referent point for most of the coverage on Russia, subscribing to 
the bipolar character of the coverage of Russia with two narratives: one built on the 
assumption that Poland should not cooperate with Moscow, the other to the contrary, 
that Poland should. These highly split narratives are further discussed in the latter part 
of this chapter. 
 
The coverage of Russia in the energy elite discourse  
The tone of the coverage of Russia is the next indicator analysed in this chapter. This 
was done following the methodology established in Chapter 3, using the codebook 
(Appendix 1). All of the texts included in this narrowed down sample have been 
quantitatively and qualitatively analysed. Below I present results of both analyses. The 
final sample included 206 texts, 108 from Gazeta Wyborcza and 98 from 
Rzeczpospolita. 
The newspaper coverage of energy between 2000 and 2009 can be divided into two 
periods: 2000 – 2005 and 2006 – 2009 with Russia playing the pivotal role in the latter 
period (Figure 14). The distribution of texts between both newspapers was relatively 
equal, with an observable exception of year 2006 (29 texts in GW to 20 texts in RZ). 
 
Figure 14. Breakdown of texts sampled as addressing cooperation with Russia collected from Gazeta 
Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita; years 2000 - 2009 
 
The analysis of contents of these texts gives a general idea of how the perceptions of 
Russian actions were shaped by both newspapers in their coverage of energy. 
Cooperation with Russia was present in the energy coverage in Poland throughout the 
decade. As mentioned earlier, Russia was an important variable in the domestic and 
foreign policy of Poland in the 1990s, including the energy sector. The observable 
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spikes in the coverage of Russia coincide with an increased frequency of texts both in 
2006 and 2009 in both newspapers. 
The narrative of the 2006 energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine had a very pro-
Ukrainian tone in both newspapers. ‘Let’s thank Yushchenko for not giving in to 
Moscow’s blackmail’ (Podziękujmy Juszczence że nie ugiął się pod szantażem Moskwy, 
Gazeta Wyborcza, 05.01.2006) was the title of a report of Gazeta Wyborcza’s expert 
and correspondent on Eastern European affairs, Marcin Wojciechowski (later Polish 
MFA spokesperson),  
‘[a]fter almost four days of a gas clinch, Ukraine refuted the merciless Russian attack 
(...) thanks to a tough posture of Yushchenko, a serious debate about a common energy 
policy can begin throughout Europe. Russia will no longer be able to convince anyone 
that its sale of raw materials is only a business issue. It is clearly visible that oil, gas and 
electricity turned in Russia’s hands into a dangerous ‘energy weapon’. Two years ago 
Moscow used it against Belarus, now against Ukraine, and constantly uses it against 
Moldova and Georgia. As of Sunday, Europe realized that anyone can be next – even 
the rich, politically powerful and those having cordial relations with Moscow, Germany, 
France or Italy.’  
 
The situation was pictured in terms of a ‘merciless attack’ with the use of ‘energy 
weapon’ as a consequence of new Ukrainian President’s defiance. The weapon had been 
already used before on other countries (Moldova, Georgia), implying that it may be 
used again. Security was a visible and important feature of the coverage of both external 
and domestic news. In the context of its external dimension, close cooperation with the 
neighbours was argued for; with Ukraine (High price for gas, Wysoka cena za gaz, 
Gazeta Wyborcza 11.01.2006), and with Lithuania (Lithuania is asking for an electricity 
link, Litwa prosi o elektryczne połączenie, Gazeta Wyborcza 16.03.2006). Secondly, 
diversification of supplies was again a high priority on the agenda, with potential 
supplies from Northern Europe, Central Asia, Caspian Basin, Iran and North Africa 
(Poland: I will buy gas urgently, as long as it is not from Russia, Polska: gaz, byle nie z 
Rosji, pilnie kupię, Gazeta Wyborcza 27.01.2006). It was not about the resources – it 
was about the supplier, Russia; even if potential new suppliers were authoritarian 
regimes. The coverage of the external energy dimension in Gazeta Wyborcza was 
strongly opinionated, with a visibly negative tone towards Russia. The texts published 
by Rzeczpospolita were equally (negatively) opinionated, e.g. in ‘A primarily political 
dispute’ (Spór głównie polityczny, Rzeczpospolita 02.01.2006), or ‘Europe blackmailed 
with gas’ (Europa szantażowana gazem, Rzeczpospolita 03.01.2006). Some comments 
from the centre-right press were openly triumphant:  
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‘The Kremlin has for years been trying to picture Poland as an obsessively anti-Russian 
country. Many politicians from Western Europe got convinced about that. Our 
explanations seemed to be in vain. But it took only several hours from the moment the 
gas tap was closed to make the EU’s analysts realise their mistake of judgement. While 
reviewing the Western newspapers, Vladimir Putin may have 
already regretted his decision. Even if he manages to force the Ukrainians to adopt a 
higher price for the supplied raw material, from his point of view the game will 
probably not be worth too much’ (An eye-opener for Europe, Europa przejrzała na 
oczy, Rzeczpospolita 04.01.2006.  
 
The triumphalism of authors of text writing for the newspapers was based on the 
assumption that they have been producing warning signs of the potential threat of 
Russian policies. In their view, events in the winter of 2005/2006 confirmed that this 
threat was viable. The second reason for the triumphalism was the perception of a defeat 
of the Kremlin faced by a unified European response. The comparative analysis of the 
January 2006 coverage suggest a national discourse with limited (if any) differences or 
discords between Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. The only observable difference 
was in the tone. 
The overall tone of the coverage of Russia was negative (Figure 15). By tone I refer to 
what I have explained in Chapter 3, that is assessing whether the language used was 
positive, negative or neutral, and whether the text was overall expressing positive, 
negative or neutral considered opinion. All texts expressing positive and negative 
opinions were put into two clusters, and further ranged on a scale from -2 (very 
negative) to +2 (very positive). The results of my analysis are visible in Figure 15 
below.  
 
Figure 15. Tone of the coverage of Russia based on the sampled material from Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Rzeczpospolita 




The analysis pointed to Rzeczpospolita’s coverage being more negative on average (-
1.5) than Gazeta Wyborcza’s (-1). Although the tone of the coverage was already 
negative, a difference can be spotted in year 2006 when the tone further increased.  
Observable differences were seen between comments of centre-right and centre-left 
politicians. The centre-right was openly critical of Russia, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, 
and a former President of Poland (and ex-leader of SLD) and other centre-left 
politicians seemed to disagree. Some (Tadeusz Iwiński of SLD) were calling for closer 
cooperation with Russia in the energy sphere especially in the Nord Stream project,  
‘we should begin negotiations on taking part in the project [Nord Stream]. The worst 
scenario would have been if the pipeline was finished regardless of anything, and 
Poland did not gain anything out of it. The train will leave, and we will stay on the 
platform’ (Kwaśniewski: Nord Steam can be beneficial for Poland, Kwaśniewski: Nord 
Stream może być korzystny dla Polski, Gazeta Wyborcza 17.07.2008). 
  
The coverage of Russian – EU dialogue, although critical in both instances, also 
differed between Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza. The preeminent example is the 
reference to Yalta – a 1945 conference that confirmed the division of Europe along the 
Iron Curtain.  In ‘Room with a view on Yalta’ (Pokój z widokiem na Jałtę, 
Rzeczpospolita 14.08.2008) Piotr Semka writes  
‘the war in the Caucasus and the Olympics in Beijing show that there has been no end 
of history (...) snapshots from the Russian aggression against Georgia has hypnotised 
Poles in a certain way. What we saw on the glass screen – like in a crystal ball – our 
own fate in 10 or 15 years. Maybe we felt that the Russian aim is to convince Western 
powers to accept the spirit of Yalta. Back then, in 1945, the Kremlin forced the West to 
accept the Soviet wish to control the countries in their zone of interest. And today 
Kremlin requested from foreign mediators, help to remove President Saakashvili from 
his position (...) the situation is disturbingly common to inhabitants of Eastern Europe: 
brutality of Kremlin and the politics of strength; helplessness and loneliness of a state, 
which has chosen a path towards the West; the actual indifference of Western European 
powers (...) We cannot underestimate the warning included in the slogan: „today Tbilisi, 
tomorrow Kyiv, and the day after tomorrow Warsaw”’.  
 
The final sentence of the text – ‘today Tbilisi, tomorrow Kyiv, and the day after 
tomorrow Warsaw’ became a catchphrase for the New Cold War narrative in Poland; in 
particular for centre-right politicians and journalists writing about Russia. The message 
was built around the sign of the Soviet domination in Poland following the end of the 
WWII. The implication was that those times may be back – and that the Kremlin is 
interested in regaining its domination not only over the former Soviet Republics of 
Georgia and Ukraine, but also over the former satellite state – Poland. And that the 
West will betray Poland again, as in the case of the conference in Yalta. It was all 
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therefore read as a consequence of great-power politics of a resurgent Russia, nothing 
else. 
Jacek Pawlicki, a European policy expert of Gazeta Wyborcza, used Yalta in a 
strikingly different way. In his text ‘Yalta is the past’ (Jałta to przeszłość, Gazeta 
Wyborcza 02.09.2008) he wrote  
‘this summit will not go to history as a turning point in European foreign policy. It was 
not the birthplace of a common policy towards Russia. It was rather, an important 
signpost in its development. Resignation from sanctions does not surprise anyone. No 
one in Europe, including Poland, wanted to go on a trade war with Russia. But the 
leaders yesterday froze all the talks about the new partnership and cooperation 
agreement with Russia until it withdraws its forces from Georgia. (...) the summit was 
trying to fix all errors made by the European – read: French – diplomacy (...) and one 
more important thing. Old Europe has begun to look at Russia also with the other, 
‘eastern’ eye. The strength of Russia has always lain in encouraging the EU countries to 
play against each other. Russians were talking with the strong ones: Germany, Italy, 
France. Smaller countries, like Poland or Baltic States, were ignored. (...) by entering 
Georgia, Russia showed the West its worst side, whose existence was questioned in 
Berlin and Paris. Of this aggresive Russia Germans and French have heard from Poles, 
Latvians and Lithuanians, but they have always perceived it as an outcome of our 
difficult history. Now they believed us (...) Sarkozy said after the summit that the return 
to spheres of influence is unacceptable and that Yalta is the past. These words will ring 
in Kremlin for a long time from now’.  
 
Pawlicki’s conclusion was that Yalta will not be repeated again, because Europe had 
learnt its lesson, and the West ‘believed us’ (Poles, Latvians, and Lithuanians) in our 
assessment of Russia as an ‘aggressive’ country. The same sign (Yalta) was read 
differently. But the, reference to Russia remained the same in both newspapers – 
strongly negative. 
Both texts show the sensitivity of Polish journalists, experts and analysts towards 
history, and the tendency to interpret current affairs in the context of historical 
experiences. They also point to divergent lessons learnt from history across the political 
spectrum in Poland.  
The same events were interpreted differently by a centre-right and centre-left 
newspaper, with the former literally adapting the 1945 frame onto 2008, and the latter 
seeing striking differences between Europe in 1945 and in 2008. Rzeczpospolita’s 
coverage was observing events through the prism of Polish history. The analysis has 
shown that Russia was seen as a villain in the majority of texts from the sample (98 
texts). Gazeta Wyborcza on the other hand, although critical, tended to adopt a 
contrasting approach, and analyse Russia within the energy coverage with limited 
references to Polish history; though still negatively. Rzeczpospolita was representing a 
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particular part of the elite opinion, based on a neorealist, anti-Russian and right-wing 
platform, but with Gazeta Wyborcza presenting a pro-EU platform, still presenting the 
anti-Russian sentiments though with a less intensive tone than Rzeczpospolita. 
In the overall analysis, Russia was present in the Polish energy discourse from the very 
beginning, with an increased presence related with particular events (gas crises; conflict 
in Georgia). The coverage was mixed. Until 2006 both newspapers covered Russia in a 
very similar (but negative) ways, whereas after 2006 one can observe an increased 
negative tone in Rzeczpospolita in comparison to Gazeta Wyborcza. This however co-
incised with the change of the editorial staff of the newspaper and consequent 
redefinition of the editorial line, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter.   
 
The coverage of the EU in the energy elite discourse 
Texts for the analysis of the coverage of the European Union in the elite newspaper 
discourse in Poland were selected through coding based on the codebook (Appendix 1). 
I was looking for texts addressing the topic of ‘cooperation with the EU’ following the 
principles outlined in Chapter 3. I have conducted a qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of the final sample, leading to the observations presented in this part of the chapter. The 
final number of texts (382 texts) was put on a frequency curve. The texts were also 
analysed according to the presence of specific frames assessing the coverage of the 
article (benefit from cooperation with the EU vs. disadvantage from cooperation with 
the EU). This method is further described in Chapter 3 as well as in the codebook 
(Appendix 1). 
Following the coding process I have identified 382 texts. 180 texts were published by 




Figure 16. Cooperation with the EU in texts sampled according to the codebook, Poland. Years 2000 – 
2009 
	  
In terms of the analysis of the frequency of texts, cooperation with the EU had two 
observable peaks of attention – in 2006, following the gas dispute and in 2008, linked 
with the conflict in Georgia. Its presence in the elite newspaper discourse between 2000 
and 2004 was associated with the on-going negotiations between Poland and the EU 
over the potential EU accession, hence the topics covered ranged from the negotiations 
over the Energy Chapter (one of the chapters of the acquis), through to the EC’s 
encouragement of privatisation of the energy sector in Poland. The incidence of the 
issue in newspapers hit its low right after the EU enlargement, in 2005, but increased in 
frequency between 2006 and 2009, which constituted a period of tensions between 
Russia and recipients of its resources.  
The benefits frame tended to dominate in the coverage of energy, being present in 
nearly half of the texts (187) as seen in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Benefits/disadvantages of the EU in the texts selected from Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Rzeczpospolita 
A table detailing numbers of texts is in Appendix 3. 
 
Cooperation with the EU was seen as an answer to the cut of gas in winter 2006, hence 
the belief that what is needed is to deepen the integration by i.e. creating an energy 
NATO (Poland will suggest an energy NATO, Polska wystąpi do Unii o energetyczne 
NATO , Gazeta Wyborcza 25.01.2006). This ‘Pact of the Musketeers’ was an initiative 
of codification of energy solidarity. According to the pact, its members would plan the 
diversification of gas supplies together; they would also collectively invest in storage 
facilities and coordinate the flow of gas in the whole EU. Rzeczpospolita however, 
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following its Eurosceptic preferences was also seeking alternative sources of security, 
e.g. in Norwegian gas (Norway is a possibility, Możliwy gaz z Norwegii, Rzeczpospolita 
27.01.2006).  
Cooperation within the European Union was pictured by Gazeta Wyborcza as an answer 
to the energy crises and Russian military intervention. The tone of the coverage 
suggested that events taking place in 2008 were due to have a significant impact on EU 
– Russian relations in a text with a symptomatic title ‘European powerhouse’;  
‘conflict in Georgia made Europe re-evaluate the importance of its relations with 
Russia. There are two – although coming from a similar assessment of the situation – 
extreme positions. The first says that Europe is doomed to rely on energy supplies from 
Russia, so it should not damage the relationship (...) the second view also highlights 
Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, but perceives it as a threat. Articles have 
appeared, comparing gas pipelines running from Siberia to the cannon barrels aimed at 
Europe or claws, with which Gazprom strangles our poor continent (...) the best answer 
is to deepen European integration (...) Europe needs to become a state not only in the 
political sense but mainly in the economic one. It has to negotiate common agreements 
with Russia, which means that it is unacceptable for any of its Member States to be 
discriminated against in their economic relationships with the outside of the EU’ 
(European powerhouse, Mocarstwo Europa, Gazeta Wyborcza 30.08.2008).  
 
Europe therefore, the argument in Gazeta Wyborcza went, has to continue integration to 
be able to face the challenge of Russia. European solidarity was one of the main themes 
of the year,  
‘Poland is again proposing energy solidarity to the EU. Prime Minister Tusk wants the 
EU to be obliged to react when gas supplies are threatened for at least one Member 
State’, (Tusk’s gas plan, Gazowy plan Tuska, Gazeta Wyborcza 07.10.2008. 
 
Texts published in 2008 concentrated on the climate change agenda of the EU. The 
coverage of climate change in GW and in RZ was set within the context of the EU’s 
ambitions of reduction of CO2 emissions,  
‘giving Poland too low limits of carbon dioxide emissions by the European Commission 
(instead of 284 million tons – 208.5 million tonnes), has led to a collective dispute of 
employees with their employers in the Bełchatów coal mine and power plant. Lower 
limits, according to the crew, may result, among others, in reducing of production by 
approximately 30%, and thus in firing 5-6 thousand people’ (Dispute over carbon 
dioxide, Spór o dwutlenek węgla, Rzeczpospolita 15.02.2008).   
 
Rzeczpospolita underlined the costs of the climate change initiatives – increased 
unemployment, closed coal mines. 
These workforce costs were met by arguments about financial consequences to all 
energy consumers, as changes would lead to increased energy prices, 
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‘it is easy to calculate that the price of electricity would rise by at least 50-70% already 
in 2013. This solution, proposed by the EC, is unacceptable to the Polish government’, 
said Maciej Nowicki, the Minister of Environment, at a press conference (Poland 
against the climate policy of the EU, Polska przeciw polityce klimatycznej UE, 
Rzeczpospolita 04.03.2008).  
 
There was also the argument of the importance of coal for the national energy mix,  
‘the issue [of climate change] has our own Polish context – and for at least two reasons. 
First, Polish electricity based on coal would be especially vulnerable in the case of 
drastic reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (…)’ (Climate change – whose 
concern?, Zmiany klimatu – czyje zmartwienie?, Rzeczpospolita 26.04.2008).  
 
Taking all the above into consideration, four different factors contributed to the high 
saliency of the EU in 2008, as seen through the coverage of both analysed newspapers: 
(1) the EU’s climate change policies, (2) their implications for the Polish energy sector 
(3) their social impact on employees working in the energy sector and (4) the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference in Poznań, held between 1-12 December 2008. 
As already observed in the frame analysis (Figure 17) although the perception of the EU 
in the case of the gas dispute was generally positive in both newspapers (though more in 
Gazeta Wyborcza), and the EU was seen as an arena of cooperation which could lead to 
enhanced energy security of Poland. Not in all cases however. The dissenting view was 
visible in particular with regards climate change initiatives. They were portrayed 
negatively, in Rzeczpospolita, ‘Commission is playing green, we will all pay’ (Komisja 
gra w zielone, zapłacimy wszyscy, Rzeczpospolita 22.01.2008); ‘Poland against the EU 
climate policy’ (Polska przeciw polityce klimatycznej EU, Rzeczpospolita 04.03.2008); 
‘European Commission is harming Poland’ (Komisja Europejska szkodzi Polsce, 
Rzeczpospolita 20.06.2008); ‘Expensive climate package’ (Drogi pakiet klimatyczny, 
Rzeczpospolita 25.07.2008);  
As well as in Gazeta Wyborcza, ‘Ecology a’la European Commission will ruin us’ 
(Ekologia ala Komisja Europejska nas zrujnuje, Gazeta Wyborcza 04.03.2008); ‘The 
first battle for CO2’ (Pierwsza bitwa o CO2, Gazeta Wyborcza 12.09.2008); ‘We will all 
have to pay’ (Zapłacimy wszyscy], Gazeta Wyborcza 24.11.2008); ‘We threaten with a 
climate veto’ (Grozimy wetem klimatycznym, Gazeta Wyborcza 16.10.2008); ‘Rebel in 
the case of CO2’ (Bunt w sprawie CO2, Gazeta Wyborcza 29.05.2008); ‘A fight for coal 
in Brussels’ (Walka o węgiel w Brukseli, Gazeta Wyborcza 08.10.2008); ‘A pact of 
climate disagreement’ (Pakt niezgody klimatycznej, Gazeta Wyborcza 21.10.2008).	  
Both newspapers underlined similar arguments centred on costs of the initiatives both 
social and financial. At the same time the attempts to block the EU’s climate initiatives 
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were seen as a success, again in both newspapers; ‘Ecological victory of Poland’ 
‘(Ekologiczny sukces Polski, Rzeczpospolita 07.06.2008); ‘Poland finally completed its 
diplomacy homework’ (Polska wreszcie odrobiła lekcję z dyplomacji, Rzeczpospolita 
07.06.2008); ‘Poland won at the summit in Brussels’ (Polska zdobyła szczyt w 




The analysis conducted in this chapter has shown observable changes in the energy 
discourse in Poland. The contents of the texts collected in the sample show a discourse 
which was very closely associated to Russian external energy policies. Regardless of the 
context, Russia was almost always mentioned as one of the reference points. As 
summarized by Grzeszak (2008b: 35), ‘the problem of energy security is noticeable in 
Poland only with the Kremlin in the background’. My analysis confirms this 
observation. The discourse was gradually changing but only in terms of the presence 
and attention put to ‘cooperation with the European Union’. Russia remained to be a 
constant feature of the energy coverage in GW and in RZ: the discursive event was 
associated with Russia; so was the case of an increased presence of the security 
language and the invocation of the topic of energy security.  
The energy coverage in both newspapers during the whole decade was dominated by the 
dynamics within the triangle of Poland – European Union – Russia with geopolitics 
constituting a major factor of the Polish approach to energy. Geography played an 
important part in the discourse, not only due to its focus on pipelines, but also focus on 
the neighbouring countries, Ukraine, Lithuania and Germany. Other topics have 
received limited coverage, bar the exception of the climate change. This however was 
addressed only in relationship to the ‘cooperation with European Union’ providing the 
only example when both newspapers were equally critical towards Brussels.  
The coverage of Russia stood between negative and strongly negative in both 
newspapers, with Rzeczpospolita being more critical of the two. The number of 
negatively opinionated texts started to gradually increase after year 2006, as a 
consequence of the discontent with the Russian policies starting with the first Russian – 
Ukrainian gas dispute. The historical heritage of the Polish – Russian relations may also 
be a response to why this particular issue was much more important in the context of the 
Polish energy discourse than in the cases of the UK and of Germany.  
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In the case of the Polish energy elite discourse securitisation was based on geopolitics; 
on setting boundaries between the inside countries and the outside villain. The crisis has 
led to the idea of closer cooperation of European countries in the energy sphere. The 
proposal of a new treaty-organisation to be founded on the idea of the Musketeer’s Pact 
was the main measure promoted in Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita as a ‘new’ 
mechanism to address the ‘new’ challenges. This was also when the argument of 
establishing frontiers which would separate ‘us’ from the threat, from ‘them’ (from 
Russia) came to life. The rhetoric around the Musketeers Pact illustrates how 
securitisation was progressively dominating the discourse on energy cooperation with 
Russia. Only the boundaries, the argument went, could protect ‘us’ from a repetition of 
the January 2006 crisis by increasing the security of energy supplies within ‘our’ group 
of countries. Establishment of these frontiers therefore increased the presence of 
security language and security rhetoric. The January 2006 crisis led to the identification 
of a clear ‘threat’ and a security-inspired response: an institutional separation from 
Russia. Russian threat was the sign around which energy security was constructed 
equally in RZ and in GW. 
The analysis identified two distinct peaks of attention – January 2006 and January 2009. 
Increased newspaper coverage in both of these cases was associated with two gas 
disputes between Russia and Ukraine. However, the coverage of the events differed 
between the newspapers. Whereas in the case of January 2006 the contents of texts 
published by both newspapers were largely similar, in the case of January 2009 notable 
differences were identified. This was particularly significant in the coverage of the 
involvement of the European Union, with GW presenting a pro-EU tone, and RZ 
underlining the failures of the EU and giving voice to both politicians and analysts 
critical to the EU. This was also reflected in the political polarisation on EU policy 
between the centre – right (Eurosceptic) and centre – left (pro-integration).  
With reference to the coverage of the EU, the frame analysis of benefits vs. 
disadvantages from the EU showed that the benefits frame was more visible (187 texts) 
than disadvantages (107 texts). This may point to the conclusion that the EU influence 
was in fact affecting the polish energy discourse, as its presence (in terms of frequency 
of texts) was relatively stable throughout the decade. Climate change however proved to 
be a peculiar variable here. Whereas the overall coverage was seen more in terms of 
benefits than disadvantages, cooperation with the EU over climate change was 
consequently framed in terms of disadvantages. This was caused by the strong reliance 
of Poland (in its energy mix) on coal, and with it the reluctance to meet strict limits of 
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carbon dioxide emissions. This issue will be further compared with the coverage in the 
UK and in Germany in Chapter 7. 
In terms of the language it was a strongly militarised tone. Definition of threats is also 
relatively easy to identify – most of them are associated with the perceptions of Russian 
policies, both internal and external. These policies are not only directed at Poland, but 
also at the EU, other Central and Eastern European countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic 
States) as well as South Caucasus (with Georgia in particular). The military language 
was applied mainly in relation to the analysis and interpretation of policies, plans and 
statements of Russian officials. Polish energy security had one referent object – Russian 
authorities (and often specifically Vladimir Putin). There were also a number of 
measures aimed at containing these perceived threats, with the most visible being the 
call for solidarity of EU Member States in the face of energy disruptions and the call for 
institutionalisation of a Musketeers Pact, which would include not only EU, but also 
other (geographically) important countries, such as Turkey. The discourses were not 
calling for fortress Poland, but for fortress Europe, with Europe seen in a very wide 
perspective, including the South Caucasus. The EU was pictured mainly in terms of 
benefits, not only financial but also as a platform through which Poland would  be able 
to assure its energy security by having the ability to influence the common European 
voice (e.g. through the calls for energy solidarity). 
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Chapter 6 – Germany 
	  
The aim of this chapter is to present the results of both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of the energy discourse in Germany from the 1st of January 2000 to 1st of 
December 2009, based on the sample collected from Sueddeutsche Zeitung and 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The chapter, mirroring two previous ones, is structured 
according to the research-guiding questions. It starts with a short overview of the 
German energy policy at the beginning of 2000s, then going to the assessment of the 
presence of security in the energy elite discourse. In the latter part of this chapter I am 
looking at the indicators which should provide me with evidence of the convergence of 
discourses (as outlined in Chapters 1, 2 and 3). I will look at the frequency of texts, 
coverage of Russia and of the EU within the energy discourse. 
Results of the analysis reflect the fact that German newspapers have generally more 
diversity of views expressed in comparison with two other chapters. In the case of the 
UK and Poland the strong editorial stance has been observed as influencing the 
coverage of energy. In the case of the German sample however dissenting views were 
observable more often within the newspapers themselves, than between each other. The 
analysis points to several competing narrations. One of them was initiated by the 
January 2006 events in Ukraine and the cut off supplies of gas by Russia. It has 
provoked varying reactions – one was based on the idea of ‘fortress Europe’ which had 
to face the threat of newly resurgent Russia. The threat was not equal to all countries 
within the group of Wider Europe (including EU Member States and Ukraine). 
Germany however was a part of this Wider Europe so it had to be protected too. This 
narration was based on a binary reading of actors (authoritarian Russia vs. democratic 
Europe) where Russian actions were not about money but about great-power politics of 
a resurgent power. The second story line underlined the strategic partnership built over 
decades between Germany and Russia. Mutual interdependencies were therefore 
making any energy conflict (obvious to the proponents of New Cold War) impossible.  
A different reading of events focused on the climate change. Here the threat was again 
faced by countries other than Germany. Germany however was shown as having a 
moral obligation to protect the poorest of the poor. One of the ways through which this 
protection could have been achieved is increased investments in renewable energy at the 
expense of resources producing high levels of CO2. 	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The analysis has shown an increasing presence of the topic of energy security and of the 
language of security in the texts. They were linked with the security of supplies and saw 
Russian ‘energy weapons’ as threats. They were also linked with the changes in the 
climate and the threats of e.g. increasing sea levels such as islands in the Pacific. All of 
these narratives were visible in both newspapers. Still, the frame of economic 
consequences, reading events in terms of outcomes of market principles, energy 
interdependencies between suppliers and consumers were prevailing over the security-
based ones. 
The analysis has also identified the European Union as an important actor and a 
reference point for the energy coverage in FAZ and SZ. In an overwhelming majority of 
texts cooperation with the EU was framed in terms of advantages for Germany, both 
within the domestic (energy market reforms) as well as the external (security of supply, 
climate change) dimensions.   
 
6.1	  The	  energy	  policy	  in	  Germany	  
	  
Following the previous chapters, I will start with the summary of the German energy 
policy. For Poland the most important event in the past 20 years was the change from a 
communist to a democratic system starting in 1989. For Germany it was reunification of 
West and East Germany, a process that started in the 1990s (and still continues). One of 
the main reasons for that is the fact that the overall (and highly complex) legal and 
administrative system of the former West Germany was transferred to a fundamentally 
different realities (and system) of the former East Germany.  
Most of the 1990s were marked by the Christian (CDU/CSU) – Liberal (FDP) coalition 
government, led by Helmut Kohl. They were followed by another coalition, between the 
Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens (or to be more specific with Bündnis '90/Die 
Grünen) in years 1998 – 2005 under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder. The last 
part of the analysed decade, years 2005 – 2009 are the years of a grand coalition 
between the centre-right CDU/CSU and the centre-left SPD with Angela Merkel as the 
head of the government. SPD therefore was the only political force present in the 
government throughout the decade. One of the most important aspects of the German 
energy sphere in the 2000s was the topic of climate change and the promotion of 
renewable energy. The political interest in German environmental policy can be tracked 
back to 1969 and the centre-left government of Willy Brandt. Daniel Yergin (2011: 
537) linked this rising interest in environmental issues and opposition to nuclear energy 
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in Germany with the rise of the Green Party in the late 1970s. Hermann Scheer, dubbed 
the environmental leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), allied with the Green’s 
opposition towards nuclear energy.  
The 1998 election victory of the SPD brought the Green Party into the governing 
coalition, with renewable energy becoming one of the key points of the coalition 
agreement (2011: 539). In 1999, the coalition decided to phase out 17 nuclear reactors 
(though over a long period of time) and in 2000 introduced the Renewable Energy Law.  
Renewable energy was promoted based on the 1991 Feed-In Law,  
‘its model required German utilities to buy electricity from renewable generators at 
higher fixed rates – or much higher fixed rates – and then subsidize those rates by 
spreading them across the system so that the costs blended into the overall price. In this 
way, the otherwise uncompetitive renewable energy would be fed into the grid, and the 
renewable producers could make a profit’ (2011: 538).  
 
This led, early in the decade, to Germany becoming the most dominant actor in the 
sector of renewable energy, in wind and photovoltaics (solar panels) and then 
subsequently an exporter of technology.  
Yet the gross inland consumption in Germany was mainly based on fossil fuels, 
estimated at over 80%. Majority of them were coming from import; including 
approximately 83% of natural gas and 97% of crude oil demand. Russia, supplied 
approximately 40% of gas and 30% of oil, and was the key external energy partner for 
Berlin (Hobhom 2009: 95) which was intrinsically linked with a (broad) tradition of 
German – Russian cooperation in the foreign policy sphere.  
Early in the decade of 2000s it seemed that the energy discourse was to be dominated 
by one big debate – which resources should be in the domestic energy mix. Still, an 
open question remained over the relationship with Russia, the biggest external supplier 
of energy resources, experiencing an unexpected (at the time) change of leadership in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. An additional variable to the debate was created by the 
focus on the environment of one of the governing parties, the Greens, and the growing 
saliency of the global warming/climate change in the late 90s – early 2000s. 
What were the preferences of other big parties in Germany?  
The Green Party, as already mentioned strongly favoured investments in renewable 
energy and at the same time robustly opposed nuclear energy.  
‘The nuclear phase-out is a prerequisite for the transformation of energy’, said Trittin [a 
prominent Green Party politician]. It led to the necessary reconstruction of power 
plants. The attacks at the support for eco-energy should be condemned as an attempt to 
‘beat the infuriating competition off the field’ (Merkel wants to stop the nuclear phase 
out, Merkel will Atomausstieg stoppen’, SZ 09.06.2005).  
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The CDU under the helm of Angela Merkel, and the FPD were the only of the big 
German parties not cautious about the nuclear energy,  
‘Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) has called on the coalition partner, the SPD and 
other supporters of the nuclear phase-out to identify alternatives. ‘I say to all those who 
want to exit [from nuclear energy] and at the same want to protect the climate that they 
are now asked to give the answers’ (Merkel: Nuclear opponents should offer 
alternatives, Merkel: Atomgegner sollen Alternative bieten, SZ 15.01.2007).  
 
At the same time, the government under Angela Merkel continued to support 
investments in renewable energy, becoming a strong proponent of climate change 
initiatives at the EU level, finding an ally in the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair.  
The FPD has argued for a combination of nuclear, coal, oil and gas and renewable 
energy for electricity production and at the same time arguing against the nuclear 
phrase-out.  
CSU, a sister party of CDU, operating only in Bavaria (CDU operates in other 15 
German states), has always been a strong proponent of nuclear energy, directly (and 
indirectly) affecting the position of CDU. The main reason behind it is that 62% of 
energy in the state of Bavaria comes from nuclear power plants, hence a big influence of 
the pro-nuclear lobby within the CDU/CSU led in part by the chairman (1998 – 2007) 
of the CSU, Edmund Stoiber.    
The SPD was the only party in government in almost the whole analysed period (until 
the September 2009 elections), first as a majority member of a coalition government 
with the Green Party (1998 – 2005) and then as a runner-up in the 2005 elections and a 
coalition partner in a grand coalition with CDU/CSU. The SPD was supporting the 
nuclear phase-out in both coalitions, as well as investments in renewable energy. The 
SPD was also the main force behind the Nord Stream pipeline, which aimed at 
increasing of the amount of imported gas. SPD was finally an advocate of the coal 
industry, often leading to confusion over the actual policy plan for energy of the SPD. 
At the same time the fact that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs became involved 
in energy, significantly raised the profile (and saliency) of energy as a policy area of 
vital importance in Germany. Duffield (2009: 4291) links it with strong political 
personalities. Joschka Fischer as head of the MFA put focus on environmental issues (as 
a Green Party politician). Steinmeier (of SPD) underlined the energy security 
dimension, but was seeking close cooperation with Russia at the same time (he was a 
close advisor to the previous Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder).  
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From 2006 energy policy was increasingly becoming salient and was becoming an 
element of both security and foreign policies of the German government. Energy was 
initially covered by the Ministry of Economics and Technology, to become a part of the 
Ministry for the Environment during Schröder’s chancellorship. From 2006 the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier started to address the problems of energy 
not only in the domestic press, but also, as Duffield (2009: 4286) observed, 
internationally: in the Munich conference on security policy (Steinmeier 2006a); as well 
as in articles for Handelsblatt and the International Herald Tribune (Steinmeier 2006b, 
2006c). Chancellor Merkel has also called three energy summits, in April and October 
of 2006 and July of 2007. In all of them, considerable attention was put on the issue of 
security of supply (Duffield 2009). The last summit resulted in the formulation of three 
goals of German energy policy: Versorgungssicherheit (security of supply), 
Wirtschaftlichkeit (economic efficiency) and Umweltverträglichkeit (environmental 
sustainability); outlined in the ‘Ergebnisse des dritten Energiegipfels. Grundlagen für 
ein integriertes Energie- und Klimaprogramm’ (Results of the third energy summit. 
Foundations for an integrated energy and climate program) published on the 3rd of July 
2007.  
Also other ministers were involved in energy policy. The minister of the environment 
Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) strongly favoured the focus on climate change, thus boosting his 
political profile. Ultimately Angela Merkel took a big interest in climate change, firstly 
due to her previous engagements (as a German delegate for the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations) and secondly, like Gabriel – to boost her popularity. 
 
6.2	  Analysed	  newspapers	  
	  
In order to understand how energy was presented in the media from 2000 onwards, a 
qualitative analysis of newspaper texts was undertaken, with the sample collected based 
on the research through the newspaper archives of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(FAZ) and Sueddeutsche Zeitung (SZ).  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was founded in 1949 and is a daily national newspaper 
with a centre-right and conservative profile (Mahrt 2010: 65). Eilders (2002: 48) in her 
analysis of political positions of editorials in German newspapers between 1994 – 1998 
concluded that FAZ (together with Die Welt, another German daily newspaper) tended 
to be to the right of the political centre, whereas SZ tended to be more centrist, although 
with liberal tendencies (Mahrt 2010: 66). Though FAZ is a liberal paper from an official 
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standpoint, it has been known to have conservative and centre-right leanings at times. It 
has been, as my analysis has shown, strongly critical of the SPD-Greens government. 
The coverage of the newspaper is considered to be conservative (on issues of politics 
and economics) but with observably liberal coverage of culture and arts. The 
newspapers’ slogan is Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung macht keine Meinung, sie 
hat eine (The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung does not create opinion it has one) (Spies 
2004: 62), underlining the lack of clear political preferences.  
Sueddeutsche Zeitung was founded in 1945 in Bavaria, and is the largest daily national 
newspaper in Germany; it is considered to have a liberal profile (Mahrt 2010: 65) 
though as my analysis of the coverage has shown, it remained to be critical of the 
Bavarian sister party of CDU - CSU. The slogan, Sie verteidigt und erstrebt 
freiheitliche, demokratische Gesellschaftsformen nach liberalen und sozialen 
Grundsätzen (It defends and strives for free and democratic forms of society, according 
to liberal and social principles) points to the centre-left orientation of the newspaper 
(Spies 2004: 62) 
A significant difference between the newspapers in Germany and newspapers in Poland 
or the United Kingdom is their lack of clear association with political parties (or policy 
preferences, as in the case of Poland), a self-proclaimed independence of opinions of 
FAZ (reflected in its slogan) and a socio-liberal profile of SZ.  
The sampled material obtained was further reduced manually, leaving an overall of 
2092 texts between 1st of January 2000 and 1st of December 2009; 1242 from SZ and 
850 from FAZ. For more information on the sampling and reduction of the material 
please see Chapter 3. 
After this short introduction of the state of affairs in the energy sector in Germany I will 
move to the analysis of the research-guiding questions of this thesis. 
First I will focus on the presence of security in the energy discourse of two elite German 
newspapers. This will be followed by an analysis of the frequency of texts, and the 
specific aspects of the coverage of Russia and the EU. Results of this analysis will be 
compared with similar results of the analyses of the UK and Polish case studies 
(Chapters 4 and 5). 
I have provided all of the translations from German to English. All errors are therefore 




6.3	  Is	  energy	  supply	  seen	  as	  highly	  threatened	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  
extraordinary	  measures	  are	  necessary?	  
 
The analysis of the presence of security in the texts published by FAZ and SZ is based 
on two elements of Securitization Theory: existential threats and extraordinary 
measures. I will further support the findings with the analysis of the relative strength of 
texts (in terms of the presence of security language). The final element will be an 
analysis of frames through which events were presented by both newspapers. Further 
information about my approach has been given in Chapters 1, 2 and 3.  
‘Energy security is back’ (quoted from ‘Natural gas is the power’, Erdgas ist Macht, SZ 
03.01.2006) was one of the keyword-phrases in the coverage of the January 2006 
energy dispute. Energy security was barely visible in the discourse prior to December 
2005 – January 2006 debates (see Figure 18). I have looked at the presence of the topic 
of energy security through my quantitative analysis of texts, based on the codebook 
(Appendix 1). I have identified 57 texts from FAZ and 67 from SZ addressing energy 
security (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. Texts from both Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Sueddeutsche Zeitung, years 2000 - 2009 
 
The distribution of texts has been somewhat equal, with observable differences in the 
number of texts in 2006 (21 texts to 27 texts) and 2008 (6 texts to 15 texts). As in the 
previous cases energy security has become more visibly present in the texts of both 
newspapers from 2005 onwards. I have not found any texts in years 2000 and 2004 that 
would refer to energy security. Years 2005 – 2006 can therefore, based on the 
quantitative analysis, be considered as shifting points in the coverage of energy by elite 
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newspapers, introducing the topic of energy security into its reporting and 
commentaries.  
The appearance of energy security in the coverage of energy was rather sudden, as 
before 2005 the issue was barely covered by mainstream newspapers. What triggered its 
emergence, according to the analysis of contents of the sampled texts, was the gas 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine that broke out in the winter of 2005/2006.  
The debate in both SZ and FAZ in years 2005 – 2006 is best epitomised by a title of an 
article from FAZ, ‘It’s about the security of supply’ (Es geht um die 
Versorgungssicherheit, FAZ 05.01.2006). Dispute was the key word here, as the whole 
issue of the Russian – Ukrainian gas relationship in winter 2005 – 2006 was 
predominantly framed as a dispute, although several articles were using more militant 
language referring to a war, e.g. ‘Preparations for the next gas war’ (Vorbereitungen 
zum nächsten Gaskrieg, FAZ 29.06.2006) or ‘A new ‘gas war’?’ (Ein neuer 
"Gaskrieg"?, FAZ 21.06.2006). 
In ‘Gas as a substitute for rockets’ (Gas als Ersatz für Raketen, SZ 02.01.2006) the 
conclusion was that ‘in truth, uncertainty grows with Russia using gas not as a 
commodity, but as a rocket’. The presence of security language was therefore visible 
both in FAZ and SZ.  
Energy security was only initially associated with security of the supply, not only linked 
with Russian gas but also e.g. with the rise of China, or geopolitics, presenting energy 
security as a topic of global concern: 
‘During the energy summit conveyed by the Chancellor a lot will be said about the 
security of supply – but that is no longer a national issue, but a global [one] (…) 
[E]nergy managers, ministers and the Chancellor want to discuss how the future energy 
supply of Germany will look like. The worries are big: oil, gas and electricity prices 
keep on rising. The China boom makes the old industrial countries dispute over raw 
materials. Large industrial enterprises complain about energy prices, which are 
increasingly making production in Germany unprofitable. And everything is still in the 
state of shock started on the 2nd of January, when the pressure in the pipelines suddenly 
fell and Germany was for a few hours a victim of the gas dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine. “How can we reduce our dependence on gas?” asks the ‘status report’ of the 
federal government prepared for the energy summit (Everyone wants to reach the end of 
the world, Alle wollen ans Ende der Welt, SZ 01.04.2006) 
 
SZ has also linked energy security with ‘profound fears not known for years’, although 
without bigger attention as to the nature of these fears, merely vaguely linking them 
with geopolitics, 
‘[I]n almost all geopolitical questions issues like electricity, gas and oil play a central 
role (…) energy supply issues are now connected with profound fears, not known for 
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years (…) Chancellor Merkel brings the issue [of energy] into the centre of its EU 
Presidency and the G8 (The new uncertainty about energy, Die neue Energie-
Unsicherheit, SZ 08.02.2007) 
 
Still however energy security was mainly constructed around the perceived threat from 
Russia, which in the analysed sample was more visible in the texts published by FAZ, 
e.g. in: 
- ‘Whispers about an ‘energy NATO’ coming especially from Eastern Europe 
because of Moscow’s handling of the gas and oil guns’ (Raunen über eine 
"Energie-Nato" Sorgen vor allem in Osteuropa wegen Moskaus Umgang mit der 
Gas- und Ölwaffe, FAZ 11.04.2008) 
 
- Who is the villain and who the victim in this winter’s horror show is difficult to 
assess. Only one thing is clear: a great cycle of energy and politics between 
Moscow, Kyiv and Brussels - the EU should draw conclusions. (The hostages of 
the gas war, Die Geiseln der Gaskrieger, FAZ 11.01.2009) 
 
Not only the presence of the security language increased, the topic of energy security 
was becoming increasingly visible in the elite energy discourse. While the media 
generally exposed Russia as the main culprit, German political leaders were very neutral 
and careful in their comments. And yet the concept of Versorgungssicherheit (security 
of supply) was increasingly present in the coverage. 
The security of supply and the perception of Russia however were not the only 
instances where security language and existential threats were mentioned. Global 
warming and climate change were progressively framed in terms of existential threats, 
usually by the environment minister, Sigmar Gabriel (SPD),  
‘The new Federal Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) makes climate one of 
the central themes of his policies. “Germany will remain a pioneer”, Gabriel said in his 
inaugural speech. Climate change is a “humanity-threatening problem”. The EU should 
therefore “commit multilaterally” to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 by 
30%, he said’ (Gabriel gives priority to climate protection, Gabriel gibt Klimaschutz 
Vorrang, SZ 02.12.2005) 
 
Climate change was therefore a humanity-threatening problem which can be addressed 
only through a multilateral commitment of the EU in terms of CO2 reductions. Climate 
change was framed as a threat to the safety of the EU,	  
‘The European Union has (for the first time) called climate change a threat to their 
safety. Policy against global warming is a part of their security strategy (…) climate 
change is a “threat multiplier” that exacerbates tensions’ (EU: Climate change is a 




The response to the climate change however was based on the no harm to others 
approach – responding to this threat was a moral responsibility,   
‘There are no winners in global warming, but the big losers the poorest of the poor (…) 
take the example of the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific (…) [they] rise 
an average of not more than two meters above the sea level. A higher concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere leads to higher wind speeds, more frequent storms 
and higher tides. Studies suggest that these effects will wash away the beaches (…) the 
benefits [of climate change initiatives] will go beyond the debate on climate change. 
Many parts of the world now have no electricity (…). Currently, millions of people in 
the developing world are forced to cut trees for firewood for cooking. This increases the 
risk of droughts and contributes to environmental degradation (…) The air pollution, 
partly due to dirty and inefficient power generation, year after year kills an estimated 
amount of 500,000 people and is responsible for millions of cases of severe respiratory 
disease’ (The morality of climate change, Die Moral des Klimaschutzes, SZ 29.06.2001) 
 
The presence of security language in the coverage of energy in the German elite 
discourse was not as visible as in the cases of Poland and Germany. Also the strength of 
the texts was relatively low (Table 7). By strength I refer to the presence of security 
language (further addressed in Chapter 2.3.2) in texts which I have measured on a scale 
from +1 (high) to 0 (low) assessing the frequency of the use of security-related words in 
the texts. 
 Reporting Analysis Interview Opinion 
Strength 0.3134 0.28 0.6 0.5454 
Table 7. The level of presence of security language in sampled material from Sueddeutsche Zeitung and 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
N=200 texts (or 10% of the overall sample; randomly selected) 
 
Security language was present in both newspapers at a relatively similar level (SZ 0.5; 
FAZ 0.6).  
Through 2007 to 2009 (the second gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine) energy 
security had observably dropped in the coverage of energy, with bigger stress put on 
other topics (climate change in particular). Energy security came back to the top of 
coverage of energy again in 2009. The analysis suggests that it was in response to 
another crisis leading to the threat to the security of supply. It would therefore seem that 
energy security was predominantly a keyword response both in FAZ and SZ to the high 
saliency of two specific energy-related events in Europe; events that were directly 
threatening the Versorgungssicherheit (security of supply) of gas. Another observation 
is that the concept of energy security, in the context of Germany, was closely associated 
with security of supply, and consequently linked with the relationship with Russia, 
which will be further discussed in the latter part of this chapter. 
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Russia was at the centre of energy security. In both newspapers energy security was 
associated with a geopolitical analysis setting frontiers dividing a wider Europe from 
Russia; wider, because it was including also Central and Eastern Europe. Russian 
actions in the energy sphere were threatening countries of Eastern, Central and Western 
Europe with its ‘energy guns’. This approach was visible in both newspapers. In both 
the approach reflected a pacifist, ‘do no harm’ approach typical of post-World War II 
Germany. A text published in Sueddeutsche Zeitung outlined these boundaries, 
‘It's not often that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe remind the public of the 
time when these nations were vassals of the communist Soviet Union (…) as always, we 
evaluated the outcome of conflict between Russia and Ukraine - the freezing neighbours 
cannot feel any different than  hostages do. You can see that gas takes priority in the 
pursuit of Russian interests. Central and European states see themselves in a humiliating 
way as second-class nations, located in a peaceful Europe, but suddenly plagued by 
fundamental problems. For you and all observers in Western Europe it is clearly visible 
and in a drastic way, what a great significance it is that the EU currently has so 
intensely discussed energy security.’ (The gas hostages, Die Gas-Geiseln, SZ 
13.01.2009).  
 
An Opinion published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in January 2006 compared gas 
to an energy weapon,  
‘[Energy] raw material supplies as a weapon – we already knew that mainly from the 
Middle East. And yet even there, no one has dared to use them since the seventies (…) 
During the Cold War, Moscow had not blackmailed the "class enemy" with gas, 
because military strength secured the global political rank of the country. Putin's Russia, 
however, is one of those semi-developed commodity-based economies that can gain 
influence often only by threatening to harm others’ (Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in 
the hands of Kremlin, Russisch-ukrainischer Gasstreit In der Hand des Kreml, FAZ 
03.01.2006) 
 
German case study provides a very different assessment of threat in the coverage of 
energy by elite newspapers. It was not only Germany that was directly threatened – the 
threat of Russian energy weapons was mainly experienced by other countries east of 
German border. Both newspapers were therefore, in this particular case, contributing to 
the New Cold War narrative analysed in Chapters 1 and 2 and also observed in Chapters 
4 and 5. This narrative was ‘framing the present in the familiarity of the past, it nudges 
the reader towards the acceptance of the new Cold War’s realpolitik agenda’ (Klinke 
2011: 711). This was particularly visible in the way Russian actions were described – as 
‘destructive’, prone to ‘threat’, ‘blackmail’ or ‘take hostage’ its neighbours as both 
quoted examples from FAZ and SZ have shown.  
This however was not the only instance when energy security was invoked or where the 
presence of the security language was observably higher. The other was climate change, 
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e.g. in ‘EU: Climate change is a security risk’ (EU: Klimawandel ist Sicherheitsrisiko, 
SZ 06.03.2008) or in ‘EU: Climate change threatens the world peace’ (Erderwärmung 
erstmals Thema im UN-Sicherheitsrat EU: Klimawandel gefährdet den Weltfrieden, SZ 
07.12.2008). The second text provides few quotes outlining this reading of climate 
change, 
‘The former head of the UN Environment Programme, UNEP, Klaus Töpfer, warned in 
the ARD television that by increasing temperatures the livelihoods of people would be 
destroyed, so that "we get more and more climate refugees". Those who are particularly 
affected are the poorest of the poor, and they have contributed least to the 
situation. "These are most certainly grounds for conflicts," Töpfer said.’ 
 
Climate change therefore has a conflict-igniting potential which does not affect the 
developed countries, responsible for the changes of the climate. It will affect the poorest 
of the poor. Again the argument of moral responsibility in tackling the climate-induced 
threat was underlined. In the same text an example of a measure aimed to tackle this 
was suggested. This measure was not aimed at stopping the changes of the climate – it 
was aimed at dealing with its consequences and future conflicts,  
‘There is a clear link between climate change and conflict prevention," Matussek 
[German Ambassador to the UN] has said. He claimed that the global 
warming continues to progress and a system of "preventive diplomacy" needs to be set 
up to mitigate the worst consequences. ‘EU: Climate change threatens the world peace’ 
(Erderwärmung erstmals Thema im UN-Sicherheitsrat EU: Klimawandel gefährdet den 
Weltfrieden, SZ 07.12.2008) 
 
The moral responsibility was obliging to create a system based on diplomacy and 
conflict prevention as a response to the problems arising from climate change. This 
moral responsibility to act was visible mainly in the texts published in SZ, according to 
the analysis of the contents of texts. 
Two specific threats have therefore been identified in the texts published in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and Sueddeutsche Zeitung. The first one was the threat to energy 
supplies. Here the coverage seemed to focus on the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe directly threatened by Russian energy policies. In the second instance the threat 
was stemming from the climate change which leads to future conflicts. 
Two of the measures suggested to address these threats were democracy and conflict 
prevention, both hardly of extraordinary character. What were the extraordinary 







I have not observed measures argued for in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung which could be considered of an extraordinary character. 
Although the New Cold War narrative was visible in the coverage of Russian energy 
policies and climate change was explicitly identified as a threat no exceptional measures 
have been argued for. The presence of security in the analysed sample was limited to an 
increase in the coverage of Russian energy policies specifically at the time of the 
January 2006 and January 2009 energy crises. The solutions promoted in both 
newspapers – cooperation at the EU level in the case of Russian threat and multilateral 
cooperation and preventative diplomacy in the case of climate change – cannot be seen 
as extraordinary. They did not fall out of what can be considered as day-to-day politics.  
 
Frames 
As explained in Chapter 3 I have looked at the presence of the frames for the purpose of 
an additional indicator measuring the presence of security in the texts on energy from 
Frankfurer Allgemeine Zeitung and Sueddeutsche Zeitung. In Chapter 3 I identified four 
potential frames which should be identifiable in the energy discourses. These were 1 – 
environmental consequences; 2 – economic consequences; 3 – geopolitical; 4 – conflict. 
The selected texts have been analysed following the process outlined in Chapter 3 with 
the use of the codebook (Appendix 1). In a situation where the selected text did not fit 
into any of the frames; it was categorized as ‘other’ (Figure 19). I have randomly 
sample 10% of the texts (200 texts) from the overall sample.  
 
Figure 19. Results of the frames analysis, Germany 
Frames: 1 – environmental consequences; 2 – economic consequences; 3 – geopolitical; 4 – conflict. A 
table detailing numbers of texts per year can be found in Appendix 4.  
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The most dominant frame – of economic consequences, was present in 67 texts of the 
sampled material, followed by the geopolitical frame (in 45 texts), and then the frame of 
conflict (32 texts) and of environmental consequences (28 texts). 28 texts out of the 
sampled material did not have any of the five frames. 
Economy was therefore the main basis of debates within the energy discourse produced 
by FAZ and SZ. The frames of geopolitics and conflict were mainly applied when 
addressing the energy crises between Russia and Belarus/Ukraine, as well as in the 
context of the coverage of the war in Georgia in August 2008. This was observable in 
the case of both newspapers. As outlined before, it was a narration of a European 
fortress which had to be defended from the threats posed by the instrumental use of 
energy resources by Russia (energy weapons).This was a mixture of a New Cold War, 
and neo-colonial narrative, where primarily Central and Eastern Europe had to seek 
protection from the ‘destructive’, ‘blackmailing’ and ‘hostage-taking’ Russia. The neo-
colonial element of this line of thinking was the conviction of the superiority of the 
Western European system over the chaotic and aggressive eastern neighbour and energy 
supplier.  
Both of these frames (geopolitical and conflict) were also applied in the coverage of 
global warming and climate change, both often pictured as global existential threats. 
Security-related frames, conflict and geopolitics, were present in approximately one-
third of the texts, mirroring the presence of the frame of economic consequences. One 
can therefore conclude that they were not the dominant frames within the German elite 
energy discourse. 
 
Conclusions about the first research-guiding question 
Year 2006 was the year of energy security in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and in 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 48 texts out of 124 texts (for the whole decade) addressing the 
topic of energy security were published in 2006. Although the presence of the topic 
remained observable from 2006 onwards year 2006 is the period of the highest attention 
paid to energy security. The main reason for that was the coverage of the January 2006 
Russia – Ukraine crisis, labelled as a dispute though with observable examples 
suggesting signs of securitisation of the coverage. The main narration which would 
point to that was the narration of a fortress, including European Union as well as 
countries east of the EU (primarily Ukraine) threatened by the Russian energy weapons. 
The threat however was not affecting Germany directly, at least according to the 
majority of texts both analysed newspapers. Central and Eastern Europe countries were 
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the ones threatened by Russian energy policies, according to FAZ and SZ. Germany had 
the obligation to do something about it which was stemming from, on the one hand, a 
visible ‘do no harm’ to others approach and on the other from a New Cold War 
narrative through which events of January 2006 were put in the context of the Cold War 
rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs. Still, even the New Cold War narrative 
did not argue for drastic measures of response. What was underlined in most of the texts 
(in both newspapers) was addressing the problems through cooperation and the EU 
platform. The fortress, although present, was not built only on ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ (as in the 
case of Poland) but also as a consequence of ‘the new self-awareness of a state [of 
Russia] that has been since the end of the Soviet Union in search of itself (Gas as a 
substitute for rockets, Gas als Ersatz für Raketen, SZ 02.01.2006).  
The second approach through which energy security was present in the analysed texts, 
and which attracted highest presence of security language was the topic of climate 
change. Here again the threat was experienced by poor countries, as they were pictured 
as the ones who will suffer the consequences of conflicts resulting from the changes of 
the climate. The ‘do no harm’ approach was also observable here. What was underlined 
was the moral responsibility to protect the poor countries through democracy and 
conflict prevention. 
Yes or no answer to the question of securitisation of the energy coverage is therefore 
impossible in the case of the sample of texts from German elite newspapers. The 
presence of security language was more visible in terms of certain topics (and coverage 
of specific events) than in the others. I did not find examples showing antagonising 
coverage – the coverage of all of the cases of energy security or of the use of security 
language remained to be relatively similar.  
Securitisation of energy did not become institutionalised in the case of Germany, even 
in the cases with the highest presence of security language or when the New Cold War 
narrative was observable. It remained an element of day-to-day politics, without any 
calls for extraordinary measures (understood as measures contradicting or not in line 
with the existing law or practices, as defined in Chapter 2.2). There were no easily 
identifiable calls for extraordinary measures because the analysed texts failed to identify 
threats of a truly existential nature. Although Russian policies were portrayed as threats, 
they were not pictured as existential; they were not even pictured as threats outside of 
the January 2006 and January 2009 crises (with several exceptions, e.g. in the case of 
the coverage of the war in Georgia in August 2008). Finally, they were not shown as 
threats directly affecting Germany – they were seen mainly as threats faced by 
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Germany’s eastern neighbours. Energy security as a topic was predominantly an 
element of the coverage of Russia, mainly within the New Cold War narrative. It was 
also visible in the debates and discussions over global warming and climate change. Yet 
still its main reference point was Versorgungssicherheit, the security of supply. 
The presence of the topic of energy security has increased, particularly after 2006, and 
the presence of the language of security was matched by an increased saliency of 
energy.  
In response to the question asked by Eurobarometer on the most important issue facing 
the country, energy-related issues have ranged between 4% - 11% in answers of German 
respondents (Table 8). This shows that energy was progressively becoming a salient 
theme. 
Year Spring Autumn 
2007 6% 6% 
2008 7% 9% 
2009 4% 11% 
Table 8. Eurobarometer opinion polls data: Energy related issues as a response to the question ‘name two 
most important issues facing their country’ in Germany 
 
Following the examination of the presence of security in the energy coverage of the two 
elite newspapers the next part of this chapter moves to the analysis of the second 
research guiding question. I will explore the number of texts in years 2000 – 2009 as 
well as specific aspects of the coverage of Russia and of the EU.  
 
6.4	  Indicators	  of	  convergence	  
 
This part of the chapter will focus on three indicators: frequency of texts (and discursive 
events), tone of the coverage of Russia in the energy sphere and the assessment of 
cooperation with the EU in terms of benefits and disadvantages. I will use the results of 
these analyses, together with the outcomes of the previous part of this chapter, in order 
to address all three research-guiding questions in Chapter 7. 
The first task is to identify a discursive peak that is moments in the timeline between 
year 2000 and year 2009 when the largest number of texts was published. This focus on 
the calendar months is of particular importance as it should allow us to see that not only 
did the reporting intensify at similar times in all analysed countries (which would be 
easy to justify, as e.g. coverage of conflicts usually leads to their higher saliency) but 
also that the coverage itself was increasingly similar. 
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I have already discussed the definition of a discursive peak in Chapters 1 and 2, but in 
order to provide the reader with a brief summary, discursive event is ‘an event only 
counts as a discursive event if it appears on the discourse planes of politics and the 
media intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time’ (Wodak and Meyer 
2009: 48). The monthly analysis of the number of texts is followed therefore by 
conclusions of an analysis of contents of all texts selected. The frequencies and 
discursive events will be compared to results of analyses of the UK and of Poland in 
Chapter 7. 
The month-by-month analysis has led to the following results (Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20. Frequency curve of texts from FAZ and SZ collected in the final sample, years 2000 – 2009 
FAZ – Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, SZ – Sueddeutsche Zeitung. A table detailing numbers of texts 
per month can be found attached as Appendix 4.  
 
Figure 20 shows two significant spikes of attention – January 2006 (65 texts) and 
January 2009 (63 texts). Both are preceded by months with similarly high number of 
texts: December 2005 (51 texts) and December 2008 (43 texts). 
The distribution of texts in these two peak months was relatively similar, January 2006 
(SZ 38, FAZ 27) and in January 2009 (SZ 36, FAZ 27). In order to explore the contents 
of texts published in both months I have examined all of these texts in detail. I have also 
looked at the similarities and differences in coverage between the two newspapers. 
The energy coverage between December 2005 - January 2006 focused mainly on the 
Russian – Ukrainian gas dispute. The other focal point was the relationship between 
Germany and Russia. This did not only occur in the light of the gas spat, but also in the 
context of Nord Stream pipeline; and in particular – of the relationship with the former 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. 
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At the end of 2005, both FAZ and SZ initially reported that energy policy started to 
become an area of increased interest for the new CDU/CSU – SPD government. The 
coalition agreement between the parties called for creation of Gesamtkonzept (a 
comprehensive plan) of energy policy. Energy was also one of the themes addressed by 
Angela Merkel in her first policy statement from 30th of November 2005. The focus was 
put on Atomausstieg (phase-out of nuclear power), climate change and concerns over 
high energy prices in Germany. Within the context of the speech both FAZ and SZ 
focused on the differences of policy ideas between both parties (outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter), in particular in terms of the phase-out of nuclear power.  
What led to an increased coverage of energy in December 2005 was the new position 
taken-up by the previous Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. After the 2005 SPD defeat in 
Parliamentary elections, Schröder became the chairman of the board of Nord Stream 
AG, a consortium responsible for the construction and operation of the Nord Stream 
pipeline. The nomination, announced in late 2005 led to a special parliamentary debate 
in December 2005. SZ in its coverage of the debate was highly critical of SPD and of its 
former leader, giving voice to those who were presenting similar arguments, 
‘the parliamentary secretary of the FDP parliamentary group Juergen Koppelin said that 
the FDP looks at Schröder’s decision not only as a sign of disrespect to his former state 
office, but also a disregard of the fact that Schröder is still on the German payroll (…)’ 
(The topic of Schröder in Bundestag, Schröder Thema im Bundestag, SZ 14.12.2005). 
  
The criticism from the mainstream parties, the Greens, FDP, CDU/CSU and the Left 
was met with silence from SDP; Schröder’s former party.  
What made the number of texts spike in January 2006 was primarily the coverage of the 
energy dispute, further discussed below when talking about the tone of the coverage of 
Russia. It is worth pointing out however that there were two other salient events in 
January 2006: the first visit of Angela Merkel in Russia (newspaper coverage on 16th 
and 17th of January 2006) and the on-going debate over the nuclear phase-out 
(throughout the month).  
Russia was therefore at the centre of attention for both newspapers when they were 
publishing texts related to energy in the first month of 2006. The coverage was strongly 
opinionated against Russian policies, which is further analysed in the latter part of this 
chapter.  
The peaks in attention in December 2008 – January 2009 were caused by the coverage 
of the second gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine. The second crisis however was 
more linked with the changes in the domestic energy market in Germany. One of the 
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conclusions of the second gas crisis was the need for further investment in renewable 
energy. This however, as expressed in FAZ, has led to a paradox that even though the 
conflict may increase the popularity of renewables, nuclear energy may be missed,  
‘the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict is likely to have increased the desire of Germans for 
energy from renewable sources again. More energy from wind and sun actually makes 
us more dependent on gas imports (…) [because] wind turbines in this country, 
statistically speaking, are standing still for 300 days’. Nuclear phase-out leaves only one 
source of energy which can supplement renewables – Russian gas.’ (German energy 
policy in an oblique triangle, Deutsche Energiepolitik im schiefen Dreieck, FAZ 
08.01.2009). 
 
The coverage of these episodes in FAZ and in SZ show the ambiguous position of the 
German government towards Russia between 2005 and 2009, years of the grand 
coalition in Germany as well as of two energy disputes between Russia and Ukraine. It 
also shows why cooperation with Russia was such a salient theme after 2005, with a 
multi-level complexity relating both to foreign policy as well as domestic political and 
energy dynamics. Whereas the first crisis in the texts of both FAZ and SZ was linked 
with the German – Russian relations, the second one (in particular in FAZ) was linked 
with the domestic energy debates.  
Going back to the definition of a discursive event as an event which appears in the 
discourse for a prolonged period of time, the analysis shows the first energy crisis, that 
of January 2006, as the most relevant to the established definition. It received an in-
depth coverage in January 2006 and in the following months; it was also the main 
referent point for the coverage of the January 2009 energy dispute; it was a reference 
point to the coverage of Russia (and Russia – EU energy relationship) as well as to the 
coverage of the EU, with plans of common EU energy policies seen increasingly 
critically. Finally, January 2006 events seemed to be, at least according to the 
newspaper coverage, reference points for the debate over the domestic energy mix; and 
an argument for further investments (and support of) renewable energy. It was also in 
December 2005 – January 2006 (Schröder joining Nord Stream and the gas dispute) 
when Russia became one of the main reference points for the debates over German 
energy (and its energy security); debates earlier centred on the debate of nuclear vs. 
renewable. 
 
The coverage of Russia in the energy elite discourse 
The next indicator I analysed here is the tone of the coverage of Russia. The importance 
of this indicator is further explained in Chapter 2, with Chapter 3 and the codebook 
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(Appendix 1) providing more detailed information as to how I have carried it out. The 
final sample included amounted to 251 texts. 156 texts were published in Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung, 95 in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
Cooperation with Russia was present in the coverage of energy throughout the decade, 
though at different levels. One year stands out in particular – year 2008 when 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung published over four times more (47: 11) texts addressing 
cooperation with Russia than Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Figure 21). This was 
linked with an increased coverage of the second gas dispute in December 2008. 
 
Figure 21. Breakdown of texts sampled as addressing cooperation with Russia collected from 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, years 2000 - 2009 
FAZ-Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, SZ-Sueddeutsche Zeitung 
 
The analysis of contents of these texts provides evidence as to how the tone of the 
perception of Russian actions in the energy sphere was presented by SZ and by FAZ.  
Energy was an important aspect of German – Russian relationship at least since 1973 
when the first gas flown from (then) USSR to (then) West Germany and remained so in 
the following decades. In 2000 however, with the new president in the Kremlin, the 
situation started to change. An article in the SZ outlined this re-modelling of the 
partnership in a text with a provocative title of ‘The sauna diplomacy has had its day’ 
(Die Sauna-Diplomatie hat ausgedient, SZ 27.10.2000).  
‘[T]he German – Russian relations are no longer dominated by male friendships, but by 
sobriety (…) Putin presented himself during his first official visit to Germany as 
friendly-reserved and distanced but correct. “Different people, different customs”, the 
president told the press on the question whether he sees his relations with Schröder as 
modelled on the Kohl-Yeltsin relationship. The economic relations dominated the 
summit. They are currently the focus for both sides. Four large German – Russian 




The peaks in Russia’s saliency in the discourse, in years 2004, 2006 and 2008 were 
centred on the energy disputes (2005/6 and 2008/9), development of Nord Stream and 
the involvement of Gerhard Schröder (from 2005 onwards) as well as cooperation 
between German energy companies and Gazprom, and the imprisonment of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky (2003/2004). The coverage in this particular year focused more on 
Russian energy companies (Gazprom, Yukos) and their relationship with Western 
energy companies, as well as the state of affairs of Yukos in the follow up of Mihkail 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest and subsequent trial. This difference is particularly visible in the 
coverage of Yukos and Khodorkovsky – whereas in 2004 energy-related articles dealt 
with the state of affairs of Yukos: the dismemberment of Yukos, purchase of its parts by 
state-owned oil company Rosneft under the helm of Igor Sechin, at the time the deputy 
chief of presidential administration. From 2005, with the start of his trial, more focus 
was put on Khodorkovsky and the involvement of the Kremlin in his imprisonment.  
‘The former head of the Russian oil company Yukos was on his way to the top – until 
he broke the iron rules of the Putin Pact. [Khodorkovsky] had violated the Putin Pact, 
according to which oligarchs are taken care of in exchange for their money and lack of 
disturbance of the Kremlin and the entourage of the president’ (In the name of the 
Kremlin, Im Namen des Kreml, SZ 27.04.2005). 
  
The overall tone was highly critical of Khodorkovsky’s imprisonment, partition and sale 
of his company. This was the case of both SZ and FAZ. The case of Yukos therefore 
marks a turning point for the coverage of energy in Germany, with (1) Russia becoming 
increasingly salient and (2) Russian officials as increasingly salient at the expense of the 
representatives of the Russian energy companies. 
Overall, and until the events of the winter of 2005/2006, Russia was portrayed in a 
relatively moderate tone. By tone I refer to what I have explained in Chapter 3, that is 
assessing whether the language used was positive, negative or neutral, and whether the 
text was overall expressing positive, negative or neutral considered opinion. All texts 
expressing positive and negative opinions were put into two clusters, and further ranged 




Figure 22. Tone of the coverage of Russia based on the sampled material from Sueddeutsche Zeitung and 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
 
I have not found observable differences between SZ and FAZ in terms of their coverage 
of Russia, both at an average level of approximately -0.5 (Figure 22). The increase of 
the negative coverage is visible particularly from 2004 onwards, as a consequence of the 
Yukos case. The analysis of coverage however points to year 2006, when the attention 
was the highest. 
The opinions voiced in the newspapers about the energy dispute in winter 2005/2006 
were mainly addressing Russia in a negative tone. ‘The Russian energy giant punished 
the pro-Western government in Ukraine, on behalf of Putin’ was the header of the text 
in SZ in January 2006 (An extended arm of Gazprom, Verlängerter Arm der Kreml AG, 
SZ 14.01.2006). In the same text, the author puts the whole dispute in the context of a 
Ukrainian pro-Western stance after the Orange Revolution,  
‘The ‘sister nation’ is governed in the eyes of the Kremlin ideologists by traitors. It is 
thus probably no accident that the strengthening of the gas conflict fell in the same time 
as the Ukrainian parliamentary election campaign. The new parliament will be elected 
in Ukraine in March [2006]’. 
 
Or in Daniel Brössler’s text ‘Caution Russia’ (Vorsicht Russland, SZ 05.01.2006),  
 
‘natural gas is a flammable mixture. It requires a high degree of caution. Nobody should 
know better than the Russians. Finally, the welfare of their country depends on this 
resource, which is concealed in large quantities in the Russian soil. Yet Moscow has in 
the first days had their fingers burnt by the gas.’  
 
The criticism of Russian policies was however relatively moderate, in comparison to the 
coverage in (especially) Poland but also (to an extent) the UK. It was matched by an 
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observable view of fear of gas cuts and energy scarcity in the EU especially in ‘Europe 
fears for supply of gas’ (Europa fürchtet um die Lieferung von Gas, SZ 03.01.2006),   
‘the European Union and the federal government consider the gas dispute between 
Russia and the Ukraine as a "serious problem". The EU foreign policy Chief Javier 
Solana has been trying unsuccessfully to mediate. The federal government increased the 
pressure on the two countries. In several countries there were supply disruptions’.  
 
In the text published several months later, also underlining the fear of energy scarcity: 
‘If you have a contract with the Russians, you can rely on it’ SZ was found quoting 
Klaus-Ewald Holst, head of the Leipzig gas transmission grid gas company (Everyone 
wants the end of the world, Alle wollen ans Ende der Welt, SZ 01.04.2006). ‘Energy 
security is back’, as stated in the earlier part of this chapter, seemed to be the common 
message of the media in January 2006, best epitomized in Nikolau Piper’s ‘Natural gas 
is the power’ (Erdgas ist Macht, SZ 03.01.2006).  
‘Suddenly it is back, the almost forgotten question of security of energy supply. Russia 
and Ukraine dispute over the price of natural gas, and in Western Europe the problem of 
low pressure in the pipelines. Although it will unlikely result in unheated flats in 
Germany, the power plays of the Russian state energy giant Gazprom may make it 
rather unsettlingly close, not only in geographical terms’.  
 
The return of energy security was linked with the emergence of the New Cold War 
narrative. The event was also seen in an openly militant tone, e.g. in Daniel Brössler’s 
‘Gas as a substitute for rockets’ (Gas als Ersatz für Raketen, SZ 02.01.2006) where the 
author interpreted Russia’s action as an attempt to re-assert itself in the post-Cold War 
reality as a global power,  
‘The year 2006 began for Russia with sizeable fanfare. Since 1 January, Russia will 
chair the G8 group of leading industrial democracies. On the same day the Russia 
turned off the gas tap to its neighbor Ukraine. Both events are essential for the new self-
awareness of a state that has been since the end of the Soviet Union in search of 
himself. ‘ 
 
At the same time Reinhard Veser in ‘Demonstration of weakness’ (Demonstration der 
Schwäche, FAZ 04.01.2006) was arguing that Russia through its actions was showing 
signs of weakness, 
‘Russia's show of strength towards Ukraine has revealed its weakness: its power is 
destructive, both internally and externally. The foreign policy instruments of the 
Russian leadership are threats, intrigues and condescension, as it is in the gas dispute 
with Kyiv or in conflicts of interests with supposedly weaker opponents (…) An idea of 
how Russia can use the weight that it will always have due to its size, without 
confrontation and sabre-rattling, does not seem to be in the minds of the Kremlin. This 
is Russia's weakness. So it harms itself and others - Ukraine, or us’.  
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His colleague from FAZ Nicolas Busse in his Opinion framed the events in terms of 
conflict and security in his ‘Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in the hands of the Kremlin’ 
(Russisch-ukrainischer Gasstreit In der Hand des Kreml, FAZ 03.01.2006), 
‘raw material supplies as a weapon – we already knew that mainly from the Middle 
East. And yet even there, no one has dared to use them since the seventies (…) During 
the Cold War, Moscow had not blackmailed the "class enemy" with gas, because 
military strength secured the global political rank of the country. Putin's Russia, 
however, is one of those semi-developed commodity-based economies that can gain 
influence often only by threatening to harm others’.  
 
Busse was also suggesting solutions to these challenges,  
 
‘before that there is only one protection: Europe must begin to diversify its energy 
purchases, such as America has made for quite some time now. The fact that today, 
66% of Europe’s gas imports come from Russia, is irresponsible. New suppliers can 
come as a response - the Caspian region, which could be reached with land-based 
pipelines, or the Gulf States, which have a lot of experience with LNG transportation. If 
you have to do it even with the unreliable, do it, as you should spread the risk’.  
 
Resources were pictured as a weapon which no one has dared to use until Putin started 
to threaten with it. Overall therefore, the approach of both FAZ and SZ, even within the 
newspapers themselves, was mixed ranging from neutral to moderately negative, with 
signs of a militant tone and use of security language. But to paraphrase earlier 
introduced text by Piper, energy security was definitely back. 
In 2009 the tone of comments of Reinhard Veser was observably different than in 
January 2006. In his ‘Russian gas weapon’ (Russlands Gaswaffe, FAZ 06.01.2009), he 
argued that  
‘with each gas dispute doubts increase as to whether Russia really only wants to collect 
debts and get a fair price for its gas from Ukraine. More and more indications show that 
the Kremlin wants to damage the reputation of Ukraine in the West; on this occasion so 
strongly because of Ukraine’s efforts to join the EU and NATO (…) Either way, this is 
a demonstration - a demonstration that a Kyiv leadership being critical towards Russia 
is “expensive”, and that the gas monopoly Gazprom can also help it, as it has shown in 
the example of Belarus, which has introduced the New Year without strong price 
increase’. 
 
In 2006 Russia’s actions were pictured as signs of its weakness. In 2009 they were an 
element of a wider strategy towards the former republics of the USSR, with Ukraine 
experiencing a demonstration of what happens when they become critical of the 
Kremlin. This text underlined the fact that the disputes were not about economy or the 
gas itself. They were about new great-power politics of a resurgent Russia. The crisis 
was also contextualised within a larger, European picture. Busse (Europe’s strive for 
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independence, Europas Streben nach Unabhängigkeit, FAZ 08.01.2009) pointed out 
fundamental geopolitical disagreements within the EU. Germany and France have a 
close relationship with Russia, whereas the former members of the Warsaw Pact (i.e. 
Poland, Baltic States) have a high level distrust of Moscow. New Cold War narrative 
was therefore again in use. 
The language, as one can observe, although militant (in some of the publications) did 
not really incorporate the same level of presence of security language as it was in the 
case of the UK and (especially) Poland.  
The comparison of the coverage of the 2006 and 2009 crises leads to several 
observations. Whereas in 2006 the overall tone was critical of Russia’s actions and 
tended to present a pro-Ukrainian stance, in 20089 both the SZ and FAZ were critical of 
all parties involved in the dispute; it was particularly critical of Germany itself, as seen 
in FAZ. The same was discernible in SZ, e.g. ‘Russians and Ukrainians try to win the 
public with propaganda tricks’ wrote Thomas Urban in January 2009, while assessing 
the crisis. As he continued, 
‘[b]oth sides have hired international PR agencies to publicize their own version of the 
conflict. So the Western European newsrooms received unsolicited information 
indicating that one of the agencies related to the White House in Washington is 
receiving money from Yushchenko, allegedly the same agency was also active during 
the war in the Caucasus last [2008] summer, working for Georgian president Mikhail 
Saakashvili. Kyiv says that Moscow hired four PR agencies in order to discredit 
Ukrainian politicians and journalists in the EU countries. The striking fact is that 
Eastern European commentators of the Western European press these days receive both 
e-mails and calls from supposed experts willing to ‘explain the facts’ (Contradictions on 
all fronts, Widersprüchliches an allen Fronten, SZ 09.01.2009). 
  
The overall coverage of Russia however was negative. The media coverage of the 
January 2006 and January 2009 episodes shows the ambiguous position of the German 
government towards Russia between 2005 and 2009, years of the grand coalition in 
Germany as well as of two energy disputes between Russia and Ukraine. It also shows 
why cooperation with Russia was such a salient theme after 2005, with a multi-level 
complexity relating both to foreign policy as well as domestic political and energy 
dynamics. The differences between the arguments and rhetoric of representatives of the 
German government and the Opinions of FAZ and SZ also confirm that German 
newspapers were not following the party lines and tend to be generally more critical of 
Russia.   
Overall, the measurement of the tone of the coverage of Russia shows the difference 
between the opinions voiced by politicians, and those of journalists. One can observe a 
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strong influence of the Ostpolitik on the perception of Russia. Ostpolitik, first drafted in 
the 1960s, is based on the assumption that Russia can be changed if this change is 
supported externally, or in other words to facilitate ‘change through rapprochement’, as 
outlined by Willy Brandt in 1963. It also generally shows that SPD was generally more 
comfortable with the Soviet Union and later Russia (Ostpolitik) than the CDU, which 
has a strong pro-US and Atlanticist wing and has been often more critical of Russia. 
This helps to explain the discord of opinions within the government which at the time 
included politicians from both SPD and CDU/CSU. 
This was also an element of the second most visible narrative within the German energy 
elite discourse – the narrative of strategic partnership and cooperation between 
Germany and Russia. The main arguments within this narrative were: export-oriented 
Germany on the one hand needs energy resources, whilst on the other – they need a 
recipient for its products; especially modern technologies. Both therefore are mutually 
dependent on each other. This narrative also had specific elements of neo-colonialism: a 
developed West was an indispensable partner for investment-hungry (and a less 
developed) Russia. Therefore it should not see it [Russia] as a rival (as in the case of the 
New Cold War narrative) but as a subordinate who needs the West and will (eventually) 
converge to the Western culture (both politically and economically) because it has no 
other option (i.e. no other option to do energy business with anyone other than the 
West). This narrative was shared in a peculiar alliance of opinions between politicians 
and entrepreneurs e.g. those associated with the Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen 
Wirtschaft (Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations), whose positive 
comments about Russia were voiced in various articles throughout the decade, though 
more often present in FAZ. 
German – Russian political and business dialogues are therefore not like in the case of 
Poland, determined by history or values, but by hard economic interests. This is often 
criticised in the newspapers, pointing to discrepancies in the perception of Russian 
policies between politicians and the media; with the former tending to frame their 
opinions within the Strategic Partnership narrative, with the latter within the New Cold 
War narrative, or somewhere in between. The emergence of the New Cold War 
narrative in FAZ and SZ was closely linked with what Klinke (2011: 707) called return 






The coverage of the EU in the energy elite discourse 
For the purpose of the analysis of the way cooperation with EU has been framed within 
the energy discourse of elite newspapers I have narrowed down the sample (see Chapter 
3 for details). The final group of texts were analysed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively providing final evidence. The analysis included focus on the frequency of 
texts, as well as an analysis of frames: benefits and disadvantages from cooperation 
with the EU in the energy sphere. The final sample included 542 texts, 380 in 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung and 162 in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Figure 23). Overall 
therefore it was present in over 25% of the overall sample collected for the German case 
study. 
 
Figure 23. Cooperation with the EU in texts sampled according to the codebook, Germany. Years 2000 – 
2009 
FAZ-Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, SZ-Sueddeutsche Zeitung 
 
Overall, cooperation with the EU was one of the visible topics in the energy elite 
discourse. Within the energy discourse, cooperation with the EU was mainly associated 
with the reforms of the domestic energy sector; creation of a common energy market; as 
well as common initiatives to tackle the climate change. The EU was also present while 
addressing the energy disputes between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006 and 
January 2009.  
The benefits frame was present in 185 texts, disadvantages in 36. In 40 texts I did not 




Figure 24. Benefits/disadvantages of the EU in the energy coverage of Sueddeutsche Zeitung and 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
A table detailing numbers of texts is in Appendix 4.	  
 
Cooperation with the EU was seen in two main contexts: in the first part of the decade it 
was associated with the process of liberalisation of economy. In the second part of the 
analysed decade the focus was on climate change initiatives and, to an extent, on the 
energy relations with Russia. Overall however the coverage has been positive and 
cooperation with the EU in the energy sphere was framed as having advantages for 
Germany. 
Competition in the energy sector - the main purpose of EC’s directives and of the 
amended Energy Act was pursued very slowly, leading the European Commission to the 
development of new directives in 2003 (EU Directive 2003/55/EC). These led to a push 
for a regulated and non-discriminatory network access, thus abolishing the previously 
available freedom of choice between regulations and NTPA. This resulted in the new 
amendments of the German Energy Act in 2005 and the inclusion of energy-related 
affairs to the competencies of the Federal Cartel Office (Das Bundeskartellamt). The 
amended 2005 Energy Act laid the foundations for a more liberalised domestic energy 
market, making the Federal Cartel Office and the Federal Network Agency 
(Bundesnetzagentur or BNetzA) responsible for enhancement of competition in the 
energy sector thus becoming regulators of the German energy sector. Regulators 
negotiated the rules for network access together with representatives of network 
operators. New rules introducing 19 ‘market areas’ came into effect in October 2006 
(Scheib, Kalisch and Graeber 2006). Year 2005 therefore was the year when the focus 
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started to shift – from liberalisation of the energy market to the global topic of climate 
change. 
The coverage of the cooperation with the EU was linked with the energy supplies, as a 
consequence of the Russia – Ukraine crises (2006 and 2009),  
‘A common European energy policy is also repeatedly hampered by different power 
structures among 27 Member States, which is reflected not only in dealing with the hot 
topic of nuclear energy: in France it is the most important energy source; in the UK, 
new nuclear power plants will be built, Germany has decided to abandon it. The degree 
of import dependence is very different from country to country. Britain and the 
Netherlands still have large gas reserves. Bulgaria, however, is completely dependent on 
Russian supplies via Ukraine.’ (Europe’s strive for independence, Europas Streben 
nach Unabhängigkeit, FAZ 08.01.2009) 
 
The second visible instance was the 20/20/20 targets and their impact on the domestic 
debate over the energy mix and on the promotion of renewable energy. Finally the EU 
was linked with the climate change debate e.g. in ‘EU: Climate change is a security 
risk’ (EU: Klimawandel ist Sicherheitsrisiko, SZ 06.03.2008); ‘Europe is facing 
controversy over climate policy’ (Europa steht Streit über Klimapolitik bevor, SZ 
14.01.2008); ‘Damper for the EU Commission in the climate controversy’ (Dämpfer für 
EU-Kommission im Klimastreit, SZ 15.03.2008); ‘European climate package takes the 
last hurdle’ (Europäisches Klimapaket nimmt die letzte Hürde, FAZ 18.12.2008); 
‘Europe decides on a rapid expansion of renewable energies’ (Europa beschließt den 
schnellen Ausbau von erneuerbaren Energien, FAZ 10.12.2008); ‘Fears of economic 
consequences of the EU climate package’ (Wirtschaft fürchtet Folgen des EU-
Klimapakets, FAZ 08.12.2008).  
The controversies at the EU level focused on the climate and energy package of the EU, 
in particular on the exact limits of carbon dioxide emissions allowed under the new 
package, and the share of renewable energy in domestic energy mixes. Both were 
epitomised in the 20/20/20 slogan (reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the EU of 
at least 20% below the 1990 levels; 20% of EU energy consumption to come from 
renewable sources; a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected 
levels, to be achieved by improving energy efficiency; everything by 2020). The EU 
however was portrayed as the leader for combating climate change, especially in 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung.  
‘In 2007 148 billion euros was invested globally in solar, wind and bio-energy. 
However, the oil industry alone invested more than twice as much in development of 
new oil sources in the same period. The EU commission has now declared its intention 
to make the Europeans independent of oil. Proposals for the efficient use of energy, 
fuel-efficient cars and the expansion of green energy are on the table. It is now 
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important that Brussels remains courageous and consistent. The really big consumers of 
energy will be followed by Europe, because one day even the expensive oil will no 
longer be enough (The situation needs to change, Der Staat muss umsteuern, SZ 
02.07.2008). 
 
Climate change was not only an issue of EU-level dialogue; it was also visible in the 
domestic context, especially in the framework of the on-going domestic debate of the 
elements of the German energy mix and the relationship with nuclear energy, though in 
all instances linked with cooperation with the EU, e.g. ‘Merkel: nuclear power is no 
litmus test for climate protection’ (Merkel: Kernkraft kein Lackmustest für Klimaschutz, 
FAZ 08.07.2008); ‘Nuclear power as a cure for high prices and climate change?’ 
(Atomstrom als Heilmittel gegen hohe Preise und Klimawandel?, FAZ 07.07.2008); 
with renewable energy, e.g. ‘Germany needs to develop eco-energy strongly’ 
(Deutschland muss Öko-Energie kräftig ausbauen, SZ 24.01.2008); as well as with 
German industry, ‘Climate package irritated industrial investors’ (Das Klimapaket 




The analysis undoubtedly showed change within discourses as well as reasons for its 
increased saliency in the 2000s. Similarly to the case of the United Kingdom, what 
started to change was the importance of the topics; with some of them present 
throughout the decade, with others gaining importance with time (as was with the case 
of cooperation with Russia). Energy security has also shown to be an interesting 
phenomenon within the discourse, mainly associated with two contexts – the security of 
supply and with climate change.  
An increasing presence of the militant and security language, as well as security-based 
frames, was observable within the analysed texts. The presence of energy security and 
of security language in texts was lined with two specific understandings of threats. The 
first one was linked with the fortress Europe – where Western Europe, Germany and (in 
particular Central and Eastern European countries) were threatened directly by the 
energy policies of the Russian Federation. German commentators and politicians did not 
feel that Germany was equally threatened by Russia as were the countries east of the 
German borders. Germany has generally not experienced any gas cuts in 2006 or in 
2009. The commentators did not identify any ways through which Russian energy 
policies could directly threaten Germany. What was underlined was the fact that 
196	  
	  
German neighbours were threatened, not Germany itself. Germany was pictured as a 
part of the community of Europe which also included new EU Member States as well as 
Ukraine. Germany however had an implicit obligation to be part of a response to this 
threat – whether it involved a new pan-European response, or support to the countries 
seen as directly threatened. Furthermore, Germany had to act pre-emptively and 
investments in renewable energy were one of the ways through which the 
overdependence on Russian gas (40% of supplies) could be limited. Overall therefore, 
the New Cold War narrative, intrinsically linked with the topic of energy security, was 
promoting the logic of protection of wider Europe from Russian energy weapons. 
Security concerns were dominant over economy-based ones. The New Cold War 
narrative therefore competed with another story line, one based on the Strategic 
Partnership between Germany and Russia; where common interdependences make any 
conflict impossible.      
The second instance where energy security was observable was the climate change. 
Here again others (‘poor countries’) were the ones who were threatened. Germany 
however had the moral responsibility to act in order to help those who are directly 
affected by the changes of the climate. Whenever threat was invoked, Germany was 
always set within a context of a group of countries. In the case of security of supply it 
was a wider Europe. In the case of climate change – all countries were affected by it. In 
none of the cases therefore Germany was portrayed as being directly threatened. 
Climate change was one of the facilitators of the development (and promotion) of 
renewable energy. This however has to be seen within the frames of long-term rise of 
environmental policies in Germany. This unfortunately falls outside of the limitations of 
this research. Energy security however, although becoming a salient topic (as reflected 
by the Eurobarometer polls) was not dominant in the coverage of energy. Events 
described in texts published in FAZ and SZ were read as economic not security, in the 
energy elite discourse. They were read within the frame of economic consequences – as 
a result of market forces, relations between consumers and producers, etc.  
Still, the New Cold War narrative was present in the texts of both newspapers, 
particularly after 2006. This narrative was also the only instance when securitisation 
was observed, where arguments of security were taking priority over economy (and all 
others).  
What was not clearly identifiable however was an assessment of existential threats as 
well as extraordinary measures. I have not observed any instances where extraordinary 
measures would have been argued for. To the contrary, all initiatives argued for (e.g. 
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diversification) were falling within the existing mechanisms of policy-making. Even in 
the texts addressing the topic of climate change, both were vaguely defined. An 
example of this is climate change, itself labelled as an existential threat. A vague call for 
international cooperation was seen as an extraordinary measure though we could not 
observe anything extraordinary about it, which would put it outside the conventional 
political mechanisms. 
The analysis has shown that German newspapers tend to be more critical of Russia than 
politicians. This has to be linked with the fact that German newspapers have generally 
more diversity of views expressed than e.g. UK papers with their strong editorial stance. 
As my analysis has shown it was possible to find texts with varying assessment of 
particular events (e.g. gas crises) in the same newspaper. Overall however the coverage 
of Russian energy policies was moderately negative with the biggest attention paid in 
January 2006 and January 2009.  
Cooperation with European Union in the energy sphere was the dominant topic within 
the analysed sample. The frame analysis showed that the benefits (185 texts) were more 
often underlined that disadvantages (36 texts). European Union therefore has proven to 
be an important reference point in the coverage of energy in Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung and in Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Cooperation with the EU was not only important 
for the domestic dynamics (e.g. liberalisation of the energy market; redefinition of the 
energy mix). It was also important for the foreign policy aspects, seen as one of the 
responses to the Russian threat within the New Cold War narration. The analysis 
therefore has matched the results of the UK case study by identifying several discursive 
construction of energy security; one created around the threats to the security of supply 





Chapter 7 – Comparison of findings 
 
This research revolved around a comparative analysis of three country cases. The aim of 
this chapter is to bring together the results of each of the cases studied in greater depth 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, in order to explore similarities as well as differences across them 
and most of all to respond to the research-guiding questions.  
The research-guiding questions will be presented separately, in order to provide the 
clarity of argument and a logical flow of the Chapter. These questions are: 
 
Research-guiding question Indicators 
1. Is energy supply seen as highly 
threatened to an extent that 
extraordinary measures are 
necessary? 
-­‐ Existential threats 
-­‐ Extraordinary measures 
-­‐ Presence of the security language 
-­‐ Discursive frames 
2. Whether and to what extent 
discourses converge across the 
three selected countries. 
-­‐ Discursive events 
-­‐ Tone of the coverage of Russian 
policies in the energy sphere 
-­‐ Benefits and disadvantages frames 
of the coverage of the EU in the 
energy sphere 
 
This thesis, in Chapters 1 and 2, identifies the year 2000 as the moment when energy 
started to become increasingly salient as a policy issue. This was a consequence of a 
number of factors (explored in Chapters 1 and 2), including an on-going ambition to 
liberalise the energy markets within the EU, increasing prominence of the concept of 
peak oil, growing awareness about the global changes of the climate and finally a new 
regime in the Kremlin. All of these, and possibly many more (e.g. those stemming from 
national policy dynamics) have made energy a theme of increased interest for 
governments, policymakers but also analysts and scholars. In the academic literature, 
limited attention has been devoted to the analysis of the development of common 
understandings of energy security and European energy policy among the EU Member 
States, to mention in particular Kratochvil and Tichy (2013).      
The analysis, conducted in Chapters 4 – 6 was carried out based on the sampled 
material from six different mainstream daily newspapers, The Guardian and The Times 
(Chapter 4), Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita (Chapter 5) and Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Chapter 6). 
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The next part of the chapter will be structured according to these research-guiding 
questions.  
7.1	  Is	  energy	  supply	  seen	  as	  highly	  threatened	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  
extraordinary	  measures	  are	  necessary?	  
	  
	  
In order to answer this research guiding question, I have primarily used four indicators. 
Two were based on the Securitization Theory’s approach: they were existential threats 
and extraordinary measures. I have also looked at the presence of the security language 
in texts. Finally, I have analysed the dominant frames through which messages were 
conveyed to the readers. Examination of these was based on a qualitative analysis of the 
texts included in each sample (see Chapter 3 for more details on the sampling 
procedure). For a discussion on the relevance of these indicators, see Chapters 1 and 2. 
The first important finding of this research is the fact that single speech acts do not 
suffice for an observer to be able to conclude that energy was in fact experiencing 
securitisation. Security was gradually entering to the energy policy in all three analysed 
case studies. There are however significant differences between all three case studies. 
Firstly, there are differences in terms of the number of texts per country (Figure 25).  
 
Figure 25. Topic of energy security: number of articles per year in six newspapers, years 2000 - 2009 
 
The lowest number of texts was produced in the United Kingdom, with 44 texts in The 
Guardian and 48 in The Times. The numbers were higher in Germany, with 57 texts in 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 67 in Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Polish elite 
newspapers have produced the largest number of texts referring to energy security, 82 in 
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Gazeta Wyborcza and 125 in Rzeczpospolita. Energy security was unevenly present; it 
has attracted the greatest attention in Polish daily newspapers, lowest in the UK. 
 
Energy security unleashed; January 2006 
Figure 25 suggests that the analysed period can be clearly divided into two parts: years 
2000 – 2004 and then 2005 – 2009. A table showing monthly distribution of texts 
referring to energy security more clearly point to January 2006 and January 2009 
(Figure 26).  
 
 
Figure 26. Distribution of energy security on a month-to-month basis, years 2000 - 2009 
	  
All six newspapers did go through very similar attention curves with increased coverage 
in similar points of time, with the most observable pike in attention in year 2006. The 
topic of energy security has occurred in an average of 9 texts per year in years 2000 – 
2005 to an increase of 145 texts in 2006 alone; and then to an average of 74 texts per 
year in 2007 – 2009. This increase is clearly linked with one particular event – the 
January 2006 gas spat between Russia and Ukraine, as the qualitative analysis has 
shown. The quality press in all three countries have linked the topic of energy security 
with the event and with its consequences. 
The increased reference to energy security was matched with a growing visibility of the 
security language in all of the texts. The analysis of contents of texts has shown that the 
most discernible presence of security language has been observed in Gazeta Wyborcza 
and Rzeczpospolita (Figure 27), with the results from the United Kingdom and Germany 




Figure 27. Presence of the security language in the sampled texts on a scale from 0 (low) to +1 (high) in 
six analysed newspapers, years 2000 - 2009 
 
In all cases (reporting, analyses, interviews, opinions) the texts from the Polish sample 
show the highest presence of the security language. Not only did the Polish case sample 
refer to energy security in the highest number of texts; the security language was also 
more evident there than in the other case studies. This was clearly linked to the fact that 
energy was tied to questions of national survival in Poland and that Russia was the main 
reference point for the Polish national security strategy. An increased presence of the 
security language was visible in particular in reference to Russian energy policy actions 
and initiatives. I have specifically observed this in the coverage of the January 2006 and 
January 2009 crises (Figure 26). It does not mean that the case study of Poland was the 
only one where security language was present. It was however that which stood out as 
having the highest number of references to security (and military) language in texts 
published by elite newspapers. This provides evidence that all three discourses were 
different throughout the analysed period. Similarities were observable only within short 
time spans, associated with specific (and highly salient from the perspective of media; 
‘newsworthy’) events. The analysis of frames confirms a growing importance over time 
of security-related frames in all three countries in comparison with the frame of 




Figure 28. The presence of security-related frames and frame of economic consequences in the relevant 
sample from six newspapers 
 
Based on these figures one can conclude that security-based frames were increasingly 
entering the energy discourse, even if in two cases (the UK and Germany) this was not 
reflected in higher amplitude of security language. Security concerns and security-based 
solutions were underlined, at the expense of the economic-based arguments. The 
graphic presentation of the frames also identifies year 2006 as the turning point. 
Although security was increasingly present, the quantitative analysis shows that the 
differences between the cases have still remained high. 
Qualitative analysis of the collected sample helps to understand the exceptional 
character of year 2006 in the coverage of energy.  
 
Presence of fortresses; differences outweigh similarities 
In Chapter 2 I have discussed various extreme examples of existential threats in the 
existing literature on energy, with the most radical being: war over resources, peak oil, 
peak gas, and the collapse of the economy of a given state (and its consequences), 
supply being stopped by a third country or political independence being compromised 
following a drop of oil/gas prices. In each country case study I have investigated all 
references to existential threats together with an analysis as to how they are explained 
by their author.  
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Existential threats and extraordinary measures in the analysed texts were exemplified 
twofold: by an extreme application of the security language, and by an application of 
the fortress storyline. In all three cases the energy discourse was becoming increasingly 
militant, setting frontiers and building imagined fortresses. The presence of the security 
language has differed however, as Figure 27 has shown. Also, the identified fortresses 
have differed from one another.  
In each of the case studies I have found different fortresses. Only one case, Poland, is an 
example which could suggest the existence of a national discourse, as the same fortress 
was equally present in (and promoted by) Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. Here 
the fortress was aimed at two challenges: security of supply and a threat posed by 
Russian energy policies. The German case study shows a fortress relatively similar to 
the one observed in Poland. It was a European fortress which had to be defended from 
the threats posed by the instrumental use of energy resources by Russia (‘energy 
weapons’). This was a mixture of a New Cold War, and neo-colonial narrative, where 
(primarily) Central and Eastern Europe had to seek protection from the ‘destructive’, 
‘blackmailing’ and ‘hostage-taking’ Russia. The neo-colonial element here was the 
conviction of the superiority of the Western European system over the chaotic and 
aggressive eastern neighbour and energy supplier. These two, relatively similar (but not 
the same) fortresses were not present in the UK energy discourse. In the United 
Kingdom I have found at least three different fortresses; two of them were present in 
The Times. The first one was a fortress of liberal democracy and capitalism against a 
European superstate; the second one was constructed against what can be generally 
described as Russian energy policies (see Chapter 4 for a more elaborate explanation). 
The latter one seemed to have common characteristics with those identified in two other 
case studies – they were lined by the New Cold War narrative.  
The general observation would be therefore that an increased presence of the security 
language was indeed observable. It did not lead however to similarities across the 
discourses. A conclusion that there were no points where all of these fortresses would 
meet would be an oversimplification though. All of these fortresses have promoted an 
exclusionary Europe. They were however different from other ‘fortresses Europe’ 
identified in the literature such as  references to culture or religion as is the case of a 
similar fortress visible in the right-wing media coverage of Turkish ambitions to join to 
the EU (Levin 2011). None has presented a nationalist and closed fortress Europe. 
Fortress Britain was created to contain the threat of EU legislation; it did not promote 
lack of cooperation with EU Member States and other countries (e.g. Norway). The 
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fortresses were based on the references to recent history, using the language and signs 
associated with the Cold War. Two of these, visible in Poland and in Germany, were 
exclusionary only towards Russia; specifically to the Russian post-2000 regime. The 
threat was usually defined unambiguously; it was Vladimir Putin and his administration, 
not the entirity of Russia or its society.   
Not only was security entering the energy discourses through an openly security or 
military-based language and phrases but it was visible, as my analysis of frames 
suggests, through the presence of the frames of geopolitics and conflict. None of the 
security-based narratives became dominant, but the presence of the New Cold War 
narrative was observable in all three countries. The process of entering of security into 
energy discourse was uneven. In some cases it was already present at the beginning of 
the analysed period (Poland), in two other it started to appear at different dimes. 
Similarities were observable in terms of the contents. In all three cases an increasing 
presence of security was associated with a growing assertiveness of the Kremlin. Both 
energy crises in January 2006 and in January 2009, as well as during the August 2008 
war in Georgia are the most visible examples. It was visible also with reference to the 
Khodorkovsky/Yukos case, as well as when addressing issues of bilateral concern. In all 
three cases it was associated with the coverage of business deals – investments of 
energy companies in Russia (UK, Germany), competition in the energy sphere with 
Russian companies (Poland). Russian policies in the energy sphere have led, in all three 
discourses, to an increased presence of security. 
National understandings of the January 2006 crisis 
The significance of energy security has ebbed and flowed in the energy discourses. 
Energy security has received the largest coverage around the times of the crises – first in 
January 2006, then in January 2009. It did however become more salient after the 
events of the beginning of 2006, in comparison with the previous five years. The 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the presence of the topic of energy security in 
the texts identifies year the Russia – Ukraine gas spat as the pivotal moment within the 
analysed timeframe. This year can be considered as pivotal for the presence of security 
in the energy discourse of all three countries.  
This observation is further supported by the overall analysis of the frequency of texts 
between 2000 and 2009 (Figure 29). January 2006 (114 texts) and January 2009 (116 




Figure 29. Frequency of texts on a month-to-month basis in all six newspapers, years 2000 - 2009 
	  
Figure 30 clearly illustrates that January 2006 and January 2009 attracted the biggest 
newspaper coverage. Why were, from the point of view of the existing media studies, 
these two months so significant? News values or news criteria help to determine why 
some, and no other events, have gained so much prominence in all analysed 
newspapers. This directly relates to the work of Galtung and Ruge (1965) (see Chapter 
2 for further discussion on newspaper contents).  
 




Galtung and Ruge identified twelve factors that contribute to the evaluation of an event 
as ‘newsworthy’. The more an event responds to these criteria, the more likely it is that 
it will be reported. The analysis of the frequencies of texts has pointed to January 2006 
as a month which attracted the highest attention of newspapers in Poland and Germany. 
In the case of the United Kingdom it was one of the most important, though not 
dominant, according to the sheer number of texts. A supporting analysis of the contents 
of texts and of discursive events has shown however the impact of January 2006 on the 
latter coverage of energy in all three countries. Overall, 130 texts were published in 
January 2006 in all three countries. The events in January 2006 became ‘newsworthy’ 
not only complying with Galtung’s and Ruge’s factors. The events played out on the 
nearest neighbourhood of the EU, attracting the biggest attention in the countries closest 
geographically (Poland, Germany). It was also relatively easy to show the events in 
terms of the hero and villain binary, where the muscular villain impersonated by 
Vladimir Putin pursues his colonial policy in order to dominate fragile Ukraine. It was 
often an almost exactly reverse picture of Western cowboy movies.  
The ‘newsworthiness’ of the January 2006 crisis has made it more salient than any other 
event within the analysed timeframe (as I will show in the latter part of this chapter), 
strongly impacting the presence of the topic of energy security, the visibility of the 
security language and eventually the manifestation of the security-based frames. This 
would suggest that the highest probability for an increased presence of security in 
energy discourse would be during a crisis event.  
Even though the January 2006 spat was visible in all three discourses, its coverage was 
not equal. The crisis was more present in the Polish and German discourse than it was in 
the case of the UK; both in the Polish and German discourses references to geopolitics 
were more frequent than in the UK. Finally, the historical context was very important. 
As one could observe in the case of Poland (Chapter 5), the majority of texts included 
references to the years of Polish – Russian conflicts from the 19th and 20th centuries. In 
my analysis I have not only focused on the months with the highest number of texts. I 
have also looked at the contents of all of the texts trying to establish which particular 
events have influenced writing about energy in each country case study. I have done it 
through the identification of discursive events. This analysis also points to the 
importance of January 2006. 
The conclusions from the comparison of discursive events across all three case studies 
are much nuanced; it is easier to show differences than similarities. In terms of sheer 
frequencies, the highest number of texts was produced in all three cases in 2006. They 
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were however distributed unequally. In the cases of Poland and Germany they were 
similar but not the same in contrast to the case with the UK discourse. Although 
coverage of the Russian - Ukrainian dispute did attract a bigger number of texts in 
January 2006, they did not (unlike in the case of Germany and Poland) dominate over 
other months, even though this particular event fits the majority of the ‘newsworthiness’ 
conditions. One can conclude that although international events did play their part in the 
UK energy coverage, its focus was predominantly on the issues which directly affected 
the UK energy market. This was reflected in the picture of the earlier identified fortress 
Britain focusing on domestic, rather than international issues.   
Similarities are however observable. Firstly, most of the events identified were linked 
with Russian policies and were influencing the tone of the coverage of Russia in the 
energy sphere (addressed below). Secondly, the content analysis of texts has shown that 
in all cases Russian policies in the energy sphere were labelled as threats; though in 
each case to a different extent. In the case of Poland it was linked with national survival 
(Chapter 5). In the case of Germany it was a ‘do no harm’ approach and a generally 
pacifist strategic culture (Chapter 6). In the case of the United Kingdom it was more 
about the threats to business (Chapter 4).   
 
Speech act is not a sufficient feature of securitisation 
Concluding therefore, the response to the research-guiding question is nuanced. 
Similarities are observable across all three country case studies. Differences however 
tend to dominate the picture. The instances when energy policy has been used as an 
instrument to enhance security have been very rare. Firstly they were closely associated 
with crisis events – 2005/2006 and 2008/2009 energy disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine. This is where all three discourses were the closest during the analysed decade 
(in terms of almost all indicators). Secondly, they were linked with Russian policies in 
the energy sphere, which was reflected in all of the analysed countries through the New 
Cold War narration reading the current events through the Cold War-based frames of 
reference and interpretation. Events in January 2006 had the biggest impact on the 
overall coverage of energy in all three countries. This was the turning point in terms of 
the presence of the topic of energy security, the security (and militant) language and the 
security-related frames. In all three cases the identified threats were different and 
several different security-related aspects of energy were given. Still, the perception of 
the threat of Russian policies has shown to be a factor unifying the coverage of all six 
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newspapers. I will explore the importance of the changing tone of coverage of Russia in 
the energy sphere in more detail in the next part of this chapter. 
The evidence also suggests that the cases of Poland and Germany are more comparable 
with each other in terms of security in energy than in the case of the UK. Firstly, the 
coverage in Poland (Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita) and in Germany (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Sueddeutsche Zeitung) has shown evidence of national discourses 
in both cases. As Chapters 5 and 6 have shown, the presence of security in two analysed 
newspapers in each country was relatively similar. It was the case both in terms of sheer 
numbers of text as well as the contents. In both cases the narration of the New Cold War 
was more noticeable (e.g. in terms of similar structures of ‘fortresses’) than in the case 
of the newspapers from the United Kingdom. There, only the texts published in The 
Times have included references to the New Cold War.    
The presence of climate change is an unexpected result of the analysis. The links 
between energy security and climate change provide a peculiar example of different 
readings of the same events. Climate change was visible in all three case studies; in all 
three it was identified as a threat. Two case studies, Chapter 4 (UK) and Chapter 6 
(Germany) have pictured the changes of the climate as an existential (global) threat 
requiring cooperation. Support of the EU climate change initiatives and policies was 
observable, although with criticisms. The Times for example was underlining the 
financial consequences of these initiatives. Yet, the common conclusion visible in all 
newspapers was that climate change was a common threat. In the Polish case study 
(Chapter 5), the reading of climate change was strikingly different. Here, climate 
change was not seen as a threat. EU initiatives of containing climate change were the 
threat, in particular the 20/20/20 targets seen as a direct threat to the mining sector in 
Poland. It is worth pointing out however that, as the analysis has showed, energy 
security was not only about the perceived threat of Russian actions; it was also about the 
changing climate. 
The results suggest that national public discourses were not influenced by securitisation. 
I found limited evidence for both existential threats and extraordinary measures. 
Although the research shows that the presence of both energy security and security 
language started to increase towards the end of the decade, the research also shows that 




7.2.	   How	   do	   discourses	   converge	   (if	   at	   all)	   across	   three	   selected	  
countries? 
The second research-guiding question focused on convergence in terms of problems 
defined and solutions offered. I understood convergence here as a process of narrowing 
of differences amongst different entities over time (see Chapter 2.1.4). 
  
Convergence – observable, though episodic 
I have observed signs of convergence in particular in reference to the first point – to the 
process of defining problems. Firstly, cooperation with Russia in the energy sphere was 
increasingly present in the analysed texts of all six countries. This was observable in 
particular in the aftermath of year 2006 (Figure 31).  
 
 
Figure 31. Cooperation with Russia in all three case studies, years 2000 - 2009 
 
The increased presence of the topic of cooperation with Russia was linked with an 
increasingly negative tone of the coverage of Russia in all three country case studies 




Figure 32. Tone of coverage of Russia in the energy sphere in all three country case studies, years 2000 - 
2009 
 
The threat perception of Russia was very strong in Poland from the very beginning of 
the analysed period, but increased in the case of the UK and Germany mainly as a 
consequence of the first gas dispute, as I have argued in the previous part of this 
chapter. The analysis of the tone of the coverage confirms this observation. Although 
the tone of the coverage was between neutral and moderately negative already in years 
2000 – 2005, it significantly drops in all three case studies in years 2006 – 2007. The 
moderate tone in 2009 is linked with a relatively low number of texts (Figure 31). All 
three Member States have increasingly portrayed Russian actions negatively. An 
increasingly similar perception in terms of the tone of the coverage is consistent with 
the previous observation pointing to the January 2006 crisis as the pivotal point for the 
coverage of energy. It is also consistent with the identification of Russian policies as 
threats to fortresses observed in the previous question. Still, Figure 32 shows an 
observable discord between all three case studies, as the perception of Russia has been 
observably more negative in Poland vis-à-vis the other two countries. Signs of 
convergence in terms of the tone are observable therefore only between the UK and 
Germany, in particular in year 2008. Although perceptions of threats resulting from 
Russian energy policies were increasingly similar, they were not matched by the tone of 
the texts.    
The evidence collected points to the relevance of the Ukraine – Russia spat in the early 
2006 in terms of the analysis of convergence. This was an event explored in the 
broadsheet newspapers across the national borders and which was extensively covered 
in all of the analysed countries. The events did not directly affect all of the countries 
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taken into consideration here. The only country affected was Poland, which suffered a 
decrease of gas supplies by approximately 14%. Neither Germany nor the United 
Kingdom had been directly affected by Russian actions. Still, the event became the 
focus of interactions between all three EU Member States, as well as between them and 
two main actors of the event: Russia and Ukraine. One of the dominant readings of the 
event was done through the New Cold War narrative, present in all of the analysed 
newspapers (though to a limited extent in The Guardian). The common assertions of 
this narrative were the supposedly fundamental and irreconcilable differences between 
the West and Russia. This four-day episode has attracted references to the Cold War 
struggle, with the unspoken assumption of hegemonic (and moral) superiority of the 
West over the authoritarian and increasingly dangerous Russia. It has also led to 
observable politicisation of reporting where newspapers were increasingly becoming 
political actors choosing sides and subscribing to the reading of the event through the 
references to the Cold War. The same conclusions can be made made based on the 
analysis of the January 2009 events with one observable difference: both involved 
parties - Russia and Ukraine, and were often pictured as being jointly responsible for the 
event. The main difference in my assessment is that the collected sample allowed me to 
weigh the long-lasting impact (e.g. in terms of future references) of January 2006. It 
was impossible for January 2009 due to the fact that the timeframe of my research did 
not look beyond December 2009. 
The collected evidence leads to the observation that the collected material provides 
evidence of an episodic convergence. This is matched by an increasing similarity in the 
coverage of Russia outside of this particular event. He coverage was not the same (see 
Figure 32) it was however very similar in terms of contents, frames of reference and the 
language (words) used. The coverage of the first gas dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine was the moment when differences between different debates were at its 
narrowest point, even in terms of the conservative vs. leftist divide between the 
newspapers in each of the analysed cases. The event could be judged as ‘newsworthy’ 
as it has attracted an in-depth coverage in all of the six newspapers. In the majority of 
the cases I have found evidence of the New Cold War narrative. In their majority, the 
tone of the coverage was negative towards Russia. They also identified Russian actions 
in the energy sphere as threats to energy security. Finally, in all of the cases I have 
observed signs of national discourses – the coverage of the event despite of a varying 
degree of the presence of the security language, were comparable in terms of the 
contents and arguments. I have to point out however that the differences, such as the 
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dissimilarity in the tone of the coverage of Russia, were observably more negative in the 
case of Poland than in the two other countries. Differences however do not undermine 
the conclusion that signs of convergence were observable in terms of several different 
factors during the Ukraine – Russia spat in the early 2006. 
The crises between Moscow and Kyiv in the early 2006 and early 2009 were the only 
points of the analysis where I have observed significant narrowing of differences 
amongst all entities. The only other which could have been considered was August 
2008, but due to the limited data I cannot make a more definite statement. What was 
evident from the qualitative analysis of all three samples was the fact that January 2006 
was the point when the threat perception of Russian energy policies started to change. 
Whereas in the case of Poland, energy and Russia were tied to national survival from 
the very beginning of the analysed decade, the first gas dispute increased the perception 
of threat in the cases of the United Kingdom and Germany. This was evident in all of 
the analysed newspapers from both of these countries.  
While the evidence points to episodic convergence in terms of problems defined, the 
case of solutions offered is more complex.  
When comparing the overall results, the benefits frame visibly outweighs the frame of 
disadvantages from cooperation with the European Union (Figure 33).  
 
Figure 33. Benefits and disadvantages frames, based on the analysis of texts from six newspapers 
 
The benefits frame is dominating over the disadvantages frame and in particular from 
2006. This could be linked with the previously established conclusion of year 2006 as 
the pivotal year for the coverage of energy in all three country case studies.  
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The first observation from the analysis is that the benefits frame was stronger in each of 
these countries, even in the United Kingdom, dominated by eurosceptics. Although one 
has to also mention the fact that the coverage of the UK within the energy discourse was 
predominantly neutral, the fact that almost one-third of the sample tended to see the EU 
favourably may lead to the conclusion that when it comes to cooperation with the 
European Union, there are specific spheres where even the newspapers with outspoken 
Eurosceptic editorial lines will see benefits. Still, Europe was not really visible in the 
case of the United Kingdom. 
The disaggregation of results into all three countries underlines these differences 
(Figure 34).  
 
 
Figure 34. Frame of benefits of cooperation with the EU in three country case studies, years 2000 - 2009 
 
Although cooperation with the EU was preferential in the texts in Germany in Poland, 
in the case of the UK it was much less visible. One explanation may be that cooperation 
with the EU itself was not an important aspect of the energy coverage by The Times and 




Figure 35. Cooperation with the EU in the UK, German and Polish newspapers, years 2000 - 2009 
 
The overall sample addressing this topic included only 68 texts from the UK 
newspapers, with 542 from German and 382 from Polish ones. This shows how 
cooperation with the EU was relatively insignificant in the energy sphere for the United 
Kingdom. The analysis of contents of these texts, compared with the frames analysis, 
shows that both Polish and German newspapers pictured cooperation with the EU 
within the energy sphere as a ‘helpful vehicle’ for both countries, in particular after the 
January 2006 events.  
 
Europeanisation of discourses 
Europeanisation of discourses is not necessarily the same as Europeanisaion of public 
spheres. The first one implies exporing national public debates about issues of key 
importance for European integration (della Porta and Caiani 2006; Stiff et al. 2007). The 
second adds the transnational dimension, seeking the emergence of a transnational 
community of communication. This research was seeking to contribute to the debate 
about the prospects for a common approach towards EU energy policy and towards its 
energy relationship with Russia. Seeing the EU as a possible solution to the energy-
linked problems is more relevant to the theories of European integration than to the 
existing scholarship on Europeanisation. My research focused on the national debates 
and the prospects for EU’s role, thus contributing (and drawing from) both 
Europeanisation and European integration (as both are not identical).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Koopmans and Erbe (2004; also Risse 2010: 122) presented 
two aspects of Europeanisation: vertical (where EU actors are regularly referred to in 
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public debates) and horizontal (focusing on communicative linkages between EU 
Member States). The UK public debates would point to the second, horizontal aspect of 
Europeanisation. Both newspapers (The Times in particular) have frequently referred 
favourably to energy cooperation with other EU Member States (Netherlands, France) 
with limited or no reference to the EU, mainly in The Times, based on its editorial, 
Eurosceptic stance. Still, this relevance is very limited, due to the small sample (only 68 
texts). Proponents of Europeanisation theory would have said that references to EU are 
not an adequate tool to analyse Europeanisation. As I have staed however, the EU as a 
‘solution’ was an important element of my approach.   
The positive coverage of the EU in Poland and Germany was less surprising, though 
one has to point out the dominance (185 texts to 36 texts) of a favourable view in the 
case of the German sample. In the case of Poland, although benefits visibly outweighed 
disadvantages, two particular events stand out. In the case of energy disputes between 
Russia and Ukraine cooperation with the EU was seen as extremely beneficial for 
Poland. The European Commission’s initiatives of tackling climate change also met 
fierce resistance in both analysed newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita.  
In terms of the coverage of the European Union the conclusions are less obvious, but 
they also point to January 2006 as a point of an episodic convergence. It was in January 
2006 when the problem faced (gas cut) attracted the largest number of references to the 
EU (Figure 35) in all three countries. It was also then that the EU was pictured as a 
helpful vehicle to solve the crisis in all three national public debates. In the Polish and 
German public debates I have found more direct references to the European Union and 
the European Commission, whereas in the UK it was to cooperation with other EU 
Member States, often without the explicit mention of the EU. 
What was observable in all cases however was that the EU has increasingly played a 
role in the energy debates in all three country case studies. Towards the end of the 
decade, some issues (e.g. climate change; security of supply) were discussed more often 
as matters of common concern for all EU Member States, not only as a domestic 
concern. The example of the response to the greenhouse gas emissions 20/20/20 targets 
has shown that the elite newspapers have predominantly paid attention to the EU 
initiatives when they were affecting the UK, Poland and Germany. The attention paid 
was due to the consequences of these EU initiatives (or policies) on the national realities 
of EU Member States. Although the coverage itself was not similar, the presence of 




The content analysis shows signs of convergence at one particular point in time. This 
has led to the identification of the coverage of energy in January 2006 as an example of 
what I labelled as episodic convergence. Conclusions of this research-guiding question 
are very closely linked with the previous question. The analysis of threats has identified 
perceptions of Russian actions as a common cause for the invocation of the fortresses, 
though they differed between each other (even within the case studies). The analysis of 
convergence in terms of problems defined has been observed primarily in the public 
debates around the 2006 Ukraine - Russia energy crisis. The evidence collected points 
to the observation that this was an example of an event debated at the same time in all 
three countries, in all three cases with similar frames of reference, structures of meaning 
and patterns of interpretations with the observable presence of the New Cold War 
narrative in all three discourses. Although the narrative was more visible in the centre-
right newspapers (The Times, Rzeczpospolita, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) I have 
also observed this in the centre-left to a higher (Gazeta Wyborcza, Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung) and lesser (The Guardian) degree. Events in January 2006 have also proven to 
be a pivotal point for the public debates on energy in all three countries in terms of the 
reference to Russia.  
Although the debates have converged to the highest degree in January 2006, I have 
observed an increasingly negative tone of the coverage of Russian actions in the 
following months and years. In comparing both the numbers of texts as well as the tone 
of the coverage, one can observe that Russia was becoming an equally important 
reference point for energy debates across all three countries, though in each case at a 
different time and to a different extent (with the notable example of Jaunary 2006 and to 
an extent January 2009). January 2006 seems to have been a pivotal learning experience 
for policy communities in the three countries which made them more sceptical in 
relation to their perception of Russia – this is visible in Georgia (August 2008) as well 
as in January 2009. Arguably it was the crisis over Ukraine in the early 2014 (further 
explored in the next Chapter) which shows that Germany seems to have shifted quite a 
bit in terms of perception of Russia from ‘business as usual’ approach visible before the 









The qualitative and quantitative analysis of texts has generated nuanced responses to my 
second research-guiding question. The most important finding is that signs of 
convergence of energy discourses in terms of perceptions of threats - perception of 
Russian action. But to a limited extent in terms of proposed solutions - EU – helpful 
vehicle; this convergence however was only episodic. It would therefore contribute to 
the existing literature on comparative media analysis suggesting that similarities across 
discourses are observable predominantly within short spans, usually associated with 
particular, salient events (e.g. Constitutional Treaty debate; Eurozone crisis debate) 
rather than through an extended period of time (approach applied in this thesis). Short 
spans allow for a greater depth in research.  
Whether or not the EU is seen as the solution to the issue of insecurity of energy 
supplies depends on the national context and differs observably between all three 
national discourses. 
Results of the analysis seem to meet the expectation of an integrative potential of 
security. Common threat perceptions (or a least increasing similarity between them) 
concerning Russia started to develop, and in particular around the pivotal January 2006. 
In all three public debates I have observed that the perceptions of the Russian policies in 
the energy sphere started to change. They also started to be increasingly perceived as 
threats. A different starting point of this process has to be emphasised here. Whereas in 
Poland energy and perceptions of Russian actions have already at the beginning of the 
analysed period been tied to questions of national survival, the perceptions in the UK 
and Germany were gradually shifting. This also helps to explain the differences in the 
tone of the coverage of cooperation with Russia, seen most negatively in Poland 
whereas comparably similar (but also negatively) in the UK and in Germany. Analysis 
of all of the indicators has pointed to the January 2006 energy crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine as the crucial moment within the analysed period. Not only did the perceptions 
of problems converge, the perceptions of Russian policies also started to change in the 
long term. Russian actions were increasingly portrayed as a common European 
problem. This was the case of texts published in all of the newspapers. These texts were 
not however always published at the same time. It does not change the fact that changes 
and narrowing of differences were observable. Although the opinions of Russian actions 
were not always identical and tended to be influenced by the editorial stances of 
newspapers, they were still debated across national energy discourses. The identified 
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episodic convergence, observed in January 2006 not only changed the energy elite 
discourses in terms of numbers of texts; it was also a catalyst for change of the tone of 
the coverage and perception of Russian actions (in the long term). Again I have to 
underline that this perception was primarily towards Russian authorities, not citizens of 
the country as such. The coverage of the crisis over Ukraine in the early 2014 in the 
Russian media, observably driving popular nationalism in Russia, and the increase in 
popularity of Putin in the country, may indicate a change here. Within my timeframe, 
the fortresses Europe promoted (in particular in Polish and German texts) were 
excluding only Russian authorities, not Russia as a whole. The villain was personalised 
as Vladimir Putin and his administration or allies within the government, parliament, or 
in boards of directors of energy companies. 
These fortresses were something of a novel, taking into consideration the pre-1989 
discourse in the West about the Berlin Wall, ‘dividing Europe through concrete barriers, 
watchtowers and armed guards’ (Carr 2012: 11). The existing literature tends to focus 
on the discursive borders drawn to divide the ‘Islamic world’ and ‘the West’, along the 
lines of Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations (Eide, Kunelius, Phillips 2010). Other 
trends focus on the Schengen as borders of the Fortress Europe (Carr 2011), addressing 
different perceptions of migration to the European Union or even securitisation of the 
borders of the EU themselves (Neal 2009). Finally, borders are themes of the coverage 
of the EU enlargement process, in particular in reference to Turkey (Levin 2011). 
Results of this research therefore contribute to this literature with the picture of ‘Energy 
Fortress Europe’, created to contain the threat of Vladimir Putin's energy policies.   
The convergence in terms of solutions was less clear-cut, though preference for 
European cooperation was observed in all of the public debates, either explicitly pro-EU 
(in Poland and Germany) or implicitly and to a limited extent (the UK, The Times in 
particular). The UK discourse differs from two other, due to a limited presence of 
Europe.  
The points of higher media attention were linked with crises, usually identified as more 
‘newsworthy’ than other events (Galtung, Ruge 1965), with events in January 2006 and 
January 2009 equally ‘newsworthy’ in all three countries. These were however the only 
two instances of events which could be called ‘newsworthy’ at the same time across all 
three case studies. In other years the attention to various events has differed, though 
contents of the texts started to change, in particular in terms of the coverage of Russian 
actions and of the EU’s influence over the energy sphere. The results of the 
Eurobarometer surveys (Chapters 4 5, 6) however have shown that energy-related issues 
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were increasingly seen as important in all of the analysed countries. Energy appeared in 
the Eurobarometer polls only in 2007; my research did not look past the 1st of December 
2009. Applicability of the results of Eurobarometer polls is therefore of limited 
scientific value for this study. 
It is not clear how the elite newspaper discourse on energy will change in the future, 
particularly given the crisis in Ukraine which started in the late 2013. What the findings 
of this research suggest however, is that claiming securitisation of energy discourses is 
an oversimplification, contested in a detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
texts. National public discourses of the three analysed countries were not found to be 
influenced by securitisation, more by an increased politicisation.  
My research also shows an emerging common perception of Russia and the 
personalised villain – Vladimir Putin. Thus one can assume that any change at the top in 
the Kremlin could theoretically lead to a change of perceptions. This has already been 
observed at the time of the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev (2008 – 2012). The change 
of perception however was highly debatable and limited in its extent, in particular 
following the August 2008 events when Putin, not Medvedev was pictured as the key 
actor in the Kremlin, despite his shift to the post of Prime Minister.  
Convergence did occur in terms of defining problems; also episodic convergence was 
clearly observable and identified. Differences among all three cases however were much 
stronger throughout the decade. National discourses were predominantly affected by 
domestic dynamics. The study identifies different fortress story lines, different 
approaches to the EU institutions, different examinations of several key topics (i.e. 
climate change). The results therefore provide a much nuanced picture of energy 
discourses in the European Union, a picture suggesting that Europeanisation, although 
sometimes observable, was in fact very limited between 2000 and 2009, at least in terms 












Chapter 8 – Conclusions and avenues for further research 
 
This thesis starts with a comparison between the EU and the chaining of Gulliver by the 
Lilliputians, made in the 2001 European Commission Green Paper on Energy Security. 
The EU was (according to the authors of the text) a ‘giant’ chained by energy suppliers. 
The ambition for the ‘giant’ was to free himself from the dependence on supplies from 
the Middle East and Russia, through ‘geopolitical diversification’ (2001: 23). This was 
the beginning of what turned out to be a decade where resource security has slowly 
risen up the agendas of governments in Europe.    
 
Energy was until then predominantly seen through the lens of economy or environment. 
As the new century progressed, it was gradually pictured through the prism of security. 
Energy security started to become a key phrase of the decade, at least in terms of the 
energy discourse. But what was causing this insecurity? Following Ciuta (2010), in 
what sense is energy a security issue?  
 
This research was set within the changing context of European energy policies and 
energy security in the first decade of the 21st century. The context was changing through 
the influence of various factors, which I introduce in Chapter 2, and then analyse in 
more detail in Chapters 4 – 6. These included domestic features (e.g. liberalisation of 
the energy market in the UK or European integration in Poland); European factors (e.g. 
pursuit of the single market) and issues from outside of the EU (e.g. new Russian 
external energy policies). 
 
This study is a comparative analysis of public elite discourses in the United Kingdom, 
Poland and Germany. It focuses on energy and the way it was present in the elite 
newspaper discourses. My research was based on an extended sample (4596 texts) of 
newspaper articles from The Times and The Guardian (United Kingdom), Gazeta 
Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita (Poland) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Germany). For more detailed information on data collection, 
please see Chapter 3.3. 
 
This study offers an analysis from the point of what is behind the general attitudes 
towards energy security. This debate is relatively limited (in the existent literature), to 
221	  
	  
mention the noticeable examples of Ciuta (2009, 2010) or Kratochvil and Tichy (2013). 
The empirical research conducted in this thesis is discourse-immanent; it is only based 
on the elite discourse presented in mainstream broadsheet daily newspapers in three 
selected EU countries. It thus makes it a partial account. The results of my research 
could however be, just one part of the empirical building blocks of a wider analysis of 
energy security or European integration in the field of energy. Despite its limitations, 
the research contributes to broadening the knowledge over the influence of 
securitisation on national public discourses on energy.  
Through analysing a large sample of newspaper articles, I looked at two research-
guiding questions: (a) is the supply of energy threatened to the extent that extraordinary 
measures are necessary? (b)  do discourses converge across the three selected countries, 
and if so to what extent? 
 
Main findings 
In response to the first question, my analysis shows that national public discourses are 
not influenced by securitisation. I have assessed the existing approaches to 
securitisation (Chapter 2.2.3) and based my observations on the empirical evidence 
provided in the analysis of national public discourses (Chapters 4 – 6). I have argued 
that single ‘securitising’ speech acts are not sufficient to detect securitisation. My 
research shows that although securitisation was not observed, what was clearly visible 
was the politicisation of resources and their supplies (including transit routes and 
pipelines). The increased politicisation of the energy debates was particularly visible at 
the times of political unrest in the Eastern part of the European continent, around the 
time of January 2006 and January 2009 (gas spats between Kyiv and Moscow) and 
August 2008 (Russian – Georgian conflict). Outside of these specific moments, it 
gradually increased throughout the decade in all three case studies, though at different 
times (usually associated with specific domestic issues) and to a different extent (see 
Chapters 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3 for more details).   
 
However, an increased saliency of politicisation of debates in the energy field was not 
observed at the time of political unrest in producer regions (e.g. 2003 invasion of Iraq) 
or at the time of oil price spikes (year 2008). This may imply influence of geopolitics 
(epitomised by the New Cold War narrative) and a bigger focus on the near 
neighbourhood (Ukraine) than on the Middle East (Iraq, despite the presence of UK and 
Polish troops). It also suggests that contrary to the American-based scholarship on 
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energy security (see Chapter 1 for a literature overview) the conflict in Iraq was not 
equally debated in Europe as an element of the energy field (at least in the analysed 
newspapers) as it was on the other side of the Atlantic. 
 
The research also shows differences between case studies in terms of the presence of 
energy security. The samples were not equal; energy security (and security language in 
general) was more discernible in the Polish case (Chapter 5) than in the others. Energy 
security overall seemed to ebb and flow in the energy discourses throughout the decade. 
However a division into years 2000 – 2004 and 2005 – 2009, with the latter period 
showing more references to energy security (see Figure 26), seems to suggest that the 
presence of security was on the increase (see Chapter 7.1 for more details).    
 
Contribution to research 
This thesis contributes to the existing research on securitisation. Its particular 
contribution is to the debate on securitisation vs. politicisation in the energy field. I 
argue that what we can observe is in fact politicisation, which contributes to the work of 
McGowan (2011) and Bosse (2011). 
 
Convergence was the second key aspect of this research. In Chapter 2.1.4 I have defined 
convergence as the process of the narrowing of differences amongst different entities 
over time. This is one of the reasons why my research looks at an extended period of 
time (years 2000 – 2009). I focused on two aspects – on definition of problems and on 
proposed solutions, or to be more specific, on the way how both were converging over 
time. In order to measure convergence, I used three indicators. I first looked at 
discursive events, the tone of the coverage of Russian policies in the field of energy, and 
the coverage of the EU, with particular focus on the frames of benefits and 
disadvantages. I identified Russia and the European Union as key actors in the 
European energy field (see Chapter 2.3.4 and Chapter 2.3.5), making the perceptions of 
both important for the assessment of convergence. My research shows an increasingly 
negative perception of Russian policies in the area of European energy and in particular 
from 2006. The tone however was not equal across all three case studies, with Polish 
case being far more negative than the two others (see Figure 32). With the notable 
exceptions of January 2006 and January 2009 - two short-term energy spats where 
convergence was easiest to identify (hence the label of episodic convergence), my 
research shows an increasing similarity outside of the events, though not occurring at 
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the same time nor to the same degree. Russia was increasingly pictured in a negative 
light (albeit not equal to the terms of frequencies in all three cases; see Chapter 7.2) 
whereas the EU was increasingly pictured as a helpful vehicle, though again not to the 
same extent in all three countries (also Chapter 7.2). By using the adverb ‘increasingly’ 
I refer to both indicators increasing (negative tone of Russia, EU as a platform to 
address energy-field dilemmas) over time. Examples of episodic convergence were the 
most important moments over time, as it was there that the negative tone of Russia and 
the beneficial tone of the EU were almost equally salient in different countries at the 
same time. The research produces enough empirical evidence to suggest that signs of 
gradual convergence over time (though neither at the same time nor to the same degree) 
were observable, particularly in the second part of the analysed decade i.e. from 2005. 
 
Where does Europeanisation fit into all of this? In the first chapter I suggested that my 
research seeks to contribute to the on-going debate about the Europeanisation of 
publicised discourse as a feature strengthening governance in the European Union. I do 
this by exploring national public debates about issues of key importance for the 
European integration project (also visible in della Porta and Caiani 2006; Stiff et al. 
2007). Europeanisation of discourses is not necessarily the same as Europeanisation of 
public spheres. It does not however mean that both concepts are completely separate. 
Europeanisation of discourses is based on the analysis on the system of interaction at 
the domestic level as well as on whether the EU affects this system of interaction (and if 
it does so – how?) (Radaelli and Franchino 2004: 948). Europeanisation of public 
spheres assumes that either the same themes are debated at the same time at similar 
levels of attention across different national public spheres, or when the debates are 
similar in terms of the language, frames of reference, or patterns of interpretation. The 
third condition, as set out by Risse (2010: 125-156) relates to the emergence of a 
transnational community of communication, with the regular participation of national or 
European speakers in cross-border debates, when speakers and listeners recognise each 
other as legitimate participants in transnational discourses, or when particular issues are 
framed as common European problems.  
 
In this research I use elements of both approaches in order to set out one version of 
Europeanisation that links with similar meaning structures across borders and which 
shows growing support for a European solution. My approach therefore is not exactly 
the same as the one set out by Risse (2010) as it does not look at the emergence of an 
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Europeanised, transnational community of communication. The results of this research 
could however be used to partly explain the building blocks of such community, by 
identifying how and when structures that are similar in meaning are observable in the 
discourses and by showing that in case of the energy field (and based on the analysis of 
dominant broadsheet newspapers in three EU countries) there are signs which may 
suggest that there is growing support for European (energy) solutions.  In the words of 
Arthur Conan Doyle (1887: 27), ‘It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. 
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts’. My 
research was not about Europeanisation of public spheres per se; however its results do 
contribute to the existing body of knowledge. 
 
The results of my research provide helpful insight into the debate over the prospects of a 
common approach towards EU energy policy as well as towards an energy relationship 
between the EU and the Russian Federation. My research points to the conclusion that 
the EU can be seen as a solution to the problems faced by EU Member States in the 
energy field, which is relevant to the existent theories of European integration. The 
results of my research appear to suggest what I have argued in Chapter 1, that energy 
was one of the few sectors where integration (in terms of policies) has actually 
continued, despite the enlargement fatigue (particularly visible after the 2004 
enlargement). Without arguing that the EU is going towards a common and integrated 
energy policy, my findings are relevant for understanding the prospects for more 
common policies vis-à-vis Russia, in particular in the field of energy. My research 
shows the particular power of events, as shown by the episodes of January 2006 and 
January 2009 (and to an extent, August 2008).  
 
I must however underline that these conclusions are based only on the analysis of a 
limited number of broadsheet newspapers in only three EU Member States. These 
conclusions provide only a partial account, but they can however contribute to a larger 
empirical study of the problems discussed here.   
 
Future outlook 
We can be rather pessimistic about the future. Results of this research paint a very bleak 
picture for the future of European energy policy, in particular in its external aspect, 
which is linked with the EU foreign policy in relation to its eastern neighbourhood and 
Russia. EU Member States appear to perceive problems in a very similar manner, but 
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this is more a reflection of a changing perception of Russia (the main energy supplier) 
rather than a genuine change of perceptions of the problem(s). The analysis of 10 years 
of national elite energy discourses helps to understand why European integration in the 
energy sphere has failed to materialise (but why it also did not stall), even though it was 
one of the cornerstones of the European project (European Coal and Steel Community). 
Domestic factors and national dynamics are more important than those which are pan – 
European. Member States do not seem to be genuinely interested in ‘Europeanising’ 
energy; the European Union is (usually) not seen as an ultimate ‘solution’ to energy – 
related challenges; this changes - but only in a short term, and when linked with a 
significant event, such as the energy spats or the Russian intervention in Georgia. In 
fact, it is easier to show differences in perceptions between the EU MS, than 
convergence. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, I found only one instance 
of episodic convergence, and it was associated with the most salient energy – related 
event in Europe since the 1973 oil crisis. In the case of two other potential events 
(August 2008, January 2009) the collected data was too limited to provide a more 
definite conclusion. Results of my research show that EU MS tend to disagree on a 
majority of energy – related issues, from the interest in a single market, to differences in 
terms of national energy mixes. This is ominous news, because energy is a sector which 
requires long-term planning, not short term solutions. Although EU MS seem to agree 
on the political level, on common initiatives (e.g. reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
according to the 20/20/20 plan, for more details see Chapter 2.3.5), analysis of 
discourses shows national discords with Brussels.  
Even though events in January 2006 have sparked an increased interest in energy 
imports from Russia, with diversification becoming one of the keywords of the second 
part of the decade, the lessons have remained relatively limited. The European Union is 
still getting 24% of its gas from the Russian Federation. The structure of the global gas 
market (further discussed in Chapter 2) and the reliance on pipelines means that it will 
still remain dependent on one dominant supplier. Some short-term improvements have 
been made (e.g. interconnectors; gas storage facilities) which should allow the 
mitigation of a potential repetition of January 2006 or January 2009 (when some EU 
MS had their gas supplies cut for almost two weeks), the long term perspective remains 
unchanged. Interconnectors are not a favourable solution to all EU MS. Spain is a 
particularly prominent example. It has the potential to become an LNG hub for Europe 
(terminals allowing receiving LNG tankers) but French companies keep opposing the 
creation of an interconnector through which gas could be transferred from Spain 
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onwards. One of the main reasons cited is the fear that it would lead to lower prices for 
consumers; something for which the French energy monopolies would not agree. 
Domestic factors still dominate in the energy sector, as they have in years 2000 – 2009. 
It is easier to show disagreements between EU MS than instances which could be 
interpreted as examples of convergence or Europeanisation, both on the levels of 
policies (e.g. disagreements over shale gas; interconnectors; use of coal; use of nuclear 
energy) as well as discourses. 
 
The conditions under which securitisation processes occur and how far they can go 
The main reference point of securitisation of energy (as observed in my research) was 
the perception of the threat of Russian energy policies. This perception, and the 
fortresses built around it and present in the analysed newspapers, were personalised 
around Vladimir Putin. This was a reflection of the leadership style presented by Putin, 
characterising him as a CEO of ‘Russia, Inc.’ (Hill and Gaddy 2013: 5). The 
interdependency of the Russian ruling elite was reflected in Vladimir Putin becoming 
the figure-face of Russian politics. Putin’s ‘telepopulism’ (Judah 2013) dominated 
various aspects of Russian politics domestically as well as internationally. Hill and 
Gaddy (2013) point to his ability to continuously re-define his own role, dependent on a 
situation, thus becoming the statist, the ‘history man’, the survivalist, the outsider, the 
free-marketer or the case officer. This was echoed in the perceptions of Russian policies 
present in the texts of all of the analysed newspapers. Russian policies in the energy 
sphere have been personalised, i.e. given a face, up to the point where ‘Russia-equals-
Putin’.  
 
The threat perception of Russian policies in the energy sphere was not only formed and 
based on the interpretation of policies, but also in Putin’s speeches. One of the most 
vivid examples of this approach was Putin’s speech in 2005, where he stated that the 
collapse of the USSR was ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe’ of the 20th century. 
This, combined with his remarks at the Munich security conference in 2007 where Putin 
criticised US foreign policy were interpreted in the frames of the New Cold War 
narrative as a return to a neo-imperialist policy of Russia (Trenin 2011: 27). I give these 
examples to show how the elite newspapers were reinforcing the existing clichés about 
Russia, Russian history (dominated by one man rule) and Russian politics in order to 
make sense of on-going news. This was a reflection of the news reporting as ‘structured 
both by the geo-political interests, political cultures and collective memories of different 
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nations’ (Eide Kunelius, Phillips: 2008: 13). The securitisation of the national public 
debates was therefore based on a ‘preferred reading’ of them by the elite press.  
 
An analysis of the degree of personalisation of the reading of the Russian threat 
suggests that this may only be a temporary phenomenon. The period of Medvedev’s 
presidency (years 2008 – 2012) has shown signs of different reading of events, in 
particular of his rapprochement with the US and the European Union. The presidency 
however was dominated by debates on whether Vladimir Putin would return as 
president from 2012. His return and failed expectations about the change of the regime 
have led to the label of Medvedev’s term as ‘servant Medvedev’ (Judah 2013: 169).  
 
Consequently, a regime change in the Kremlin may lead to de-securitisation of energy 
and to changing perceptions of Russian threats, still personalised by Putin in 2014. 
However, I must underline that localised interpretations may differ. Energy has been 
tied to national survival in Poland in the period prior to Putin’s presidency; hence the 
ties between security and energy may remain strong. The evidence collected suggests 
strong influence of Putin on the process of securitising energy, visible also in the case of 
the elite newspaper coverage of energy in the UK and in Germany. In some of the 
examples, the preferred readings have differed in interpretations between publications. 
De-personalisation of the perception of a Russian threat may therefore lead to the 
deconstruction of the identified fortresses.     
 
Securitisation processes were facilitated by specific crisis events, namely the January 
2006 and January 2009 Russia – Ukraine gas cuts. They were impacted by the external, 
and not the domestic aspects of energy. Although both events were associated with 
supply cuts, the fact that the UK and Germany have not experienced them directly 
suggests that processes of securitisation of energy may not necessarily be directly linked 
with energy itself. Thus a change of regime in the Kremlin may noticeably change the 
observed energy discourses. 
 
Limitations of this thesis 
This research is limited to national elite discourses, based on the analysis of texts from 
only six broadsheet newspapers from three different countries (two per country). These 
are not the only available resources. The results offered here provide only a partial 
account. The results of my study could however be one part of empirical building 
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blocks of a wider study on energy security, EU energy policy or on the relationship in 
relation to Russia. 
 
An analysis of a wider range of data (e.g. radio, TV, social media or tabloid papers) 
would have provided a wider picture and would have allowed for a more general 
analysis of the energy discourse. It is doubtful however that the conclusions would 
differ significantly. The arguments present in the TV or radio rarely differ from those 
published in daily broadsheet newspapers. Analysis of tabloids could have provided a 
new insight into the analysis, since they primarily focus on the coverage of domestic 
rather than international affairs. My analysis suggests that domestic dynamics play a 
more important role than the external. One of the major elements of Securitization 
Theory is an assessment of the impact a given ‘speech act’ has on the wider audience. 
An investigation of the impact on public opinion through surveys would have allowed 
the assessment of whether securitisation (which did not occur according to my research) 
had any impact on the wider audience. Interviews with policy communities would have 
added additional data which would have allowed exploration of the ‘speech acts’ in 
greater depth.  
 
This study could have involved more than descriptive statistics and could have actually 
tried to test the arguments through advanced statistics and different correlation tests. 
This however would have taken away space and time from the qualitative analysis of 
the texts, which was productive in terms of findings (as explored in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
7). It would also have involved an increased investment of my time and additional 
resources which could have greatly extended this research even further in time. 
 
The temporal structure of this research is another limitation of this study. Analysis of 
texts produced during a time span of 10 years allows the researcher to track the flow of 
the discourse; to see the bigger picture. On the other hand it limits the ability for a 
greater depth of the analysis, as a wider timeframe leads to a wider array of variables 
influencing it. 
 
Limitations of this thesis also stem from its research design and lack of deeper attention 
put to the relationship between security and climate change within the energy 
discourses. This issue has been addressed here, although with a limited scope. The main 
explanation for this has been the fact that energy is only one of the elements of the 
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climate change discourse. Its analysis would have affected the process of selecting and 
sampling material. This is why I decided to include only those elements of climate 
change which have crossed-over with the energy discourse. I do however believe that a 
complete analysis of securitisation of the climate change discourse would have provided 
an additional added value to the findings of this research. The narrative of climate 
change shows an observable case of synchronisation of narratives in the Western 
European Union Member States and almost complete divergence with the discourses in 
the post-2004 EU Members. Whereas in the cases of the United Kingdom and Germany 
the narratives did show signs of convergence, the Polish case almost rejected the global 
warming agenda in its entirety, underlining the importance of the domestic coal 
industry. A more detailed analysis, with the inclusion of a larger number of cases (e.g. 
two from the ‘old’ EU, two from the ‘new’ EU) could contribute to the existing 
literature of how a concept that was almost invisible before the Kyoto Agreements 
became the basis of redefinitions of energy mixes in Western European Union Member 
States. It has also been the approach towards the climate change agenda in less 
developed (thus unable to provide costly subventions to alternative energy resources) 
post-2004 Member States. An increasingly growing field of analysis is the climate 
change risk research, which also includes discourse analysis. It explores the limitations 
of the current scientific understanding of climate change, analyses perceptions of the 
public about the dangers coming from the changes of the climate. It also discusses the 
social and cultural processes intensifying and decreasing perceptions of climate change 
(Weingart, Engels, Pasengrau 2000; Lorenzoni, Pidgeon, O’Connor 2005; Carvalho, 
Burgess 2005; Smith 2005; Etkin, Ho 2007; Dahl 2011; Pidgeon 2012). An analysis of 
the securitisation of climate change would have greatly contributed to this growing area 
of discourse analysis of climate change.  
 
Finally, the sample could have been extended to a fourth EU Member State, promoting 
a different source of energy. The inclusion of France, a strong proponent of nuclear 
energy in Europe would have provided new avenues for the research, adding new 
dimensions to the perceptions of the threats in energy. Since the analysis of texts in my 
research has mainly shown a negative coverage of nuclear energy, inclusion of the 
French discourse could have significantly affected these observations.  
 
Future avenues for research 
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This research has shown many questions in need of further investigation. Firstly, the 
New Cold War narrative is a relatively new phenomenon observable in the discourse 
analysis. Although it has already attracted some scholarly attention (Ciuta 2010, Klinke 
2011) results of my research show its presence across different Member States public 
discourses. The narrative was initiated with Edward Lucas’s book in 2008 to interpret 
the processes in Russia since the end of Yeltsin’s presidency, gaining particular 
prominence since January 2006 onwards, as my research has shown. In the case of my 
research it has been only one of the outcomes of the content analysis of energy-related 
texts. My analysis has shown its particular salience in the energy elite discourse. The 
question that arises from the results of my analysis is on the presence of this narrative in 
the overall elite newspaper discourse on Russia in the mass media of European Union 
countries. My research has shown a growing change of perception of Russian policies in 
the energy sphere by European mainstream daily newspapers. Potential future research 
could build on the results of my research, accompanied by the already existing literature 
on the New Cold War narrative (as previously mentioned mainly in Ciuta 2010 and 
Klinke 2011) in order to track the process of development of this narrative, its 
applicability to other global crisis events (e.g. the Arab Spring, the Syria conflict), or 
differences in narrative between different public discourses. The return of Vladimir 
Putin to the Kremlin in 2012 coupled with a number of events (e.g. passing the 
Magnitsky Act in the US, the Edward Snowden affair and his stay in Russia, concerns 
about LGBT rights in Russia) and his policies in the international sphere have created a 
new political context for such research, especially in the light of events taking place in 
Ukraine in early 2014 (and the Russian annexation of Crimea).  
 
Another question raised by the results of my thesis is the growing saliency of 
environmental concerns, coupled with the climate change agenda. As I have shown in 
Chapter 6, that although environmental factors started to become part of the German 
political culture back in the 1970s, their presence in the discourses of other countries 
(Poland in particular) shows it to be a relatively fresh issue. Since climate change has 
become a reference point to energy security, at least in the cases of the UK (Chapter 4) 
and Germany (Chapter 6), this raises questions of the applicability of Securitization 
Theory to analyse environmental security. Although this has already been widely 
addressed, starting in Buzan (1991), the relationship between environmental security 
and climate change on the discursive level remains to be an undeveloped area of study. 
Mirroring the path offered by my research, a similar analysis over the process of 
231	  
	  
development of common understandings of climate change threats, and their 
relationship with different understandings of the environmental security (based on the 
existing literature, e.g. Barnett 2001; Dalby 2002) would undoubtedly contribute to the 
existing literature on climate change and discourse analysis (e.g. Detraz and Betsill 
2009).   
 
Gulliver still chained 
I started this thesis with a reference to Lemuel Gulliver, a giant chained by Lilliputians. 
The metaphor still remains valid in 2014 as it was in 2001. When it was first used, the 
chains were representing dependencies on external energy supplies from the Middle 
East, North Africa and from Russia. Thirteen years onwards, the analysis of the first 
decade of the 21st century shows that Gulliver’s metaphor is still valid in the case of the 
European Union. The only difference is that it becomes increasingly clear that Gulliver 
is not chained only by external Lilliputians. It also seems that some parts of the body of 
Gulliver – EU, its Member States, are happy with the giant remaining where he is. 
Although a lot has changed in terms of energy policies and discourses since Gulliver’s 
metaphor was first used in the European Commission’s Green Paper on Energy 
Security, the EU remains energy dependent, and it does not seem to have a common 





















This codebook is used to code articles selected on the basis of their relevance to 
‘energy’. Articles are taken from six broadsheet daily newspapers from Germany 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), Poland (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
Rzeczpospolita) and the United Kingdom (The Guardian, The Times).  
 
1. Unit of analysis: texts selected on the basis of limitations further explained below. 
These texts include reports, analyses, interviews, editorials, opinions and letters.  
 
2. Sample: it contains of the body of texts to be coded. Texts from Lexis-Nexis and 
other relevant websites (in particular newspaper archives) selected on the basis of a key 
word search ‘energy’ + ‘country’. A first diminution of the sample followed the 
selection of articles, which include the word ‘energy’ in the headline and then have 
three or more mentions in the body of text, and refer to the ‘country’ in the same 
paragraph. Sampled texts exclude newswires. A second diminution of the sample 
followed the removal of unrelated or redundant materials. I have eliminated all of the 
texts where the word appeared without any relationship to tbe body of the text, as a 
remark. I have also eliminated duplicates, obituaries, sports texts. 
For the purpose of the operationalisation of the tone regarding Russia, ‘energy’ 
+ ‘country’ sample was additionally limited by adding ‘Russia’. This created a sample 
allowing assessing the tone of texts with regards to Russia. 
 
3. Operationalising frequencies 
 
All articles selected on the basis of sampling ‘energy’ + ‘country’ will be put on the 
scale both in case of each country (assessing differences between two newspapers from 
each country) as well as in case of all analysed countries (assessing similarities and 
differences between countries).  
 




I will be looking for four main frames: economic consequences, geopolitics, 
environmental consequences, conflict, and attribution of responsibility. In order to 
assess the presence of a frame, the following questions will be asked:  
 Economic consequences: (1) is there a mention of financial losses or gains now 
or in the future? (2) is there a mention of costs/degrees of expense involved? (3) is there 
a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing  a course of action? 
Geopolitics: (1) does the story address the theme in terms of spatial threats? (2) 
does the text mention others in terms of space? (3) does it mention consequences of 
pursuing or not pursuing a course of action in terms of geopolitics? 
Environmental consequences: (1) does the story address the theme in terms of 
negative/positive consequences to the environment? (2) does the story make any 
reference to climate change or global warming? (3) does the story suggests pursuing 
renewable energy? 
Conflict: (1) does the story reflect disagreement between parties-individuals-
groups-countries? (2) does the party-individual-group-country reproach another? (3) 
does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue? (4) 
does the story refer to winners and losers? 
 
 
5. Operationalising perceptions 
 
The application of the focus of coverage will be used to construct a number of 
summative index scales for the following variables: the tone of coverage (negative vs. 
positive view of Russia), focus on beneficial vs. disadvantaging coverage of the EU, 
focus on actors. A total of 43 possible codes were identified for the actors’ variable, and 
34 codes for the focus variable. These were derived from the theoretical hypotheses of 
my research, as well as based on the initial lecture of the sampled material. 
 
I read through approximately 10% of the total sample, selected randomly, making sure 
to cover a similar share of texts from each of the countries. Specific stress was placed 
on the focus of each article, which is what were the topics raised by its author in the 
text. This allowed me to run a first verification of my research-guiding questions 
(seeing whether my research-guiding questions were reflected at all in the sampled 
material) as well as to get a general overview of material, arguments used, issues raised, 
actors introduced or quotes, etc. This initial study allowed me to advance with a more 
detailed coding scheme, which can be grouped into four different categories. The first 
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one includes energy resources (oil, gas, nuclear, renewables, fossil fuels), second 
focuses on their origins (Russia, Central Asia, Middle East). Third was about broader 
implications internationally (climate change, supplier and transit countries), and 
domestically (energy policies, energy security). Fourth group is about the European 
dimension (energy cooperation within the European Union).  
 
Tone of coverage – Russia 
This variable refers to negative and positive evaluations of Russia in the energy 
discourses. Adding all positive evaluations and then subtracting all negative evaluations 
computed the scale. The remaining focus codes were neutral. Values ranged from -2 
(very negative), -1 (somewhat negative), 0 (neutral), 1 (somewhat positive), +2 (very 
positive). Difference between 2 and 1 (and consequently -2 and -1) will be based on the 
number of arguments used for on against. In other words, if the text contains two or 
more positive/negative arguments about Russia in two separate sentences or paragraphs, 
it qualifies for 2/-2.  
 
Coverage of the EU: benefits vs. disadvantages 
This variable refers to the focus of coverage of the EU on benefits or disadvantages. 
Adding all EU-related issues and then subtracting all domestic-related issues computed 
the scale. Issues that not fit into either category were treated as neutral. Values could 
range from -2 (very disadvantaging), -1 (somewhat disadvantage), 0 (neutral), 1 
(somewhat beneficial), 2 (very beneficial). As in the case of analysing tone, more than 




This variable refers to actors either addressing particular topics within energy discourses 
or being referred to or quoted in the text. The final scale will be based on the overall 
number of references to particular actors first in case of each analysed country and then 
secondly in case of all countries taken together.  
 
COUNTRY    
1. Germany  
2. Poland  
3. United Kingdom  
  
NEWSPAPER   
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110. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  
120. Suddeutsche Zeitung  
210. Gazeta Wyborcza  
220. Rzeczpospolita  
310. The Guardian  
320. The Times  
  
TYPE OF THE ARTICLE  
1. Reporting  
2. Analysis  
3. Interview  
4. Editorial  
5. Opinion  
6. Letter  
  
LENGTH  
1. Short  
2. Medium  
3. Long  
  
WHAT IS THE ARTICLE ABOUT  
Code article’s two main topics  
  
Focus 1  
Focus 2  
  
Code article’s two main actors  
  
Actor 1  
Actor 2  
  
FRAME(S) PRESENT  
  
Frame 1  
Frame 2  
 
 
QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS – CODING SCHEME 
 
CODING – FRAMES 
 
1 – environmental consequences; 2 – economic consequences; 3 – geopolitics; 4 – 
conflict 
 
CODING – ACTORS 
 
010 – Journalist/Germany 
011 – Journalist/Poland 
012 – Journalist/United Kingdom 
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020 – Analyst/Germany 
021 – Analyst/Poland 
022 – Analyst/United Kingdom 
030 – Official/Germany 
031 – Official/Poland 
032 – Official/United Kingdom 
060 – EU official 
090 – Russia/officials 
091 – Ukraine/officials 
092 – Belarus/ officials 
093 – Norway/ officials 
094 – Middle Eastern states/ officials 
095 – Algeria/ officials 
501 – Energy companies 
601 – General public 
CODING – TOPICS 
What is the main focus of the article? 
 
710 – Nuclear, debate 
720 - Nuclear, in favor 
730 – Nuclear, against 
810 – Renewable energy 
910 – Fossil fuels 
1010 – Economic benefits 
1020 – Economic losses 
1110 – Gas, depletion 
1120 – Gas, imports 
1210 – Oil, depletion 
1220 – Oil, imports 
1310 – Climate change 
1410 –EU, cooperation with 
1510 – Cooperation with Russia 
1610 – Energy policies, in favor 
1810 – Energy security 
1910 – Energy resources, Russia 
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2010 – Energy resources, Central Asia 
2020 – Energy resources, Middle East 
2110 – Pipelines 
2210 – Energy transit, Ukraine 
2220 – Energy transit, Caucasus 
2310 – Energy prices 
2410 – Investments 
2510 – Domestic energy market 
2610 – Corruption 






Appendix 2. Results of the analysis of the UK case study 
	  
 
Table 1. Frequency of texts per month, data used in Chapter 4. 
 
Year Month The Guardian The Times 
2000 January 1 0 
 
February 2 1 
 
March 4 0 
 
April 0 0 
 
May 1 1 
 
June 2 1 
 
July 0 0 
 
August 0 0 
 
September 4 1 
 
October 3 0 
 
November 4 3 
 
December 4 1 
2001 January 1 0 
 
February 1 0 
 
March 2 4 
 
April 1 1 
 
May 1 0 
 
June 5 6 
 
July 3 2 
 
August 1 1 
 
September 1 0 
 
October 3 1 
 
November 4 0 
 
December 8 2 
2002 January 2 1 
 
February 3 4 
 
March 1 4 
 
April 1 2 
 
May 1 1 
 
June 1 1 
 
July 2 1 
 
August 0 0 
 
September 2 4 
 
October 3 0 
 
November 4 1 
 
December 3 1 
2003 January 2 2 
 
February 7 4 
 
March 1 2 
 
April 2 2 
 
May 0 0 
 




July 1 1 
 
August 3 1 
 
September 1 0 
 
October 2 1 
 
November 3 2 
 
December 3 0 
2004 January 1 2 
 
February 1 0 
 
March 0 4 
 
April 2 1 
 
May 2 2 
 
June 1 2 
 
July 1 3 
 
August 1 4 
 
September 2 6 
 
October 3 4 
 
November 4 0 
 
December 5 1 
2005 January 2 2 
 
February 1 4 
 
March 1 1 
 
April 3 1 
 
May 1 4 
 





August 2 2 
 
September 2 3 
 
October 4 6 
 
November 8 12 
 
December 5 9 
2006 January 8 8 
 
February 4 5 
 
March 3 8 
 
April 6 10 
 
May 7 12 
 
June 7 2 
 
July 10 12 
 
August 4 1 
 
September 3 7 
 
October 9 10 
 
November 5 3 
 
December 1 3 
2007 January 5 4 
 
February 3 2 
 
March 5 2 
 
April 2 3 
 
May 8 6 
 
June 7 3 
 
July 7 3 
 




September 2 1 
 
October 11 2 
 
November 6 5 
 
December 5 4 
2008 January 10 12 
 
February 8 7 
 
March 6 7 
 
April 2 4 
 
May 1 5 
 
June 11 9 
 
July 7 10 
 
August 15 10 
 
September 7 7 
 
October 8 4 
 
November 5 2 
 
December 4 4 
2009 January 6 5 
 
February 6 7 
 
March 8 8 
 
April 6 6 
 
May 3 2 
 
June 2 7 
 
July 4 4 
 
August 1 4 
 
September 4 0 
 
October 8 2 
 
November 7 8 
	  
Table 2. Tone of coverage of Russia, data used in Chapter 4. 
	  
Year Reporting Analysis Interview Opinion 
2000 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 
2003 -0.333 0 0 0 
2004 -0.333 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 
2006 -0.5 -0.333 0 -0.5 
2007 -0.333 0 0 -1 
2008 -0.5 0 -1 -2 
2009 0 0 0 -1 
 
Table 3. Frame of benefits and frame of disadvantages from cooperation with the 




Year Benefits Disadvantages None 
2000 1 1 0 
2001 0 1 5 
2002 6 0 3 
2003 0 0 5 
2004 0 0 1 
2005 2 4 4 
2006 3 3 7 
2007 2 3 5 
2008 3 2 5 
2009 0 1 1 
TOTAL 17 15 36 
	  
Table 4. Analysis of frames in the texts, data used in Chapter 4. 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 Other 
2000 1 1 0 0 2 
2001 2 3 0 0 2 
2002 0 5 0 0 0 
2003 1 3 2 0 2 
2004 0 3 0 0 1 
2005 1 5 2 0 0 
2006 0 2 3 5 0 
2007 1 4 3 5 0 
2008 4 3 2 4 1 
2009 2 5 1 1 0 
TOTAL 12 34 13 15 8 






Appendix 3. Results of the analysis of the Polish case study 
	  
Table 1. Frequency of texts per month, data used in Chapter 5. 
	  
Year Month Gazeta Wyborcza Rrzeczpospolita 
2000 January 8 6 
 
February 10 5 
 
March 4 10 
 
April 3 4 
 
May 5 2 
 
June 3 7 
 
July 4 7 
 
August 2 4 
 
September 4 9 
 
October 10 4 
 
November 6 7 
 
December 11 1 
2001 January 3 2 
 
February 6 7 
 
March 8 6 
 
April 4 4 
 
May 6 2 
 
June 2 6 
 
July 1 2 
 
August 7 3 
 
September 2 4 
 
October 2 5 
 
November 1 6 
 
December 4 3 
2002 January 7 3 
 
February 3 2 
 
March 8 4 
 
April 6 4 
 
May 6 3 
 
June 4 5 
 
July 1 1 
 
August 4 2 
 
September 10 2 
 
October 4 8 
 
November 2 2 
 
December 4 1 
2003 January 5 5 
 
February 4 6 
 
March 8 3 
 
April 2 2 
 
May 1 1 
 
June 4 1 
 




August 2 0 
 
September 4 6 
 
October 1 7 
 
November 4 5 
 
December 3 2 
2004 January 5 10 
 
February 2 10 
 
March 7 12 
 
April 1 5 
 
May 6 4 
 
June 3 7 
 
July 1 6 
 
August 5 7 
 
September 3 9 
 
October 4 16 
 
November 7 7 
 
December 10 7 
2005 January 3 3 
 
February 2 2 
 
March 9 10 
 
April 6 7 
 
May 2 3 
 
June 3 2 
 
July 7 8 
 
August 3 1 
 
September 10 7 
 
October 6 2 
 
November 1 5 
 
December 7 9 
2006 January 29 20 
 
February 15 11 
 
March 22 13 
 
April 8 7 
 
May 18 8 
 
June 6 7 
 
July 10 9 
 
August 4 4 
 
September 7 5 
 
October 10 17 
 
November 18 5 
 
December 9 3 
2007 January 14 16 
 
February 12 8 
 
March 20 17 
 
April 5 10 
 
May 8 8 
 
June 10 4 
 
July 4 8 
 
August 5 4 
 




October 18 7 
 
November 11 10 
 
December 9 19 
2008 January 11 18 
 
February 10 13 
 
March 8 6 
 
April 20 8 
 
May 15 20 
 
June 14 10 
 
July 5 8 
 
August 4 11 
 
September 25 12 
 
October 13 13 
 
November 10 11 
 
December 15 25 
2009 January 28 25 
 
February 12 4 
 
March 15 5 
 
April 10 3 
 
May 7 2 
 
June 4 5 
 
July 8 7 
 
August 3 1 
 
September 6 5 
 
October 7 2 
 
November 9 8 
 
Table 2. Tone of the coverage of Russia, data used in Chapter 5. 
 
Year Reporting Analysis Interview Opinion 
2000 -0.666 -1 0 -0.666 
2001 -0.230 0 -1 -0.333 
2002 -0.428 -0.333 0.2 0 
2003 -1 0 -1 -1 
2004 -0.555 -0.875 -1.333 -1 
2005 -0.461 -0.6 -1 -0.5 
2006 -1.020 -1.111 -1.6 -1.7 
2007 -0.909 -1.44 0 -1.333 
2008 -0.769 -1 -0.916 -1.705 
2009 -0.848 -1.307 -1 -2 
 





Year Benefits Disadvantages None 
2000 6 1 3 
2001 50 31 19 
2002 54 15 30 
2003 23 23 54 
2004 36 36 27 
2005 50 50 0 
2006 56 33 10 
2007 60 16 28 
2008 39 39 22 
2009 57 19 23 
TOTAL 187 107 88 
 
Table 4. Frame analysis. Data used in Chapter 5. 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 Other 
2000 1 3 1 0 3 
2001 2 2 1 0 1 
2002 0 4 0 1 1 
2003 0 3 1 1 3 
2004 0 4 4 1 4 
2005 0 8 5 0 8 
2006 0 3 10 4 3 
2007 3 6 8 7 6 
2008 6 5 6 5 8 
2009 1 5 9 6 5 





Appendix 4. Results of the analysis of the German case study 
	  







2000 January 15 7 
 
February 10 5 
 
March 8 4 
 
April 6 5 
 
May 11 5 
 
June 10 4 
 
July 5 5 
 
August 6 5 
 
September 9 7 
 
October 9 6 
 
November 5 4 
 
December 1 5 
2001 January 5 3 
 
February 15 5 
 
March 17 7 
 
April 11 3 
 
May 7 2 
 
June 14 6 
 
July 4 2 
 
August 2 1 
 
September 5 7 
 
October 3 4 
 
November 3 4 
 
December 5 1 
2002 January 5 3 
 
February 11 8 
 
March 1 3 
 
April 4 2 
 
May 5 5 
 
June 6 4 
 
July 6 4 
 
August 10 7 
 
September 10 12 
 
October 5 4 
 
November 9 7 
 
December 11 8 
2003 January 5 6 
 
February 13 4 
 
March 7 2 
 
April 8 3 
 
May 9 5 
 




July 7 6 
 
August 6 5 
 
September 7 5 
 
October 13 7 
 
November 12 8 
 
December 15 9 
2004 January 6 4 
 
February 3 2 
 
March 7 4 
 
April 3 2 
 
May 5 4 
 
June 19 3 
 
July 16 3 
 
August 4 3 
 
September 8 9 
 
October 7 5 
 
November 11 5 
 
December 18 4 
2005 January 12 7 
 
February 6 2 
 
March 8 2 
 
April 20 6 
 
May 7 5 
 
June 14 9 
 
July 12 7 
 
August 14 7 
 
September 22 6 
 
October 12 9 
 
November 12 8 
 
December 29 22 
2006 January 38 27 
 
February 20 17 
 
March 19 15 
 
April 33 12 
 
May 18 8 
 
June 14 5 
 
July 9 4 
 
August 8 4 
 
September 8 6 
 
October 16 9 
 
November 10 4 
 
December 9 2 
2007 January 15 16 
 
February 14 17 
 
March 7 8 
 
April 5 8 
 
May 5 9 
 
June 10 14 
 
July 6 8 
 




September 5 7 
 
October 9 7 
 
November 5 10 
 
December 6 8 
2008 January 20 7 
 
February 18 10 
 
March 15 8 
 
April 10 7 
 
May 10 6 
 
June 19 7 
 
July 12 5 
 
August 13 7 
 
September 14 10 
 
October 9 11 
 
November 12 9 
 
December 25 18 
2009 January 36 27 
 
February 6 15 
 
March 6 12 
 
April 8 9 
 
May 6 10 
 
June 7 8 
 
July 8 11 
 
August 9 9 
 
September 10 8 
 
October 8 8 
 
November 16 12 
 
Table 2. Tone of coverage of Russia, data used in Chapter 6. 
 
Year Reporting Analysis Interview Opinion 
2000 0 0 - -1 
2001 -0.071 -1 0 -1 
2002 0 0 0 1 
2003 0.095 -0.333 0 -0.4 
2004 -0.111 -0.2 0 -0.625 
2005 -0.108 -0.238 -1 -0.666 
2006 -0.111 -0.666 -1 -0.666 
2007 -0.2 -0.8 -1 -0.769 
2008 -0.285 -0.38 0 -0.46 
2009 -0.215 -0.571 0 -0.526 
	  
3. Benefits and disadvantages from cooperation with the EU, data used in Chapter 6. 
 
Year Benefits Disadvantages None 
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2000 12 2 6 
2001 14 4 2 
2002 20 5 4 
2003 9 2 3 
2004 5 1 0 
2005 7 1 4 
2006 37 8 5 
2007 20 4 7 
2008 44 7 7 
2009 17 2 2 
TOTAL 185 36 40 
	  
Table 4. Frame analysis, data used in Chapter 6. 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 Other 
2000 3 7 1 0 1 
2001 5 4 1 0 1 
2002 2 8 0 0 1 
2003 2 5 4 4 5 
2004 2 6 5 5 6 
2005 2 4 5 6 2 
2006 0 9 10 6 1 
2007 5 4 5 2 4 
2008 5 10 6 5 5 
2009 2 10 8 4 2 
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